Archives For mergers & acquisitions

Amazon offers Prime discounts to Whole Food customers and offers free delivery for Prime members. Those are certainly consumer benefits. But with those comes a cost, which may or may not be significant. By bundling its products with collective discounts, Amazon makes it more attractive for shoppers to shift their buying practices from local stores to the internet giant. Will this eventually mean that local stores will become more inefficient, based on lower volume, and will eventually close? Do most Americans care about the potential loss of local supermarkets and specialty grocers? No one, including antitrust enforcers, seems to have asked them.

Rate this:

Continue Reading...

The gist of these arguments is simple. The Amazon / Whole Foods merger would lead to the exclusion of competitors, with Amazon leveraging its swaths of data and pricing below costs. All of this begs a simple question: have these prophecies come to pass?

The problem with antitrust populism is not just that it leads to unfounded predictions regarding the negative effects of a given business practice. It also ignores the significant gains which consumers may reap from these practices. The Amazon / Whole foods offers a case in point.

Rate this:

Continue Reading...

Even with these caveats, it’s still worth looking at the recent trends. Whole Foods’s sales since 2015 have been flat, with only low single-digit growth, according to data from Second Measure. This suggests Whole Foods is not yet getting a lift from the relationship. However, the percentage of Whole Foods’ new customers who are Prime Members increased post-merger, from 34 percent in June 2017 to 41 percent in June 2018. This suggests that Amazon’s platform is delivering customers to Whole Foods.

Rate this:

Continue Reading...

The negativity that surrounded the deal at its announcement made Whole Foods seem like an innocent player, but it is important to recall that they were hemorrhaging and were looking to exit. Throughout the 2010s, the company lost its market leading edge as others began to offer the same kinds of services and products. Still, the company was able to sell near the top of its value to Amazon because it was able to court so many suitors. Given all of these features, Whole Foods could have been using the exit as a mechanism to appropriate another firm’s rent.

Rate this:

Continue Reading...

Brandeis is back, with today’s neo-Brandeisians reflexively opposing virtually all mergers involving large firms. For them, industry concentration has grown to crisis proportions and breaking up big companies should be the animating goal not just of antitrust policy but of U.S. economic policy generally. The key to understanding the neo-Brandeisian opposition to the Whole Foods/Amazon mergers is that it has nothing to do with consumer welfare, and everything to do with a large firm animus. Sabeel Rahman, a Roosevelt Institute scholar, concedes that big firms give us higher productivity, and hence lower prices, but he dismisses the value of that. He writes, “If consumer prices are our only concern, it is hard to see how Amazon, Comcast, and companies such as Uber need regulation.” And this gets to the key point regarding most of the opposition to the merger: it had nothing to do with concerns about monopolistic effects on economic efficiency or consumer prices.  It had everything to do with opposition to big firm for the sole reason that they are big.

Rate this:

Continue Reading...

Carl Shapiro, the government’s economics expert opposing the AT&T-Time Warner merger, seems skeptical of much of the antitrust populists’ Amazon rhetoric: “Simply saying that Amazon has grown like a weed, charges very low prices, and has driven many smaller retailers out of business is not sufficient. Where is the consumer harm?”

On its face, there was nothing about the Amazon/Whole Foods merger that should have raised any antitrust concerns. While one year is too soon to fully judge the competitive impacts of the Amazon-Whole Foods merger, nevertheless, it appears that much of the populist antitrust movement’s speculation that the merger would destroy competition and competitors and impoverish workers has failed to materialize.

Rate this:

Continue Reading...

Viewed from the long history of the evolution of the grocery store, the Amazon-Whole Foods merger made sense as the start of the next stage of that historical process. The combination of increased wealth that is driving the demand for upscale grocery stores, and the corresponding increase in the value of people’s time that is driving the demand for one-stop shopping and various forms of pick-up and delivery, makes clear the potential benefits of this merger. Amazon was already beginning to make a mark in the sale and delivery of the non-perishables and dry goods that upscale groceries tend to have less of. Acquiring Whole Foods gives it a way to expand that into perishables in a very sensible way. We are only beginning to see the synergies that this combination will produce. Its long-term effect on the structure of the grocery business will be significant and highly beneficial for consumers.

