Showing archive for: “Consumer Welfare Standard”
The Future of the DMA: Judge Dredd or Juror 8?
When it was passed into law, the European Union’s Digital Markets Act (DMA) was heralded by supporters as a key step toward fairness and contestability in online markets. It has unfortunately become increasingly clear that reality might not live up to those expectations. Indeed, there is mounting evidence that European consumers’ online experiences have been ... The Future of the DMA: Judge Dredd or Juror 8?
Antitrust at the Agencies Roundup: The Supply Chain, Part Deux
But First, Money Makes the World Go ‘Round For all my carping about this or that program or enforcement matter, it seems to me a very good thing that Congress passed—and President Joe Biden signed into law—the spending package that will keep much of the federal government up and running for Fiscal Year 2024 (see ... Antitrust at the Agencies Roundup: The Supply Chain, Part Deux
US v. Apple Lawsuit Has Big Implications for Competition and Innovation
The lawsuit filed yesterday by the U.S. Justice Department (DOJ) against Apple for monopolization of the U.S. smartphone market (joined by 15 states and the District of Columbia) has big implications for American competition and innovation. At the heart of the complaint is the DOJ’s assertion that: [Apple’s] anticompetitive acts include, but are not limited ... US v. Apple Lawsuit Has Big Implications for Competition and Innovation
The FTC Should Not Enact a Deceptive or Unfair Marketing Earnings-Claims Rule
Back in February 2022, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) announced an advance notice of proposed rulemaking (ANPRM) on “deceptive or unfair earnings claims.” According to the FTC: [The Deceptive or Unfair ANPRM was aimed at] challenging bogus money-making claims used to lure consumers, workers, and prospective entrepreneurs into risky business ventures that often turn into ... The FTC Should Not Enact a Deceptive or Unfair Marketing Earnings-Claims Rule
A European Commission Challenge to iRobot’s Acquisition Is Unjustified and Would Harm Dynamic Competition
Once again, a major competition agency, the European Commission, appears poised to take an anticompetitive enforcement action—in this case, blocking Amazon’s acquisition of consumer robotic-manufacturer iRobot. iRobot, headquartered in Bedford, Massachusetts, is an American success story: Founded in 1990 by Massachusetts Institute of Technology roboticists with the vision of making practical robots a reality, iRobot ... A European Commission Challenge to iRobot’s Acquisition Is Unjustified and Would Harm Dynamic Competition
In Reforming Its Antitrust Act, Argentina Should Not Ignore Its Institutional Achilles Heel
As part of a set of “shock therapy” measures introduced to deregulate and stabilize its economy, the Argentinian government led by newly elected President Javier Milei has already adopted an emergency decree (Decreto de Necesidad y Urgencia) that makes broad array of legal changes. Toward the same goal, the government in late December sent up ... In Reforming Its Antitrust Act, Argentina Should Not Ignore Its Institutional Achilles Heel
A Consumer-Welfare-Centric Reform Agenda for the Federal Trade Commission
As we approach a presidential election year, it is time to begin developing a comprehensive reform agenda for the Federal Trade Commission (FTC). In that spirit, this post proposes 12 reforms that could be implemented by new leadership, either through unilateral action by a new chair or (in some cases) majority votes of the commission. ... A Consumer-Welfare-Centric Reform Agenda for the Federal Trade Commission
When Progress Is Regressive: The Ordo-Brandeisian Devolution
It is no coincidence that ordoliberalism—the European (originally German) alternative to classical liberalism that emphasized the importance of the “social market” economy—and the New Brandeis or “neo-Brandeisian” movement, which harkens back to the Progressive Era thought of the late U.S. Supreme Court Justice Louis Brandeis, both are enjoying comebacks simultaneously. The effects of these ideological ... When Progress Is Regressive: The Ordo-Brandeisian Devolution
Market Power as a Limiting Principle in Merger Enforcement
One of the most important changes in the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) and U.S. Justice Department’s (DOJ) draft merger guidelines is the abandonment of market power as the central element of merger enforcement. The “unifying theme” of the 2010 horizontal merger guidelines was that “mergers should not be permitted to create, enhance, or entrench market ... Market Power as a Limiting Principle in Merger Enforcement
I, For One, Welcome Our New FTC Overlords
In this post—the last planned post for this symposium on The FTC’s New Normal (though we will continue to accept unsolicited submissions of responses)—I will offer some summary of the ideas that have been shared here over the past month, before turning to some of my own thoughts. To keep your attention rapt, I will ... I, For One, Welcome Our New FTC Overlords
The Changing Role of Structural Presumption at the Federal Trade Commission
The draft merger guidelines that were released July 19 by the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) and U.S. Justice Department (DOJ) indicate a shift by the agencies toward an overreliance on structural market factors to trigger merger scrutiny. For example, Draft Guideline 1—titled “Mergers Should Not Significantly Increase Concentration in Highly Concentrated Markets”—would lower the bar ... The Changing Role of Structural Presumption at the Federal Trade Commission
Draft Merger Guidelines Do Not ‘Return Antitrust to a Sound Economic and Legal Foundation’ – A Response to Professor Kwoka
In a recently published article in ProMarket, John Kwoka of Northeastern University (who “worked on the draft Merger Guidelines while serving at the Federal Trade Commission as chief economist to the chair in 2022”) asserts that the U.S. Justice Department (DOJ) and Federal Trade Commission’s (FTC) draft merger guidelines aim to improve “deficient merger enforcement” ... Draft Merger Guidelines Do Not ‘Return Antitrust to a Sound Economic and Legal Foundation’ – A Response to Professor Kwoka
