Archives For consumer financial protection bureau

There has been plenty of Hurricane Irene blogging, and some posts linking natural disasters to various aspects of law and policy (see, e.g. my colleague Ilya Somin discussing property rights and falling trees).   Often, post-natural disaster economic discussion at TOTM turns to the perverse consequences of price gouging laws.  This time around, the damage from the hurricane got me thinking about the issue of availability of credit.  In policy debates in and around the new CFPB and its likely agenda — which is often reported to include restrictions on payday lending — I often take up the unpopular (at least in the rooms in which these debates often occur) position that while payday lenders can abuse consumers, one should think very carefully about incentives before going about restricting access to any form of consumer credit.  In the case of payday lending, for example, proponents of restrictions or outright bans generally have in mind a counterfactual world in which consumers who are choosing payday loans are simply “missing out” on other forms of credit with superior terms.  Often, proponents of this position rely upon a theory involving particular behavioral biases of at least some substantial fraction of borrowers who, for example, over estimate their future ability to pay off the loan.  Skeptics of government-imposed restrictions on access to consumer credit (whether it be credit cards or payday lending) often argue that such restrictions do not change the underlying demand for consumer credit.  Consumer demand for credit — whether for consumption smoothing purposes or in response to a natural disaster or personal income “shock” or another reason — is an important lubricant for economic growth.  Restrictions do not reduce this demand at all — in fact, critics of these restrictions point out, consumers are likely to switch to the closest substitute forms of credit available to them if access to one source is foreclosed.  Of course, these stories are not necessarily mutually exclusive: that is, some payday loan customers might irrationally use payday lending while better options are available while at the same time, it is the best source of credit available to other customers.

In any event, one important testable implication for the economic theories of payday lending relied upon by critics of such restrictions (including myself) is that restrictions on their use will have a negative impact on access to credit for payday lending customers (i.e. they will not be able to simply turn to better sources of credit).  While most critics of government restrictions on access to consumer credit appear to recognize the potential for abuse and favor disclosure regimes and significant efforts to police and punish fraud, the idea that payday loans might generate serious economic benefits for society often appears repugnant to supporters.  All of this takes me to an excellent paper that lies at the intersection of these two issues: natural disasters and the economic effects of restrictions on payday lending.  The paper is Adair Morse’s Payday Lenders: Heroes or Villians.    From the abstract:

I ask whether access to high-interest credit (payday loans) exacerbates or mitigates individual financial distress. Using natural disasters as an exogenous shock, I apply a propensity score matched, triple difference specification to identify a causal relationship between access-to-credit and welfare. I find that California foreclosures increase by 4.5 units per 1,000 homes in the year after a natural disaster, but the existence of payday lenders mitigates 1.0-1.3 of these foreclosures. In a placebo test for natural disasters covered by homeowner insurance, I find no payday lending mitigation effect. Lenders also mitigate larcenies, but have no effect on burglaries or vehicle thefts. My methodology demonstrates that my results apply to ordinary personal emergencies, with the caveat that not all payday loan customers borrow for emergencies.

To be sure, there are other papers with different designs that identify economic benefits from payday lending and other otherwise “disfavored” credit products.  Similarly, there papers out there that use different data and a variety of research designs and identify social harms from payday lending (see here for links to a handful, and here for a recent attempt).  A literature survey is available here.  Nonetheless, Morse’s results remind me that consumer credit institutions — even non-traditional ones — can generate serious economic benefits in times of need and policy analysts must be careful in evaluating and weighing those benefits against potential costs when thinking about and designing restrictions that will change incentives in consumer credit markets.

There is an embarrassing blind spot in the behavioral law and economics literature with respect to implementation of policy whether via legislation or administrative agency.  James Cooper and William Kovacic — both currently at the Federal Trade Commission as Attorney Advisor Commissioner, respectively — aim to fill this gap with a recent working paper entitled “Behavioral Economics: Implications for Regulatory Behavior.”  The basic idea is to combine the insights of public choice economics and behavioral economics to explore the implications for behavioral regulation at administrative agencies and, in particular given their experiences, a competition and consumer protection regulator.