Rate this:

Continue Reading...

At the heart of the common ownership issue in the current antitrust debate is an empirical measure, the Modified Herfindahl-Hirschmann Index, researchers have used to correlate patterns of common ownership with measures of firm behavior and performance. In an accompanying post, Thom Lambert provides a great summary of just what the MHHI, and more specifically the MHHIΔ, is and how it can be calculated. I’m going to free-ride off Thom’s effort, so if you’re not very familiar with the measure, I suggest you start here and here.

There are multiple problems with the common ownership story and with the empirical evidence proponents of stricter antitrust enforcement point to in order to justify their calls to action. Thom and I address a number of those problems in our recent paper on “The Case for Doing Nothing About Institutional Investors’ Common Ownership of Small Stakes in Competing Firms.” However, one problem we don’t take on in that paper is the nature of the MHHIΔ itself. More specifically, what is one to make of it and how should it be interpreted, especially from a policy perspective?

The Policy Benchmark

The benchmark for discussion is the original Herfindahl-Hirschmann Index (HHI), which has been part of antitrust for decades. The HHI is calculated by summing the squared value of each firm’s market share. Depending on whether you use percents or percentages, the value of the sum may be multiplied by 10,000. For instance, for two firms that split the market evenly, the HHI could be calculated either as:

HHI = 502 + 502 = 5.000, or
HHI = (.502 + .502)*10,000 = 5,000

It’s a pretty simple exercise to see that one of the useful properties of HHI is that it is naturally bounded between 0 and 10,000. In the case of a pure monopoly that commands the entire market, the value of HHI is 10,000 (1002). As the number of firms increases and market shares approach very small fractions, the value of HHI asymptotically approaches 0. For a market with 10 firms firms that evenly share the market, for instance, HHI is 1,000; for 100 identical firms, HHI is 100; for 1,000 identical firms, HHI is 1. As a result, we know that when HHI is close to 10,000, the industry is highly concentrated in one firm; and when the HHI is close to zero, there is no meaningful concentration at all. Indeed, the Department of Justice’s Horizontal Merger Guidelines make use of this property of the HHI:

Based on their experience, the Agencies generally classify markets into three types:

  • Unconcentrated Markets: HHI below 1500
  • Moderately Concentrated Markets: HHI between 1500 and 2500
  • Highly Concentrated Markets: HHI above 2500

The Agencies employ the following general standards for the relevant markets they have defined:

  • Small Change in Concentration: Mergers involving an increase in the HHI of less than 100 points are unlikely to have adverse competitive effects and ordinarily require no further analysis.
  • Unconcentrated Markets: Mergers resulting in unconcentrated markets are unlikely to have adverse competitive effects and ordinarily require no further analysis.
  • Moderately Concentrated Markets: Mergers resulting in moderately concentrated markets that involve an increase in the HHI of more than 100 points potentially raise significant competitive concerns and often warrant scrutiny.
  • Highly Concentrated Markets: Mergers resulting in highly concentrated markets that involve an increase in the HHI of between 100 points and 200 points potentially raise significant competitive concerns and often warrant scrutiny. Mergers resulting in highly concentrated markets that involve an increase in the HHI of more than 200 points will be presumed to be likely to enhance market power. The presumption may be rebutted by persuasive evidence showing that the merger is unlikely to enhance market power.

Just by way of reference, an HHI of 2500 could reflect four firms sharing the market equally (i.e., 25% each), or it could be one firm with roughly 49% of the market and 51 identical small firms sharing the rest evenly.

Injecting MHHIΔ Into the Mix

MHHI is intended to account for both the product market concentration among firms captured by the HHI, and the common ownership concentration across firms in the market measured by the MHHIΔ. In short, MHHI = HHI + MHHIΔ.

As Thom explains in great detail, MHHIΔ attempts to measure the combined effects of the relative influence of shareholders that own positions across competing firms on management’s strategic decision-making and the combined market shares of the commonly-owned firms. MHHIΔ is the measure used in the various empirical studies allegedly demonstrating a causal relationship between common ownership (higher MHHIΔs) and the supposed anti-competitive behavior of choice.

