Brad DeLong's head must have already exploded before he wrote this
I have no intention of wading into the debate over the climate change chapter in Superfreakonomics. I’m sure you all know the controversy: Levitt and Dubner had the temerity to suggest that global warming was a huge problem, that we should look hard for really expensive solutions, and we need to do something. And the ... Brad DeLong's head must have already exploded before he wrote this
Don't kill interchange fees
Speaking of Josh’s co-author, David Evans, David just testified the other day before the House Financial Services Committee on a bill, the Welch Bill, HR 2382, that would regulate the fees banks charge to each other to process credit card payments. The Welch Bill is actually only one of three pending bills that would regulate ... Don't kill interchange fees
A bright spot in the bleak financial industry regulatory firmament
Between the various power grabs and dubious regulatory proposals (each more dubious than the last!) from the likes of Geithner, Bernanke, Frank (.pdf), Dodd, etc., etc. you’d be excused for thinking the financial news from Washington (remember when financial news used to come from New York?) was all bad and growing only worse. But there ... A bright spot in the bleak financial industry regulatory firmament
International Signals: The Political Dimension of International Competition Law Harmonization
Seth Weinberger and I have a new article up at SSRN injecting some IR theory into the debate over international antitrust law. Abstract: The article, written jointly by a law professor and political science professor, endeavors to explain why the United States is particularly resistant to various efforts at international harmonization of antitrust law. While ... International Signals: The Political Dimension of International Competition Law Harmonization
Regulating Innovation: Competition Policy and Patent Law Under Uncertainty
Later this year Josh and I have an edited volume with the above title coming out with Cambridge University Press. The list of contributors is phenomenal, including: Bob Cooter Vincenzo Denicolo Richard Epstein Luigi Franzoni Damien Geradin Keith Hylton Marco Iansiti Scott Kieff Bruce Kobayashi Haizhen Lee Stan Leibowitz Mark Lemley Doug Lichtman Steve Margolis ... Regulating Innovation: Competition Policy and Patent Law Under Uncertainty
The optimal level of risk is not zero
I have said it before and I’ll say it again: All of this hand wringing over executive compensation seems to exist in a parallel world where corporate executives have no risk aversion, where there is no real competition for managerial talent, and where firms can only take on too much–never too little–risk. And this in ... The optimal level of risk is not zero
We're Back
Dear Readers: We apologize for the inactivity over the last two weeks. We’ve been having some technical problems with the blog, but believe we now have them resolved. Look for a lot of activity here over the next few days as we try to make up for lost time! The Management
Economics in one lesson
Several people, including Josh, have drawn my attention to John Hasnas’ excellent op-ed on the Sotomayor nomination in the WSJ last week. Just in case you don’t read the same blogs I do, I thought I’d highlight it here. It is brilliant. Here’s a taste: One can have compassion for workers who lose their jobs ... Economics in one lesson
Revisionist corporate governance
If you haven’t been living under a rock recently, you’ve seen an incredible amount of hand wringing–and proposed regulation–around “excessive compensation.” I’m a little too lazy to amass all the relevant links here, but both the administration and the congress are introducing regulations/bills and talking about the issue extensively. Commentators, too, have gotten in on ... Revisionist corporate governance
Hylton, Manne and Wright in The Deal on Varney's Withdrawal of the Section 2 Report
Available here. An excerpt: But wholesale rejection of the document — the most complete statement to date on the law and economics of Section 2 — because of disagreement with some of its positions is irresponsible and premature. And the rejection of specific conclusions from among the range of possibilities discussed in the report without ... Hylton, Manne and Wright in The Deal on Varney's Withdrawal of the Section 2 Report
If A Tree Falls in a Forest and Nobody Hears It, Did the Bush Antitrust Division Cut It Down?
The NYT ran an unsigned editorial on “Intel and Competition” that, quite frankly, doesn’t make much sense to us. It offers two basic arguments: (1) that the Bush administration DOJ is responsible for the state of Section 2 law requirement that plaintiffs demonstrate actual consumer harm, and (2) that foreign antitrust jurisdictions’ pursuit of enforcement ... If A Tree Falls in a Forest and Nobody Hears It, Did the Bush Antitrust Division Cut It Down?
Hylton, Manne and Wright in Forbes on Intel, Section 2 and Monopolization in the US
Available here. Here’s an excerpt: It turns out that it is a very difficult business to identify the few cases when low prices and aggressive competition might perversely end up harming consumers in the long run rather than simply making them better off. And the cost of erroneous antitrust enforcement, such as mistakenly condemning Intel’s ... Hylton, Manne and Wright in Forbes on Intel, Section 2 and Monopolization in the US
