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In libertarian critiques of intellectual property (IP) rights, such as copyrights and patents, it’s common to the hear the claim that “traditional property rights in land” is based in inductive, ground-up “common law court decisions,” but that IP rights are top-down, artificial statutory entitlements.  Thus, the argument goes, property rights in land are rooted solely in court decisions arising from facts of the world, but IP rights are state-created monopolies that mostly serve the interests of rent-seeking special interests exploiting access to unbounded legislatures.

 For those who may think that this is an improper characterization of this widespread claim about IP rights need only have attended the “Copyright Unbalanced” event at the Cato Institute on December 6, in which copyright was attacked in precisely these terms.

This oft-made contrast by libertarians between so-called “common law property in land” versus “statutory IP” is a myth that has no basis in the reality of how common law property rights in land evolved in England and then in the United States of America. 

This is important, because history is very informative and provides importance evidence for inducing principles in both ethical and political theory, but when myth is passed off as history, these ersatz “historical” claims undermine clear thinking and perpetuate falsehoods.  This is especially important when these mythical claims are advanced in the policy debates, as this misleads commentators and decision-makers about the true nature of our property rights and the true foundations of our political and legal institutions. 

With respect to IP rights as property rights, I and others have been explaining in our academic law journal articles for years that these “historical” claims are a myth, but we have focused only on the IP side of the myth.  For instance, I have shown with my substantial research into primary historical documents how the history of patents evolved under the guiding hand of natural rights philosophy, both in America and in England.  I have also explained, contrary to claims by Tom Bell, Jerry Brito and other libertarians, how John Locke expressly endorsed copyright in his writings and positively referred to “inventions and arts” in his natural rights justification of property in the Second Treatise (you can read my article here). Professor Justin Hughes has uncovered similar historical evidence on the side of copyright law (you can read his article here).

But I have never addressed why the libertarian argument advanced by Tom Bell, Jerry Brito and others is entirely a myth even in its claims about the historical legal development of common-law property rights in land (at least not in public, as I have done this in private email exchanges.)

First and foremost, I know it’s a myth because I teach the Anglo-American evolution of property rights in land every year in my Property class (what we call the 1L year in law school).  But I’m not unusual, as this information is in all of the Property textbooks used by property professors in every law school.  As all law students learn each year in their Property classes, the foundation of the “fee simple” in land is not court decisions, but rather a statute passed by Parliament: the Statute Quai Emptores of 1290.  This statute is explicitly identified in all Property textbooks as the foundation of the entire Anglo-American property system in land; as the most famous and widely used property textbook states, “By the end of the thirteenth century, Quia Emptores settled that the fee was freely alieneable,” and thus it explains that it was this statute that first established that “the [originally feudal] relationship between tenant and lord was basically an economic one.”

What followed in the ensuing decades and centuries were more and more statutes enacted by Parliament, further defining the scope and boundaries of many of the rights that constitute property rights in land. Here are just a few of the prominent statutes (there are far too many to effectively list all of them in a blog posting):

 Statute of Gloucester (1278) (creating rights against life estate owners by the owner of the follow-on future interest or broader estate)

 Statute of Uses (1535) (creating many future interests in land)

 Statute of Wills (1540) (securing and creating conveyance rights in land in wills)

 Tenures Abolition Act (1660) (eliminating feudal services associated with property rights in land)

Of course, the common law courts extended and applied these statutes, and developed in classic common-law fashion more legal doctrines that defined and further secured property rights in land, but it is simply an historical myth that common law property rights in land were entirely fashioned by courts, contrary to the legislatively created IP rights in patents and copyrights.  (In fact, the English common law system was heavily influenced by the Roman Law and the natural law philosophers working within the Roman Law, and of course all property rights in Roman Law were based in statutes as well.)

This same pattern in the creation and enforcement of property rights in land continued in the early American Republic. For example, early American state legislatures enacted statutes defining and securing the rights of adverse possessors, creating title recordation requirements, defining and securing property conveyance rights, defining and securing wills and the creation of future interests in land, as well as adopting statutes eliminating English common law property rights, such as the fee tail, among many others.  This pattern has continued today; for instance, most states have adopted statutes eliminating the famous property doctrine of the Rule Against Perpetuities (creating much happiness among property lawyers and law students alike), replacing it with a doctrine that goes by the acronym of USRAP (Uniform Statutory Rule Against Perpetuities). Of course, these statutes have all been interpreted, applied and extended in common law fashion by American state courts in the same way that the English common law courts did so with Parliament’s statutes. 