Some common ownership critics, such as Einer Elhague, have taken those results and suggested modifying antitrust rules to incorporate the MHHIΔ in the HHI guidelines above. For instance, Elhague writes (p 1303):

Accordingly, the federal agencies can and should challenge any stock acquisitions that have produced, or are likely to produce, anti-competitive horizontal shareholdings. Given their own guidelines and the empirical results summarized in Part I, they should investigate any horizontal stock acquisitions that have created, or would create, a ΔMHHI of over 200 in a market with an MHHI over 2500, in order to determine whether those horizontal stock acquisitions raised prices or are likely to do so.

Elhague, like many others, couch their discussion of MHHI and MHHIΔ in the context of HHI values as though the additive nature of MHHI means such a context make sense. And if the examples are carefully chosen, the numbers even seem to make sense. For instance, even in our paper (page 30), we give a few examples to illustrate some of the endogeneity problems with MHHIΔ:

For example, suppose again that five institutional investors hold equal stakes (say, 3%) of each airline servicing a market and that the airlines have no other significant shareholders.  If there are two airlines servicing the market and their market shares are equivalent, HHI will be 5000, MHHI∆ will be 5000, and MHHI (HHI + MHHI∆) will be 10000.  If a third airline enters and grows so that the three airlines have equal market shares, HHI will drop to 3333, MHHI∆ will rise to 6667, and MHHI will remain constant at 10000.  If a fourth airline enters and the airlines split the market evenly, HHI will fall to 2500, MHHI∆ will rise further to 7500, and MHHI will again total 10000.

But do MHHI and MHHI∆ really fit so neatly into the HHI framework? Sadly–and worringly–no, not at all.

The Policy Problem

There seems to be a significant problem with simply imposing MHHIΔ into the HHI framework. Unlike HHI, from which we can infer something about the market based on the nominal value of the measure, MHHIΔ has no established intuitive or theoretical grounding. In fact, MHHIΔ has no intuitively meaningful mathematical boundaries from which to draw inferences about “how big is big?”, a fundamental problem for antitrust policy.

This is especially true within the range of cross-shareholding values we’re talking about in the common ownership debate. To illustrate just how big a problem this is, consider a constrained optimization of MHHI based on parameters that are not at all unreasonable relative to hypothetical examples cited in the literature:

  • Four competing firms in the market, each of which is constrained to having at least 5% market share, and their collective sum must equal 1 (or 100%).
  • Five institutional investors each of which can own no more than 5% of the outstanding shares of any individual airline, with no restrictions across airlines.
  • The remaining outstanding shares are assumed to be diffusely owned (i.e., no other large shareholder in any firm).

With only these modest restrictions on market share and common ownership, what’s the maximum potential value of MHHI? A mere 26,864,516,491, with an MHHI∆ of 26,864,513,774 and HHI of 2,717.

That’s right, over 26.8 billion. To reach such an astronomical number, what are the parameter values? The four firms split the market with 33, 31.7, 18.3, and 17% shares, respectively. Investor 1 owns 2.6% of the largest firm (by market share) while Investors 2-5 each own between 4.5 and 5% of the largest firm. Investors 1 and 2 own 5% of the smallest firm, while Investors 3 and 4 own 3.9% and Investor 5 owns a minuscule (0.0006%) share. Investor 2 is the only investor with any holdings (a tiny 0.0000004% each) in the two middling firms. These are not unreasonable numbers by any means, but the MHHI∆ surely is–especially from a policy perspective.

So if MHHI∆ can range from near zero to as much as 28.6 billion within reasonable ranges of market share and shareholdings, what should we make of Elhague’s proposal that mergers be scrutinized for increasing MHHI∆ by 200 points if the MHHI is 2,500 or more? We argue that such an arbitrary policy model is not only unfounded empirically, but is completely void of substantive reason or relevance.

The DOJ’s Horizontal Merger Guidelines above indicate that antitrust agencies adopted the HHI benchmarks for review “[b]ased on their experience”.  In the 1982 and 1984 Guidelines, the agencies adopted HHI standards 1,000 and 1,800, compared to the current 1,500 and 2,500 levels, in determining whether the industry is concentrated and a merger deserves additional scrutiny. These changes reflect decades of case reviews relating market structure to likely competitive behavior and consumer harm.