Here is the abstract:

Behavioral economics (BE) examines the implications for decision-making when actors suffer from biases documented in the psychological literature. These scholars replace the assumption of rationality with one of “bounded rationality,” in which consumers’ actions are affected by their initial endowments, their tastes for fairness, their inability to appreciate the future costs, their lack of self-control, and general use of flawed heuristics. We posit a simple model of a competition regulator who serves as an agent to a political overseer. The regulator chooses a policy that accounts for the rewards she gets from the political overseer – whose optimal policy is one that focuses on short-run outputs that garner political support, rather than on long-term effective policy solutions – and the weight she puts on the optimal long run policy. We use this model to explore the effects of bounded rationality on policymaking, with an emphasis on competition and consumer protection policy. We find that flawed heuristics (e.g., availability, representativeness, optimism, and hindsight) and present bias are likely to lead regulators to adopt policies closer to those preferred by political overseers than they otherwise would. We argue that unlike the case of firms, which face competition, the incentive structure for regulators is likely to reward regulators who adopt politically expedient policies, either intentionally (due to a desire to please the political overseer) or accidentally (due to bounded rationality). This sample selection process is likely to lead to a cadre of regulators who focus on maximizing outputs rather than outcomes.

Here is a little snippet from the conclusion, but please go do read the whole thing:

The model we present shows that political pressure will cause rational regulators to choose policies that are not optimal from a consumer standpoint, and that in a large number of circumstances regulatory bias will exacerbate this tendency. Our analysis also suggests special caution when attempting to correct firm behavior as regulatory bias appears likely more durable than firm bias because the market provides a much stronger feedback mechanism than exists in the regulatory environment. To the extent that we can de-bias regulators – either through a greater use of internal and external adversarial review or by making a closer nexus between outcomes and rewards – they will become more effective at welfare-enhancing interventions designed to correct biases.

Thinking about the implications of behavioral economics at the regulatory level is incredibly important for competition and consumer protection policy (think CFPB, for example).  And I’m very happy to see scholars of Cooper and Kovacic’s caliber — not to mention real world agency experience to bring to bear on the problem — tackling it.   For full disclosure purposes, I should note that I have or am currently co-authoring with each of them.  But don’t hold that against them!  Its a thought provoking paper upon which I will have some more thoughts later on, as well as tying it in to some of the work I’ve done on behavioral economics.  For example, Judd Stone and I explore a related problem of the implications of firm level irrationality — both for incumbents and entrants — in this piece, and find the implications for antitrust policy less clear (and in some cases, absent) than have behavioral antitrust proponents.  See also Stone’s post during the TOTM Free to Choose Symposium on BE and Administrative Agencies.

In the Huffington Post, Marcus Baram warns against those who claim to be concerned about over-regulation on Wall Street and in the consumer protection sphere.  Baram writes:

Today, Wall Street is again on the attack against a regulatory overhaul that includes more stringent investor and consumer protections. Though the financial landscape is far different and the details of the proposals have changed since 1912, the industry is using much of the same alarmist rhetoric to oppose new regulations and rules.

JPMorgan chairman Jamie Dimon recently complained that proposed rules on derivatives, capital buffers and too-big-to-fail banks are bad for America. Wall Street could lose customers to European banks, he said.

Baram includes economist, and my co-author, David S. Evans in his list of those “crying wolf” over over-regulation:

At a congressional hearing on the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, banking consultant David S. Evans attacked the “hard paternalism” of its interim director Elizabeth Warren. He cautioned that the bureau “could make it harder and more expensive for consumers to borrow money.”

Such Cassandra-like warnings are common in the history of financial regulation.