In short, the libertarians advancing the false distinction between “common law property in land” versus “statutory IP rights” are misstating what it means when we all say that the Anglo-American property system is rooted in the “common law.”  In the technical sense of this term, the Anglo-American property system is a common law system insofar as courts have developed the law and the rationale for their decisions without having to validate these decisions by reference to a particular statute.  This is in contrast to the “civil law” system in Europe, in which all judicial decisions must ultimately refer back to a statute as the validating source of the judicial decision itself. But to say that the Anglo-American property system is a “common law system” does not mean, of course, that there weren’t statutes that were interpreted, applied and extended by courts, and as a straightforward historical fact there were many statutes enacted by Parliament that defined the foundational rights in Anglo-American property law.  The fact that statutes weren’t mandated by the Anglo-American legal system as an institutional requirement for valid court decisions does not mean that statutes did not play a substantial historical role in the creation and enforcement of property rights in land.

In sum, it’s a complete myth for libertarians to argue that IP rights are “different” from property rights in land because property rights in land developed in “common law” as opposed to “statutory” IP rights.  But it’s even worse than a myth, because this is not a false claim made in the ivory tower in a dispute between academic historians. Rather, this false historical claim is asserted in the policy debates today to advance an anti-IP agenda. Thus, it’s important to call out this misleading historical myth, as it’s being used to leverage misleading attacks on copyright and patents.  I don’t mind engaging in bracing public policy debates about whether IP rights are right or wrong — I love these debates, especially with people who share my own commitment to free market principles — but let’s at least get the basic historical facts correct in these debates.  These are facts that are not in dispute and are well known, including even to the libertarians who survived their 1L Property classes in law school and are now speaking on these issues in the academy and in think tanks.

(In my next blog posting on this topic, I’ll address how there was the exact same interplay between statutes and common law decision-making in the courts in the development of patent and copyright law.)

UPDATE: For Part 2, see here.

UPDATE: I made a few, minor copy-edits to this posting.

It’s almost impossible to read an article or blog posting today about patents that doesn’t complain that “the patent system is broken.”  It’s especially prevalent in reports on high-tech patents, software patents, or the “smart phone wars.”  (I’m not hyperlinking here, because there’s just too many examples to choose between.)  In fact, the din on the increasingly clichéd statement that “the patent system is broken” is really reaching histrionic proportions.  It’s even prompted Patent Commissioner David Kappos to appeal to “those reporting and commenting on the smartphone system patent wars” to “move beyond the flippant rhetoric and instead engage in thoughtful discussion.”

Although it’s tempting to think that Commissioner Kappos is engaging in his own bombastic exclamations in his criticism of “flippant rhetoric,” it’s unfortunately true.  Here’s just one relatively recent example from the venerable New York Times, called “Apple Now Owns the Page Turn,” by Nick Bilton.

In this brief article, Mr. Bilton decries that Apple “now owns the page turn” in ebook readers with its recently issued design patent (D670,713).  Proclaiming that this is proof of “how broken the patent system is,” Mr. Bilton informs his readers that this design patent “gives Apple the exclusive rights to the page turn in an e-reader application.”

No, Mr. Bilton, it does not, and the NY Times should be embarrassed that such ignorant proclamations continue to be published under its masthead, including the blatantly biased and equally ill-informed hit piece on software patents published by the Old Gray Lady last October.

When most people talk about patents, they usually are speaking about a utility patent, which do secure exclusive property rights in new technology and discoveries.  But there is an entirely different type of patent, called a design patent.  Despite legal requirements that superficially sound similar, such as requirements of novelty and nonobviousness, design patents are entirely different from utility patents.

If Mr. Bilton had bothered to do even the minimal amount of research that most college undergraduates do today, say by checking Wikipedia’s entry on design patents, he would have discovered that it is certainly not true that Apple has “exclusive rights to the page turn in an e-reader application.” Despite Wikipedia’s well-deserved reputation for ill-informed entries, it actually has a good, succinct summary of design patents, describing briefly the differences between design patents and utility patents, and it even cites some classic examples from 150 years ago, such as design patents on famous fonts, the design patent on the statue of liberty, etc.