We simply do not know enough yet empirically about the relation between MHHI∆ and benchmarks of competitive behavior and consumer welfare to make any intelligent policies based on that metric–even if the underlying argument had any substantive theoretical basis, which we doubt. This is just one more reason we believe the best response to the common ownership problem is to do nothing, at least until we have a theoretically, and empirically, sound basis on which to make intelligent and informed policy decisions and frameworks.


Truth on the Market is pleased to announce its next blog symposium:

Is Amazon’s Appetite Bottomless?

The Whole Foods Merger After One Year

August 28, 2018

One year ago tomorrow the Amazon/Whole Foods merger closed, following its approval by the FTC. The merger was something of a flashpoint in the growing populist antitrust movement, raising some interesting questions — and a host of objections from a number of scholars, advocates, journalists, antitrust experts, and others who voiced a range of possible problematic outcomes.

Under settled antitrust law — evolved over the last century-plus — the merger between Amazon and Whole Foods was largely uncontroversial. But the size and scope of Amazon’s operation and ambition has given some pause. And despite the apparent inapplicability of antitrust law to the array of populist concerns about large tech companies, advocates nonetheless contend that antitrust should be altered to deal with new threats posed by companies like Amazon.  

For something of a primer on the antitrust debate surrounding Amazon, listen to ICLE’s Geoffrey Manne and Open Markets’ Lina Khan on Season 2 Episode 1 of Briefly, a podcast produced by the University of Chicago Law Review.  

Beginning tomorrow, August 28, Truth on the Market and the International Center for Law & Economics will host a blog symposium discussing the impact of the merger.

One year on, we asked antitrust scholars and other experts to consider:

  • What has been the significance of the Amazon/Whole Foods merger?
  • How has the merger affected various markets and the participants within them (e.g., grocery stores, food delivery services, online retailers, workers, grocery suppliers, etc.)?
  • What, if anything, does the merger and its aftermath tell us about current antitrust doctrine and our understanding of platform markets?
  • Has a year of experience borne out any of the objections to the merger?
  • Have the market changes since the merger undermined or reinforced the populist antitrust arguments regarding this or other conduct?

As in the past (see examples of previous TOTM blog symposia here), we’ve lined up an outstanding and diverse group of scholars to discuss these issues.


The symposium posts will be collected here. We hope you’ll join us!

AT&T’s merger with Time Warner has lead to one of the most important, but least interesting, antitrust trials in recent history.

The merger itself is somewhat unimportant to consumers. It’s about a close to a “pure” vertical merger as we can get in today’s world and would not lead to a measurable increase in prices paid by consumers. At the same time, Richard J. Leon’s decision to approve the merger may have sent a signal regarding how the anticipated Fox-Disney (or Comcast), CVS-Aetna, and Cigna-Express Scripts mergers might proceed.

Judge Leon of the United States District Court in Washington, said the U.S. Department of Justice had not proved that AT&T’s acquisition of Time Warner would lead to fewer choices for consumers and higher prices for television and internet services.

As shown in the figure below, there is virtually no overlap in services provided by Time Warner (content creation and broadcasting) and AT&T (content distribution). We say “virtually” because, through it’s ownership of DirecTV, AT&T has an ownership stake in several channels such as the Game Show Network, the MLB Network, and Root Sports. So, not a “pure” vertical merger, but pretty close. Besides no one seems to really care about GSN, MLB, or Root.

Infographic: What's at Stake in the Proposed AT&T - Time Warner Merger | Statista

The merger trial was one of the least interesting because the government’s case opposing the merger was so weak.

The Justice Department’s economic expert, University of California, Berkeley, professor Carl Shapiro, argued the merger would harm consumers and competition in three ways:

  1. AT&T would raise the price of content to other cable companies, driving up their costs which would be passed on consumers.
  2. Across more than 1,000 subscription television markets, AT&T could benefit by drawing customers away from rival content distributors in the event of a “blackout,” in which the distributor chooses not to carry Time Warner content over a pricing dispute. In addition, AT&T could also use its control over Time Warner content to retain customers by discouraging consumers from switching to providers that don’t carry the Time Warner content. Those two factors, according to Shapiro, could cause rival cable companies to lose between 9 and 14 percent of their subscribers over the long term.
  3. AT&T and competitor Comcast could coordinate to restrict access to popular Time Warner and NBC content in ways that could stifle competition from online cable alternatives such as Dish Network’s Sling TV or Sony’s PlayStation Vue. Even tacit coordination of this type would impair consumer choices, Shapiro opined.