I think Baram might want to have this one back if given the chance.  His point is that the Dimon and David Evans and others are concerned about imposing an enormous regulatory burden are wrong.  Of course, I am no scholar of Greek mythology, but I seem to recall that Cassandra was right!  Her curse was that nobody believed her accurate predictions about the future.  Baram may have stumbled upon something here.

But more seriously, at a time when the unemployment rate is over 9%, when the intellectual architects of the CFPB were quite frank about favoring a regulatory approach that would restrict access to consumer credit (see here), and when the flow of credit is critical to economic growth and recovery, one has to be pretty deeply committed to the cause to so brazenly ignore predictions that massive regulatory structure just might hold the economy back.

Evans’ testimony at the House Hearing on the CFPB is available here.

Daniel Kahnemann and co-authors discuss, in the most recent issue of the Harvard Business Review (HT: Brian McCann), various strategies for debiasing individual decisions that impact firm performance.  Much of the advice boils down to more conscious deliberation about decisions, incorporating awareness that individuals can be biased into firm-level decisions, and subjecting decisions to more rigorous cost-benefit analysis.  The authors discuss a handful of examples with executives contemplating this or that decision (a pricing change, a large capital outlay, and a major acquisition) and walk through how thinking harder about recognizing biases of individuals responsible for these decisions or recommendations might be identified and nipped in the bud before a costly error occurs.

Luckily for our HBS heroes they are able to catch these potential decision-making errors in time and correct them:

But in the end, Bob, Lisa, and Devesh all did, and averted serious problems as a result. Bob resisted the temptation to implement the price cut his team was clamoring for at the risk of destroying profitability and triggering a price war. Instead, he challenged the team to propose an alternative, and eventually successful, marketing plan. Lisa refused to approve an investment that, as she discovered, aimed to justify and prop up earlier sunk-cost investments in the same business. Her team later proposed an investment in a new technology that would leapfrog the competition. Finally, Devesh signed off on the deal his team was proposing, but not before additional due diligence had uncovered issues that led to a significant reduction in the acquisition price.

The real challenge for executives who want to implement decision quality control is not time or cost. It is the need to build awareness that even highly experienced, superbly competent, and well intentioned managers are fallible. Organizations need to realize that a disciplined decision-making process, not individual genius, is the key to a sound strategy. And they will have to create a culture of open debate in which such processes can flourish.

But what if they didn’t?  Of course, the result would be a costly mistake.  The sanction from the marketplace would provide a significant incentive for firms to act “as-if” rational over time.  As Judd Stone and I have written (forthcoming in the Cardozo Law Review), the firm itself can be expected to play a critical role in this debiasing:

Economic theory provides another reason for skepticism concerning predictable firm irrationality. As Armen Alchian, Ronald Coase, Harold Demsetz, Benjamin Klein, and Oliver Williamson (amongst others) have reiterated for decades, the firm is not merely a heterogeneous hodgepodge of individuals, but an institution constructed to lower transaction costs relative to making use of the price system (the make or buy decision). Firms thereby facilitate specialization, production, and exchange. Firms must react to the full panoply of economic forces and pressures, responding through innovation and competition. To the extent that cognitive biases operate to deprive individuals of the ability to choose rationally, the firm and the market provide effective mechanisms to at least mitigate these biases when they reduce profits.

A critical battleground for behaviorally-based regulatory intervention, including antitrust but not limited to it, is the question of whether agencies and courts on the one hand, or firms on the other, are the least cost avoiders of social costs associated with cognitive bias.  Stone & Wright argue in the antitrust context — contrary to the claims of Commissioner Rosch and other proponents of the behavioral approach — that the claim that individuals are behaviorally biased, and that because firms are made up of individuals, they too must be biased, simply does not provide intellectual support for behavioral regulation.  The most obvious failure is that it lacks the comparative institutional perspective described above.  Most accounts favoring greater implementation of behavioral regulation at the agency level glide over this question.  Not all, of course.