So, if Mr. Bilton had bothered to take five minutes to check Wikipedia before writing his NY Times posting, he would have learned that design patents are not patents on functional technology, but rather secure only non-functional, ornamental designs. For the sake of this vaunted NY Times writer and the many people he has mislead, I’ll repeat the most important word here in the definition: non-functional. Thus, Apple does not own e-book page-turning technology nor does it own the function of turning pages in an e-book reader. What this design patent secures is the novel ornamental design Apple has developed for its particular e-book reader, and it’s limited to exactly this particular ornamental design — no more, no less. For anyone even semi-aware of Steve Jobs and Apple Computer — an innovative person and his company who recognized the fundamental role and value of artistic design in computer technology since 1984’s release of the famous Macintosh computer – it should hardly be surprising that it is protecting its IP rights in these innovative design features.

Instead, Mr. Bilton negligently suggests that Apple could sue other e-book readers for their page turning technology because it now has “exclusive rights to the page turn in an e-reader application,” but this is patently false (pun intended).  And Mr. Bilton is clearly negligent here and his mistake is entirely his fault, because in the second paragraph of his NY Times report, he explicitly identifies Apple’s patent as a “design patent.”  This is significant, because everything he writes in his report after saying “design patent” is 100% wrong by mere dint of this term, because everything he writes after this wrongly assumes that Apple’s patent is a “utility patent.”

(As an aside, this design patent might be invalid, but Mr. Bilton provides no information or facts to make this judgment, because all of his high-handed rhetoric is based on the assumption that it is a utility patent.  Of course, if this was a utility patent, it would be invalid, as ebook readers that change pages have been around for many years, but what of the particular ornamental design of this ebook reader? One will search in vain in Mr. Bilton’s report for any information on this all-important question.)

Admittedly, there is much confusion today about the patent system, and much of this confusion is caused by misleading reports like those written by Mr. Bilton.  Of course, there are some good reporters and bloggers, who are commenting sensibly on the “smart phone wars” and other issues in the public policy debates over patents today.  But, unfortunately, Mr. Bilton represents a far larger cadre of reporters and bloggers who spread confusion and misinformation about the patent system and about the “smart phone war” in particular.

The real problem with this “broken reporting” by Mr. Bilton and his ilk is that it is feeding a growing anti-patent frenzy among commentators, academics, and the public, who seem to think that your smart phones, tablets and other technological marvels just don’t exist because of a so-called “broken patent system” that has stymied software and other high-tech innovation at every turn. I’m glad to see that some people, like Commissioner Kappos, the Honorable Paul Michel, and the Honorable Randall Rader, are starting to push back against this “broken reporting” on the patent system.

Last week, I participated in a panel discussion on standard essential patents and antitrust at the Washington Legal Foundation.  The panel was entitled, “Standard Essential Patents: Where do IP Protections End and Antitrust Concerns Begin?”  It was a great panel, and I think everyone did a really good job at avoiding any unnecessary technical jargon in discussing what is a very complex issue.

You can read about the panel in this blog posting by WLF’s Chief Counsel of its Legal Studies Division, Glenn Lammi (who also moderated the panel discussion).

Even better, you can watch the video of the panel here.

 What promises to be an interesting and lively panel discussion on copyright will occur on the Hill on December 13.  Even better, it includes not one but two Truth on the Market bloggers–Geoff and me!  Come one, come all! 

 

EVENT ADVISORY

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE
November 30, 2012
CONTACT: Will Rinehart
(202) 599-0408

Register for “CopyRIGHT: Can Free Marketeers
Agree On Copyright Reform?” 12/13

WASHINGTON D.C. – Join TechFreedom, the Competitive Enterprise Institute, and the International Center for Law & Economics on December 13 at 3pm for “CopyRIGHT: Can Free Marketeers Agree On Copyright Reform?”