Price increases and blackouts

Shapiro initially indicated the merger would cause consumers to pay an additional $436 million year, which amounts to an average of 45 cents a month per customer, or a 0.4 percent increase. At trial, he testified the amount might be closer to 27 cents a month and conceded it could be a low as 13 cents a month.

The government’s “blackout” arguments seemed to get lost in the shifting sands of shifting survey results. Blackouts mattered, according to Shapiro, because “Even though they don’t happen very much, that’s the key to leverage.” His testimony on the potential for price hikes relied heavily on a study commissioned by Charter Communications Inc., which opposes the merger. Stefan Bewley, a director at consulting firm Altman Vilandrie & Co., which produced the study, testified the report predicted Charter would lose 9 percent of its subscribers if it lost access to Turner programming.

Under cross-examination by AT&T’s lawyer, Bewley acknowledged what was described as a “final” version of the study presented to Charter in April last year put the subscriber loss estimate at 5 percent. When confronted with his own emails about the change to 9 percent, Bewley said he agreed to the update after meeting with Charter. At the time of the change from 5 percent to 9 percent, Charter was discussing its opposition to the merger with the Justice Department.

Bewley noted that the change occurred because he saw that some of the figures his team had gathered about Turner networks were outliers, with a range of subcriber losses of 5 percent on the low end and 14 percent on the high end. He indicated his team came up with a “weighted average” of 9 percent.

This 5/9/14 percent distinction seems to be critical to the government’s claim the merger would raise consumer prices. Referring to Shapiro’s analysis, AT&T-Time Warner’s lead counsel, Daniel Petrocelli, asked Bewley: “Are you aware that if he’d used 5 percent there would have been a price increase of zero?” Bewley said he was not aware.

At trial, AT&T and Turner executives testified that they couldn’t credibly threaten to withhold Turner programming from rivals because the networks’ profitability depends on wide distribution. In addition, one of AT&T’s expert witnesses, University of California, Berkeley business and economics professor Michael Katz, testified about what he said were the benefits of AT&T’s offer to use “baseball style” arbitration with rival pay TV distributors if the two sides couldn’t agree on what fees to pay for Time Warner’s Turner networks. With baseball style arbitration, both sides submit their final offer to an arbitrator, who determines which of the two offers is most appropriate.

Under the terms of the arbitration offer, AT&T has agreed not to black out its networks for the duration of negotiations with distributors. Dennis Carlton, an economics professor at the University of Chicago, said Shapiro’s model was unreliable because he didn’t account for that. Shapiro conceded he did not factor that into his study, saying that he would need to use an entirely different model to study how the arbitration agreement would affect the merger.

Coordination with Comcast/NBCUniversal

The government’s contention that, after the merger, AT&T and rival Comcast could coordinate to restrict access to popular Time Warner and NBC content to harm emerging competitors was always a weak argument.

At trial, the Justice Department seemed to abandon any claim that the merged company would unilaterally restrict access to online “virtual MVPDs.” The government’s case, made by its expert Shapiro, ended up being there would be a “risk” and “danger” that AT&T and Comcast would “coordinate” to withhold programming in a way to harm emerging online multichannel distributors. However, under cross examination, he conceded that his opinions were not based on a “quantifiable model.” Shapiro testified that he had no opinion whether the odds of such coordination would be greater than 1 percent.

Doing no favors to its case, the government turned to a seemingly contradictory argument that AT&T and Comcast would coordinate to demand virtual providers take too much content. Emerging online multichannel distributors pitch their offerings as “skinny bundles” with a limited selection of the more popular channels. By forcing these providers to take more channels, the government argued, the skinny bundle business model is undermined in a version of raising rivals costs. This theory did not get much play at trial, but seems to suggest the government was trying to have its cake and eat it, too.

Except in this case, as with much of the government’s case in this matter, the cake was not completely baked.