For example, Commissioner Rosch has offered the following response to the “regulators are irrational-too” critique:

My problem with this criticism is that it ignores the fact that, unlike human beings who make decisions in a vacuum, government regulators have the ability to study over time how individuals behave in certain settings (i.e., whether certain default rules provide adequate disclosure to help them make the most informed decision). Thus, if and to the extent that government regulators are mindful of the human failings discussed above, and their rules are preceded by rigorous and objective tests, it is arguable that they are less likely to get things wrong than one would predict. Of course, it may be the case that the concern with behavioral economics is less that regulators are imperfect and more than they are subject to political biases and that behavioral economics is simply liberalism masquerading as economic thinking.24 My response to that is that political capture is everywhere in Washington and that to the extent behavioral economics supports “hands on” regulation it is no more political than neoclassical economics which generally supports “hands off” regulation. On a more serious note, perhaps the best way behavioral economics could counter this critique over the long run would be to identify ways in which the insights from behavioral economics suggest regulation that one would not expect from a “left-wing” legal theory.

For my money, I find this reply altogether unconvincing.  It amounts to the claim that government agencies can be expected to have a comparative advantage over firms in ameliorating the social costs of errors.  The fact that government regulators might “get things wrong” less often than one might predict is besides the point.  The question is, again, comparing the two relevant institutions: firms in the marketplace and government agencies.  “We’re the government and we’re here to help” isn’t much of an answer to the appropriate question here.  There are further problems with this answer.  As I’ve written in response to the Commissioner’s claims:

But seriously, human beings making decisions “in a vacuum?”  It is individuals and firms who are making decisions insulated from market forces that create profit-motive and other incentives to learn about irrationality and get decisions right — not regulators?   The response to the argument that behavioral economics is simply liberalism masquerading as economic thinking (by the way, the argument is not that, it is that antitrust policy based on behavioral economics has not yet proven to be any more than simply interventionism masquerading as economic thinking — but I quibble) is weak.

As calls for behavioral regulation become more common, administrative agencies are built upon its teachings, or even more aggressive claims that behavioral law and economics can claim intellectual victory over rational choice approaches, it is critical to keep the right question in mind so that we do not fall victim to the Nirvana Fallacy.  The right comparative institutional question is whether courts and agencies or the market is better suited to mitigate the social costs of errors.   The external discipline imposed by the market in mitigating decision-making errors is well documented in the economic literature.  The claim that such discipline can replicated, or exceeded, in agencies is an assertion that remains, thus far, in search of empirical support.

With the recent announcement of Sendhil Mullainathan as the Assistant Director for Research at the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (WSJ profile here), while one turns to the question of how economic input will be incorporated into agency decision-making.

Luke Froeb makes a nice point about the organization of economists in administrative agencies:

The FTC, which enforces identical consumer protection laws, is organized along functional lines, with attorneys and economists each writing memos to a bipartisan Commission. By design, this results in conflict between the economists and attorneys, which allows benefit-cost analysis done by economists to be heard at the highest levels of the organizations.

Watch the organizational design of the new agency. I suspect it will put economists, if it has them at all, under the supervision of attorneys to reduce their influence, as was done during the FTC early years.

For those more interested in how Mullainathan’s economic views will translate to policy, the correct place to start is in his October 2008 piece (co-authored with Michael Barr and Eldar Shafir) on Behaviorally Informed Financial Services Regulation, which includes discussions of at least ten policy ideas, including:

  • Full information disclosure to debias home mortgage borrowers.
  • A new standard for truth in lending.
  • A “sticky” opt-out home mortgage system.
  • Restructuring the relationship between brokers and borrowers.
  • Using framing and salience to improve credit card disclosures.
  • An opt-out payment plan for credit cards.
  • An opt-out credit card.
  • Regulating of credit card late fees.
  • A tax credit for banks offering safe and affordable accounts.
  • An opt-out bank account for tax refunds.

I also believe, but not with great confidence, that this particular paper was the first to propose the well-known “plain vanilla” requirement.