A panel of free marketeers with diverse views on copyright will explore the debate among conservatives and libertarians about the purpose of copyright, how it interacts with other rights, and a range of other questions. How is copyright like real property, and how do they differ? Will technological change force copyright to change, too? We will address these questions and discuss areas of consensus and disagreement regarding how and whether the Copyright Act should be amended to address challenges involving orphan works, fair use, piracy, intermediary liability, free speech and rogue foreign websites — among others.

TechFreedom President Berin Szoka will moderate a panel featuring:

You can follow the conversation on Twitter on the #RightCR hashtag. You can join the Facebook event to see who else will be coming—but please RSVP. A livestream of the event will be available here.

When:
Thursday, December 13, 2012
3:00 p.m. – 4:15 p.m. (coffee and registration begins at 2:45 p.m.) 

Where:
Capitol Meeting Room HC-8 (directions
United States Capitol 
Washington D.C. 20004

Questions? Email contact@techfreedom.org.  

Find/share this release on Facebook, Twitter, or Google+.

About TechFreedom:
TechFreedom is a non-profit, non-partisan technology policy think tank. We work to chart a path forward for policymakers towards a bright future where technology enhances freedom, and freedom enhances technology.

About the Competitive Enterprise Institute:
The Competitive Enterprise Institute (CEI) is a non-profit, non-partisan public interest group dedicated to the principles of free enterprise and limited government.

 

About The International Center for Law & Economics:

The International Center for Law and Economics is a non-profit, non-partisan research center aimed at fostering rigorous policy analysis and evidence-based regulation.

The U.S. Department of Justice sued eBay last week for agreeing not to poach employees from rival Intuit. According to the Department’s press release, “eBay’s agreement with Intuit hurt employees by lowering the salaries and benefits they might have received and deprived them of better job opportunities at the other company.” DOJ maintains that agreements among rivals not to compete for workers have long been deemed per se illegal. (Indeed, Google, Apple, Adobe, and Pixar quickly settled antitrust claims based on similar non-poaching arrangements in 2010.)

DOJ is right to attack this type of arrangement. Apart from harming individual employees, non-poaching agreements occasion a societal harm: They preclude labor resources from being channeled to their highest and best uses. To poach a competitor’s star employee, you must offer to pay that employee more than she’s currently making (or otherwise adjust the terms of her employment in a way she deems desirable). Her current employer will usually have a chance to counter your offer. If you win the bidding war, it’s likely because the current employer’s willingness-to-pay for the employee—an amount reflective of the degree by which the employee enhances her firm’s value—is less than yours. If you can derive more value from the employee, you should have her. When employers agree to limit competition for workers, they preclude labor resources from flowing to their highest and best ends, causing an “allocative inefficiency.”

So perhaps DOJ should go after the members of the Association of American Law Schools. Pursuant to a Statement of Good Practices to which AALS members scrupulously adhere, each law school has agreed to limit competition with its rivals by refraining from making lateral offers of employment after March 1 each year. Unlike the eBay/Intuit arrangement, the competing law schools’ trade restraint is applicable for only part of the year–from March 1 until the fall hiring season–but it has the same basic effect as the eBay arrangement. And, despite the law schools’ claims to the contrary, it isn’t justified on efficiency grounds.

By preventing law professors from credibly threatening to leave their existing employers after March 1, the AALS restraint significantly reduces professors’ ability to negotiate higher wages or more favorable employment terms. If you announce a competing school’s offer six weeks before fall classes start, you’re much more likely to receive an attractive counter-offer from your current employer than you would be if you sprang the news of your potential departure six months before the start of classes, when you’re more easily replaced. What’s more, law schools generally don’t tell professors what they’ll be earning the following year until after March 1, when it’s too late for a disgruntled professor to secure another offer elsewhere. The AALS restraint thus artificially depresses the salaries of a school’s most desirable professors.

Now this might not seem like something to get worked up over. Most people think law professors are a spoiled lot. They have relatively low teaching loads and, despite the fact that most lack PhDs, they generally earn a good deal more than most academics. Why should DOJ intervene on behalf of these fat cats? Because the law schools’ non-poaching arrangement diminishes the quality of legal education. Here’s why.

At most law schools, where equality of end-states tends to be fetishized, professors are generally compensated in lock-step according to seniority. There’s some variation, but apart from endowed positions, starting salaries and annual raises are around the same level for everyone.

