Showing archive for: “Harm to Competition”
Sher: Implications of the Draft Vertical Merger Guidelines for Vertical Mergers Involving Technology Start-Ups
[TOTM: The following is part of a symposium by TOTM guests and authors on the 2020 Vertical Merger Guidelines. The entire series of posts is available here. This post is authored by Scott Sher (Partner, Wilson Sonsini Goodrich & Rosati) and Matthew McDonald (Associate, Wilson Sonsini Goodrich & Rosati).] On January 10, 2020, the United ... Sher: Implications of the Draft Vertical Merger Guidelines for Vertical Mergers Involving Technology Start-Ups
Fruits: Messy Mergers and Muddled Guidelines (Or, “Orange You Glad I Didn’t Say Banana?”)
[TOTM: The following is part of a symposium by TOTM guests and authors on the 2020 Vertical Merger Guidelines. The entire series of posts is available here. This post is authored by Eric Fruits (Chief Economist, International Center for Law & Economics and Professor of Economics, Portland State University).] Vertical mergers are messy. They’re messy ... Fruits: Messy Mergers and Muddled Guidelines (Or, “Orange You Glad I Didn’t Say Banana?”)
Wright, Ginsburg, Lipsky and Yun: Connecting Vertical Merger Guidelines to Sound Economics
After much anticipation, the Department of Justice Antitrust Division and the Federal Trade Commission released a draft of the Vertical Merger Guidelines (VMGs) on January 10, 2020. The Global Antitrust Institute (GAI) will be submitting formal comments to the agencies regarding the VMGs and this post summarizes our main points. The Draft VMGs supersede the ... Wright, Ginsburg, Lipsky and Yun: Connecting Vertical Merger Guidelines to Sound Economics
Nuechterlein: Guidelines without Guidance on Vertical Mergers
[TOTM: The following is part of a symposium by TOTM guests and authors on the 2020 Vertical Merger Guidelines. The entire series of posts is available here. This post is authored by Jonathan E. Nuechterlein (Partner, Sidley Austin LLP; former General Counsel, FTC; former Deputy General Counsel, FCC).] [Nuechterlein: I represented AT&T in United States ... Nuechterlein: Guidelines without Guidance on Vertical Mergers
Debating the FTC v Qualcomm Amicus Brief, a Summary
Qualcomm is currently in the midst of a high-profile antitrust case against the FTC. At the heart of these proceedings lies Qualcomm’s so-called “No License, No Chips” (NLNC) policy, whereby it purportedly refuses to sell chips to OEMs that have not concluded a license agreement covering its underlying intellectual property. According to the FTC and ... Debating the FTC v Qualcomm Amicus Brief, a Summary
Exclusionary Pricing Without the Exclusion: Unpacking Qualcomm’s No License, No Chips Policy
Qualcomm is currently in the midst of a high-profile antitrust case against the FTC. At the heart of these proceedings lies Qualcomm’s so-called “No License, No Chips” (NLNC) policy, whereby it purportedly refuses to sell chips to OEMs that have not concluded a license agreement covering its underlying intellectual property. According to the FTC and ... Exclusionary Pricing Without the Exclusion: Unpacking Qualcomm’s No License, No Chips Policy
Why the FTC had to Abandon the Duty to Deal Argument Against Qualcomm
On November 22, the FTC filed its answering brief in the FTC v. Qualcomm litigation. As we’ve noted before, it has always seemed a little odd that the current FTC is so vigorously pursuing this case, given some of the precedents it might set and the Commission majority’s apparent views on such issues. But this ... Why the FTC had to Abandon the Duty to Deal Argument Against Qualcomm
Big Ink vs. Bigger Tech
[TOTM: The following is the fifth in a series of posts by TOTM guests and authors on the politicization of antitrust. The entire series of posts is available here.] This post is authored by Ramsi Woodcock, Assistant Professor, College of Law, and Assistant Professor, Department of Management at Gatton College of Business & Economics, University ... Big Ink vs. Bigger Tech
On the Antitrust Risks of Four to Three Mergers: A Case Study of a Potential ThyssenKrupp/Kone Merger
Today, Reuters reports that Germany-based ThyssenKrupp has received bids from three bidding groups for a majority stake in the firm’s elevator business. Finland’s Kone teamed with private equity firm CVC to bid on the company. Private equity firms Blackstone and Carlyle joined with the Canada Pension Plan Investment Board to submit a bid. A third ... On the Antitrust Risks of Four to Three Mergers: A Case Study of a Potential ThyssenKrupp/Kone Merger
Does Apple’s “Discrimination” Against Rival Apps in the App Store harm Consumers?
A spate of recent newspaper investigations and commentary have focused on Apple allegedly discriminating against rivals in the App Store. The underlying assumption is that Apple, as a vertically integrated entity that operates both a platform for third-party apps and also makes it own apps, is acting nefariously whenever it “discriminates” against rival apps through ... Does Apple’s “Discrimination” Against Rival Apps in the App Store harm Consumers?
The District Court’s FTC v. Qualcomm Decision Rests on Impermissible Inferences and Should Be Reversed
Last week the International Center for Law & Economics (ICLE) and twelve noted law and economics scholars filed an amicus brief in the Ninth Circuit in FTC v. Qualcomm, in support of appellant (Qualcomm) and urging reversal of the district court’s decision. The brief was authored by Geoffrey A. Manne, President & founder of ICLE, and ... The District Court’s FTC v. Qualcomm Decision Rests on Impermissible Inferences and Should Be Reversed
T-Mobile Sprints to the Finish Line: States Demand a Do-Over
The Department of Justice announced it has approved the $26 billion T-Mobile/Sprint merger. Once completed, the deal will create a mobile carrier with around 136 million customers in the U.S., putting it just behind Verizon (158 million) and AT&T (156 million). While all the relevant federal government agencies have now approved the merger, it still ... T-Mobile Sprints to the Finish Line: States Demand a Do-Over