I have submitted a comment to the Federal Reserve Board concerning Regulation II, along with the American Enterprise Institute’s Alex Brill, Christopher DeMuth, Alex J. Pollock, and Peter Wallison, as well as my George Mason colleague Todd Zywicki.  Regulation II implements the interchange fee provisions of the Dodd-Frank Act.

The comment makes a rather straightforward and simple point:

We write to express our concern that the Federal Reserve Board has not to date taken the prudent and, importantly, legally required step of conducting a competitive impact analysis of Regulation II, which implements the interchange fee provisions of section 1075 of the Dodd-Frank Act (Pub L. 111-203). We consider this to be one of the most significant legal changes to the payment system’s competitive landscape since the Electronic Funds Transfer Act in 1978. This dramatic statutory and subsequent regulatory change will undoubtedly trigger a complex set of consequences for all firms participating in the payment system as well as for consumers purchasing both retail goods and financial services. The Federal Reserve’s obligation to conduct a competitive impact analysis of Regulation II is an appropriate and prudent safeguard against legal change with potentially pernicious consequences for the economy and consumers. Given the Board’s own well-crafted standards, we do not believe it is appropriate for the Board to move forward in implementing Regulation II without the required competitive impact analysis.

The rest of the comment appears below the fold.

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C. Boyden Gray and John Shu offer a very helpful discussion on this issue in an article in Engage.  Here is the abstract:

President Obama signed the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010 (“Dodd-Frank” or “the Act”) into law on July 21, 2010. The massive and complex Act is reportedly the result of many compromises. Dodd-Frank’s intent, according to its title page, is “[t]o promote the financial stability of the United States by improving accountability and transparency in the financial system, to end ‘too big to fail,’ to protect the American taxpayer by ending bailouts, to protect consumers from abusive financial services practices, and for other purposes.”

Of particular interest to me was this portion of the discussion of the Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection (BCFP):

One of the BCFP’s stated objectives is to protect consumers “from unfair, deceptive, or abusive acts and practices and from discrimination.”75 The BCFP may halt a company or service provider from “committing or engaging in an unfair, deceptive, or abusive act or practice” with respect to offering or transacting in a consumer financial product or service.76 In fact, Dodd-Frank makes it unlawful for consumer financial product companies or service providers to “engage in any unfair, deceptive, or abusive act or practice.”77 The Act extends this liability to any entity that “knowingly or recklessly provide[d] substantial assistance” to the offender.78

clearly defi ne vague terms such as “unfair,” “deceptive,” “abusive,” and “discrimination.” BCFP is vested with the sole discretion to decide what those terms mean and how they are applied to consumer financial products and services and the consumer financial industry.79 For example, Dodd- Frank defines an act or practice as “abusive” if it “materially interferes with the ability of a consumer to understand a term or condition of a consumer financial product or service,” or if it takes “unreasonable advantage” of a consumer’s “lack of understanding” of the “material risks, costs, or conditions of the product or service” or a consumer’s “inability” to protect his own interests “in selecting or using a consumer financial product or service.”80 Given that each and every consumer has different abilities to understand a term, condition, material risk, and cost; and each and every consumer has varying levels of ability—or desire—to protect his own interests, the Act’s standard can readily be caricatured as “we know it when we see it.”

Moreover, the Act does not seem to include the concepts of deception or fraud with respect to the term “abusive,” which would mean that the BCFP could still declare illegal products and services whose terms, conditions, risks and costs are fully disclosed, so long as the BCFP labels them “abusive.” Moreover, the BCFP’s charter
is so vast that its power could be characterized as including the practical authority to re-write consumer financial protection laws if it chooses to do so. Accordingly, it is reasonable to argue that Congress must do the re-writing, not an agency that escapes
meaningful oversight.