Talent and effort, by contrast, are not evenly distributed. Most law schools have some super-stars who are exceptional teachers and scholars, a number of “solid” professors who put in their time and provide competent teaching and enough scholarship to stay engaged, and a fair bit of dead weight. Lock-step compensation depresses the incentive to move into the first category and enhances the attractiveness of the last. It’s favored by administrators, though, because it permits them to avoid awkward conversations about merit.

If late-in-time departures of professors were a real possibility, administrators would have a stronger incentive to keep their most productive folks happy. They could stand to lose teachers with low course enrollments, so they probably wouldn’t worry too much about keeping their salaries relatively high. They’d also know that their less productive scholars are unlikely to receive a late offer. But highly productive scholars who also provide lots of the thing the law school is ultimately selling–law teaching–would likely begin to earn higher salaries than their less valuable colleagues. With compensation more accurately reflecting the value professors provide, labor resources would be allocated more efficiently. And, of course, law professors would have an increased incentive to make themselves both “poachable” and indispensable by firing on all cylinders–teaching, scholarship, and service.

But don’t the law schools need their non-poaching arrangement in order to prevent scheduling disorder that would hurt students? That’s certainly what they claim. The “Statement of Good Practices” memorializing the law schools’ collusive agreement begins:

[T]he departure of a full-time law teacher always requires changes at the law school. Unless the school is given sufficient time to make the necessary arrangements to find another to offer the instruction given by the departing teacher, the reasonable expectations of students will be  frustrated and the school’s educational program otherwise disrupted. To serve  the best interests of the program of legal education from which the teacher is departing and that to which she or he may be going, the Association urges that law schools and law faculty members follow these suggested practices….

A horizontal restraint of trade, though, isn’t necessary to prevent the sort of harm the law schools envision. If a law school believes it needs some amount of lead time to prepare for a professor’s departure, it may unilaterally negotiate contracts with its professors obligating them to provide a certain amount of notice before any departure and specifying liquidated damages for breach. Unlike the “one-size-fits-all” AALS restraint, such contracts could accommodate heterogeneous needs and preferences. For example, required lead times and the amount of liquidated damages could vary based on the location of the school (urban with lots of adjunct possibilities vs. rural with few), the degree to which the professor’s course offerings require a specialized background (Securities Regulation vs. Contracts), and the pedagogical importance of the courses (Business Organizations vs. Law & Literature). Moreover, this contractarian approach, unlike the AALS’s horizontal restraint, would further allocative efficiency across law schools: If Raider Law is willing to pay Target Law’s hot professor an amount that will increase her salary and cover the liquidated damages she owes Target because of an untimely departure, then Raider must value her more than Target and should get her. Thus, it is possible to achieve the practical benefit the AALS restraint purports to pursue without using a horizontal restraint and in a manner that permits allocative efficiency.

A horizontal agreement not to compete should not be allowed to stand when a less restrictive, easily achieved vertical option could secure the retraint’s benefits. See, e.g., Maricopa County Med. Soc’y (condemning an efficiency-enhancing maximum price-fixing agreement among physicians and observing that the procompetitive benefit occasioned by the restraint could be achieved via vertical agreements rather than a horizontal restraint); NCAA (refusing to allow the need for competitive balance to immunize a naked horizontal restraint because such balance could be achieved less restrictively); cf. Professional Engineers (horizontal agreement not to engage in price negotiations in order to assure high-quality engineering illegal when substantive quality standards could achieve same result).

Perhaps one day the DOJ will acknowledge that American law schools are competitors and, for the benefit of law students and the legal profession, ought to act like it.

http://www.fed-soc.org/publications/detail/boon-or-bane-for-technological-innovation-software-patents-podcast

Although pure software patents are only a couple decades old, they have become the focus of a heated innovation policy debate. On the one hand, new technological innovation once imagined only as science fiction is now a commonplace feature of our lives — tablet computers, smart phones, wireless telecommunication, cloud computing, and streaming television, movies and songs, to name just a few of our modern marvels.  On the other hand, the high-tech industry seems awash in patent litigation, especially in the “smart phone war” between Apple, Samsung, Google, Microsoft, and other high-tech firms.  As a result of this extensive litigation, commentators in newspaper articles, in blogs, and at conferences now complain about the “problem of software patents.” Conventional wisdom seems to be quickly gelling around the proposition that software patents are a problem that demands a solution from Congress or the courts. The speakers on this previously recorded teleconference discuss whether software patents advance development of new technological innovation or hinder this vital innovation. The panelists represent all viewpoints on this topic, and bring their extensive academic, legal and industry experiences to bear on this increasingly important issue in the innovation policy debates today.

