Larcker & Tayan speculate, for example (footnotes omitted):
Researchers have long noted that the compensation of college football coaches has risen faster than the compensation of other university employees. According to one study, the compensation awarded to head coaches rose 500 percent between 1986 and 2007. By comparison, the compensation of university presidents rose 100 percent and the compensation of full professors only 30 percent over this period. Student athletes receive no compensation. As a result, the average head football coach of an NCAA Division I school earns three times the compensation of the average president, 17 times the salary of an assistant professor, and an infinite amount more than the average student athlete. The NCAA Act required that a university calculate and disclose these ratios for its own constituents.
They ask:
* If these requirements would not work in an athletic setting, should we expect them to work in business?
* Why are the governance provisions of Dodd-Frank legally required, rather than voluntarily adopted by individual companies?
* Why does Dodd-Frank place such emphasis on executive compensation and disclosure? Will its compensation requirements reduce governance failures?