Those challenging Dodd-Frank will maintain that Congress structured the BCFP in such a way that it unconstitutionally escapes both Article I and Article II oversight. The key is that the Act houses the BCFP within the Federal Reserve, thereby placing one protected entity (the BCFP) within another (the Fed).81

The article provides a good summary of the provisions of Dodd-Frank as well.

At the excellent Core Economics blog, Andreas Ortman discusses an Australian policy debate involving the Review of the Governance, Efficiency, Structure and Operation of Australia’s Superannuation System (also known as the Cooper Review), and more specifically, retirement savings and the superannuation system.  The Cooper Review drafters contend that the behavioral economics literature strongly supports a mandated default option (MySuper).

Ortmann responds that the Cooper Review overstates the case for behavioral law and economics in the realm of retirement savings, and perhaps consumer financial protection generally:

Arguing that a substantial body of work has emerged in recent decades in the field of Behavioral Economics, Gruen then sells unabashedly that field’s alleged insights as the foundation on which to build the choice architecture of the Australian superannuation scheme.

The result is known: it is likely — if indeed the Cooper Review recommendations will be implemented in its essence, which seems likely at this point — that a mandated one-size-fits-all default option (“MySuper”) will be imposed on superannuation members. Gruen, clearly, see this as progress. After all, superannuation members still have the choice to opt out. Or so he argues.

The argument is problematic for at least two reasons.

First, the paternalism of the MySuper default might indeed save poorly informed consumers from themselves. Unfortunately, the existence of such a default option is also likely to result in consumers being poorly informed and disengaged with their supers in the same way as insurance without deductions leads people to be less careful about the things they have insured. Gruen acknowledges some version of this argument in a footnote on p. 16 but dismisses it in passing in a somewhat snotty manner. Well, like it or not, there is an endogeneity problem here. And to dismiss it out of hand is wrong-headed and troubling. Especially if it comes from as influential a person as Gruen. Recent evidence has shown that even optimal defaults may not be optimal and that, in particular when consumers are fairly heterogeneous, requiring individuals to make explicit choices for themselves may dominate optimal defaults (e.g., Carroll et al, Optimal Decisions and Active Decisions, Quarterly Journal of Economics 2009, pp. 1639 – 1674). The result by Carroll et al. is hardly surprising in light of what we know empirically about the — sometimes quite dramatic – effects of financial literacy and peer effects.

Second, it has become bad habit of highly visible policy and/or opinion makers to appeal to alleged insights from Behavioral Economics. None of the people I have in mind here has ever actually done an experiment and it is clear from their uncritical sampling of the evidence that they do not know the relevant literature or the controversies over the production of the – mostly – laboratory evidence that undergirds much of Behavioral Economics. The simple fact is that pretty much every cognitive bias that psychologists, and behavioral economists, have allegedly identified is contested in the relevant literature. (There’d be too many references to list here but feel free to ask me for the syllabus of my Behavioral Course.) Building the superannuation choice architecture on disputed evidence is problematic at best.

Ortmann’s skepticism, particularly in regards to use and abuse of the behavioral economics literature in policy implementations, is similar to that articulated by Judge Ginsburg in I in our contributions to the TOTM Free to Choose Symposium here and here.

Tiffany Joslyn provides a useful summary of the criminal provisions of the Dodd-Frank Act at the Federalist Society National Federal Initiatives Project.  One of the things Joslyn points out is that the Act includes new criminal consumer protection liability:

Section 1036 makes it a criminal offense for any covered person or service provider to offer or provide to a consumer any financial product or service not in conformity with Federal consumer financial law, or otherwise commit any act or omission in violation of a Federal consumer financial law, or to engage in any unfair, deceptive, or abusive act or practice. It also criminalizes the failure or refusal by any covered person or service provider to permit access to or copying of records, to establish or maintain records, or to make reports or provide information to the Bureau, as required by Federal consumer financial law, or any rule or order issued by the Bureau thereunder. Additionally, Section 1036 criminalizes knowingly or recklessly providing substantial assistance to a covered person or service provider in violation of these provisions or any rules or regulations issued thereunder (exception for solely providing or selling time or space for advertisements).