Featuring:

  • Prof. Adam Mossoff, George Mason University School of Law
  • Prof. David Olson, Boston College Law School
  • Mr. Robert R. Sachs, Partner, Fenwick & West LLP
  • Moderator: Prof. Mark Schultz, Southern Illinois University School of Law

Running Time: 01:02:26

It’s also available for download via iTunes for those of you who have been assimilated, contributing your biological and technological distinctiveness to Apple.

I have a guest blog posting up on Intellectual Ventures’ blog on why a patent war — or “patent thicket” in scholarly parlance — cannot be defined solely in terms of the number of patents involved in the legal and commercial conflict. 

 Check it out at: http://www.intellectualventures.com/index.php/insights/archives/how-many-patents-make-a-patent-war

As an aside, this issue is important because I keep hearing from some quarters that historical patent wars, such as the Sewing Machine War of the 1850s, weren’t patent thickets for precisely this reason; that is, relative to the number of patents involved in the “smart phone war” today, there were simply too few patents involved in these earlier legal conflicts for them to be identified as “patent thickets.” 

For instance, Professor Mark Lemley made this point in a comment to my recent blog post, Today’s Software Patents Look a Lot Like Early Pharma Patents.  Although this short blog posting addressed only how software patents and early pharma patents were both accused by famous judges of being too complex or too vague for the courts to handle efficiently, Mark instead decided to make the tangential comment: “Um, except for the part where there were 250,000 pharmaceutical patents covering the same product.”  (This was made on Facebook, and so, sorry, no link.)

Pofessor Michael Risch has a great blog posting on why the oft-repeated claim that there are 250,000 patents covering each smart phone is overblown, especially as this statistic is used in the increasingly overheated rhetoric in today’s policy debates in which many people are treating as settled fact that there is a so-called “software patent problem.”  

But even if Professor Risch is wrong and there are in fact 250,000 patents covering each smart phone, this would still not justify the claim that the number of patents is the primary cause of today’s patent war. 

I often heard this point from my fellow academics when I was researching my article on the Sewing Machine War of the 1850s — that things are somehow different today because there are lots more patents covering the same commercial product — and thus I specifically address this issue in my paper.  In fact, I spent several pages discussing this issue and why the premise “thousands of patents = patent war” is profoundly mistaken. 

Given the prevalence of the “250,000 patents cover each smartphone” and similar claims today, though, I realize that it’s an important enough point to carve out these several pages and reproduce them in a blog posting (so that people don’t have to sift through a 50-page article to find it).

So, as I said, check out my guest blog posting at IV’s blog, and poke around there a bit to learn more about the cool things that IV is doing with the patented innovation that it creates, acquires and licenses.

A nice way to take a break from Election Day stress about this fingernail-biting-close election is to listen to some panelists talk about something that is truly important — software patents! :)

It a great panel, notwithstanding my participation, and it promises to be a lot of fun and informative.  So, call in for the teleforum and even ask a question or two of us while you’re at it.  Here’s the information:

Boon or Bane for Technological Innovation?: Software Patents

Intellectual Property Practice Group Teleforum

Although pure software patents are only a couple decades old, they have become the focus of a heated innovation policy debate. On the one hand, new technological innovation once imagined only as science fiction is now a commonplace feature of our lives—tablet computers, smart phones, wireless telecommunication, cloud computing, and streaming television, movies and songs, to name just a few of our modern marvels.  On the other hand, the high-tech industry seems awash in patent litigation, especially in the “smart phone war” between Apple, Samsung, Google, Microsoft, and other high-tech firms.  As a result of this extensive litigation, commentators in newspaper articles, in blogs, and at conferences now complain about the “problem of software patents.” Conventional wisdom seems to be quickly gelling around the proposition that software patents are a problem that demands a solution from Congress or the courts. This Teleforum panel will consider whether software patents advance development of new technological innovation or hinder this vital innovation. The panelists represent all viewpoints on this topic, and they bring their extensive academic, legal and industry experiences to bear on this increasingly important issue in the innovation policy debates today.