 

 

Douglas Ginsburg is Circuit Judge, U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia.

Joshua Wright is Associate Professor, George Mason University School of Law.

The behavioral economics research agenda is an ambitious one for several reasons.  The first reason is that behavioral economics requires a theory “true” preferences aside from – and in opposition to — the “revealed” preferences of the decision maker.  A second reason is that while collecting and documenting individual biases in an ad hoc fashion can generate interesting results, policy relevance requires an integrative theory of errors that can predict the sufficient and necessary conditions under which cognitive biases will hamper the decision-making of economic agents.  A third is not unique to behavioral economics but is nonetheless significant: demonstrating that behavioral economics improves predictive power.  The core methodological commitment of the behavioral economics enterprise — as with economics generally at least since Friedman (1953) —  is an empirical one: predictive power.  Indeed, no less than  Christine Jolls, Cass Sunstein and Richard Thaler have described the behavioralist research program as the economic analysis of law “with a higher R-squared,” that is, “a greater power to explain the observed data.”

As I’ve observed previously, there are some good reasons to believe that behavioral law and economics (BLE) scholars do not share these methodological commitments.   I’ve discussed previously the example of failure of BLE scholars to even cite, much less grapple with, the work of Zeiler & Plott (or here) regarding the endowment effect.  Zeiler & Plott present and support the provocative claim that current evidence supporting the endowment effect is better explained by experimental procedures than cognitive biases.  Proponents of regulation based on the endowment effect, in my view, need not agree with this interpretation of these findings but they ought to respond to them if they want to be taken seriously.  Unfortunately, out of the 342 articles in JLR discussing the “endowment effect” from 2006 to present, only 35 cite either Zeiler and Plott article.  I find that ratio discouraging for the discipline of behavioral law and economics generally and the prevailing level of discourse.

Indeed, while David Levine is not referring to the BLE literature, he might as well have been when he writes:

Behavioral economics: love it or hate it – there seems to be no middle ground. Lovers take the obvious fact people are not frictionless maximizing machines together with the false premise that economists assume that they are to conclude that all of economics must be wrong. The haters take the equally obvious fact that laboratories are not the real world to dismiss all laboratory evidence that conflicts with their pet theories as irrelevant. In the end they seem primarily to talk past each other.

How can we improve the discourse and get discussion focused on predictive power and consequences of actual behavioral policies proposed or implemented?  The burden here lies with the skeptics.  As Richard Epstein points out, the behavioralists’ message has been clear and effective; indeed, Bar-Gill and Warren’s article generated the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau.  Behavioral skepticism has proven less effective.

Skeptics, including myself, have been decidedly less effective in convincing their respective audiences that specific behavioral proposals should be rejected and conventional economic approaches should (at least for now) prevail in the market for ideas in the academy and in the policy world.  It is true that the skeptics have a number of forces working against them.  One is that BLE is new and exciting.  Arguing that the “conventional” approach outperforms the newest tool in the toolkit is always an uphill battle.  I’ve alluded to a second reason, failure of at least some of the BLE literature to engage with opposing ideas.  But perhaps most important is the failure of the skeptics to present a comprehensive and convincing case that the conventional economic approach systematically can be expected to outperform BLE when the full social benefits and costs of the various approaches and institutions are accounted for.  I’ve long been of the opinion that two primary reasons for this failure are that different strands of the skeptical literature have talked past one another, and that this has led to a failure to present the “full” case against BLE on the record to be evaluated.

Consistent with this view, the goal of this post is not to present any new ideas about behavioral economics or behavioral law and economics, but catalog the various objections that have been raised in the literature, discussing their interactions, and linking to some of the leading scholarship in the area calling into question the assumed superiority of the BLE approach on a variety of grounds.