Featuring:

  • Mr. Robert R. Sachs, Partner, Fenwick & West LLP
  • Prof. Adam Mossoff, George Mason University School of Law
  • Prof. David Olson, Boston College Law School
  • Moderator: Prof. Mark Schultz, Southern Illinois University School of Law

Agenda:

Call begins at 2:00 p.m. Eastern Time.

Registration details:

Teleforum calls are open to all dues paying members of the Federalist Society. To become a member, sign up here. As a member, you should receive email announcements of upcoming Teleforum calls which contain the conference call phone number. If you are not receiving those email announcements, please contact us at 202-822-8138.

My colleague, Eric Claeys, has posted to SSRN an interesting and important review of Robert Merges’s new book, Justifying Intellectual Property (Harvard University Press, 2012).  Here’s the abstract:

This article contributes to a symposium issue on the Philosophical Foundations of Intellectual Property. In a popular Saturday Night Live skit, a famous record producer helps a rock band record a rock anthem by demanding maniacally that the band put more cowbell on the recording. This article reviews Justifying Intellectual Property (2011), by Robert Merges, in a similar spirit.

Justifying Intellectual Property challenges contemporary IP scholarly sensibilities by arguing that IP is better justified on moral, rights-based foundations than on economic or other utilitarian foundations. The book provides an excellent moral defense of property rights in copyright and patent. It provides an excellent account of at least one set of rights-based foundations for IP, i.e. Lockean theory. It also provides an extremely helpful framework for explaining how rights-based foundations get implemented into specific IP doctrines. However, as the record producer could have used a little more cowbell on the rock anthem, so Merges could have used a little more property theory in his account of how IP law implements rights-based foundations in practice. This article illustrates its praises and criticisms using the damages-versus-injunction remedy question considered by the U.S. Supreme Court in eBay v. MercExchange (2006).

Download the article here, and enjoy.  Also, always remember: More cowbell!

I’m moderating the digital equivalent of a “fireside chat” with Richard Epstein at 3pm this afternoon.  The great thing about teleforums is that, unlike podcasts, listeners can ask questions of the speaker.  So, call in and let’s have fun!   Here’s the information:

Patent Rights: A Spark or Hindrance for the Economy?

Federalist Society Intellectual Property Practice Group Teleforum

Innovation and entrepreneurship are integral to America’s economic strength, and the U.S. patent system has been critical to nurturing the innovation economy.  With its foundation in Article One, Section 8 of the Constitution, the U.S. patent system has been the strongest in the world.  In recent years, some critics, including Judge Richard Posner, have argued that the patent system has led to excessive patenting, too much litigation, and unwarranted costs for consumers.  Patent defenders have responded that with every spike in innovation comes a corresponding increase in the number of patent suits, and efforts to weaken patent rights will inevitably lead to less innovation.  With the passage of the America Invents Act — the broadest overhaul of the patent system in 50 years America — many people believed that the dispute over patent rights would recede.  However, with a string of high profile patent infringement suits in the smartphone industry – and a new effort to roll back patent rights at the International Trade Commission certain patents held by so-called “non-practicing entities” (NPEs) – the debate over intellectual property has grown more intense.  Would reduced patent rights diminish U.S. competitiveness and depress innovation?  In a diversified economy, should NPEs have fewer patent rights than those that manufacture their inventions?   Will innovation continue apace even if patent protections are scaled back?

Featuring:

  • Prof. Richard A. Epstein, Laurence A. Tisch Professor of Law, New York University School of Law
  • Prof. Adam Mossoff, Professor of Law, George Mason University School of Law

 
Agenda:

Call begins at 3:00 p.m. Eastern Time.

Registration details:

Teleforum calls are open to all dues paying members of the Federalist Society. To become a member, sign up here. As a member, you should receive email announcements of upcoming Teleforum calls which contain the conference call phone number. If you are not receiving those email announcements, please contact us at 202-822-8138.

Information at: http://www.fed-soc.org/events/detail/patent-rights-a-spark-or-hindrance-for-the-economy