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Richard A. Epstein is the Laurence A. Tisch Professor of Law, New York University School of Law, The Peter and Kirsten Bedford Senior Fellow, The Hoover Institution, and the James Parker Hall Distinguished Service Professor of Law, The University of Chicago.

Few academic publications have had as much direct public influence on the law as the 2008 article by my NYU colleague Oren Bar-Gill and then Harvard Law Professor Elizabeth Warren.  In “Making Credit Safer,” they seek to combine two strands of academic thought in support of one great cause—more regulation of financial markets.  They start with the central claim of behavioral economics that sophisticated entrepreneurs are able to take advantage of the systematic foibles of ordinary people, by rigging their products in ways that work systematically to their own advantage.  By plying ordinary individuals will carefully packaged payment contracts, firms can undercut the central postulate of rational choice economics that all voluntary transactions produce mutual gains for the parties.  In its stead we get the wreckage of families and fortunes brought about by unscrupulous bankers in search of a buck.  Warren and Bar-Gill repeatedly talk about the importance of empirical evidence.  Her own work, however, is exceptionally shoddy, as Todd Zywicki has recently pointed out in the Wall Street Journal.

The second strand of their argument refers to the law of product liability in which they claim that government actors at all levels have intervened into markets to cure the information deficits in products that in an earlier age used to maim, if not kill, ordinary consumers.  The exploding toaster is their key example of a product that needs government oversight.  In their view, the key insight is that “sellers have no incentive to invest in making a safer product given consumers’ imperfect information.”  That position, moreover, is barely tolerable if consumers know about their own ignorance because they are then in a position to take precautions to offset the lamentable neglect of product providers.  Yet in those cases where consumers fail to perceive the risks, they get the worst of both worlds.  Sellers can afford to be indifferent to product risk, which leads to many bad consequences for consumers in the absence of firm government regulation.

In their model, financial products have similar characteristics.  It is just a short step therefore to argue that the insights of behavioral economics should transform the way in which payment cards should be regulated, to bring the situation into a closer alignment with the system of product liability regulation. However imperfect, Bar-Gill and Warren insist that the current regulation of consumer products outperforms the current of financial products.

At this point, the proper approach is to accept no small ambitions.  Instead their prescient conclusion runs as follows:

[T]he current legal structure, a loose amalgam of common law, statutory prohibitions, and regulatory agency oversight, is structurally incapable of providing effective protection. We propose the creation of a single regulatory body that will be responsible for evaluating the safety of consumer credit products and policing any features that are designed to trick, trap, or otherwise fool the consumers who use them.

Their fondest dreams have been realized.  By recess appointment, Elizabeth Warren is perched inside the United States Treasury as an Assistant to the President and Special Advisor to the Secretary of the Treasury on the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau. (CFPB)  In that capacity, my hope is that she will come to realize the uselessness of the product liability analogies to which she attaches so much weight.  You have to know something first about the body of law to which you which to compare payment markets.  In this instance, neither Bar-Gill nor Warren have the slightest clue about the evolution of product liability law.

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Ronald Mann is a Professor of Law at Columbia Law School

The idea that the regularity of behavioral departures from full rationality justifies regulatory intervention has rarely gained more credence than in the context of consumer finance.  The Credit CARD Act of 2009 rests on nothing so much as the supposition that cardholder decisions about spending and repayment reflect systematic misapprehension of the likely patterns of future behavior.  And given Elizabeth Warren’s prior writings with Oren Bar-Gill, we can expect the new CFPB to rely heavily on such regulation.

This symposium seems an apt time to consider the difficulty of designing regulatory regimes that aptly take advantage of perceived behavioral regularities.  My doubt comes not from skepticism about departures from rationality – I have no doubt that consumer use of financial products falls far short of the perfection of the rational actor.  Rather, my point is a typical “second best” critique: the departures from rationality are so unpredictable and contextually specific that intervention designed to remedy one departure without accounting for the others has little chance of a salutary result.

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