Truth on the Market

Academic commentary on law, business, economics and more

Archive for the ‘regulation’ Category

Lessons in Regulatory Barriers to Entry: San Francisco Ice Cream Shop Edition

Posted by Josh Wright on February 18, 2012

A great video recounting the trials and tribulations of an entrepreneur and her attempts to open an ice cream shop in San Francisco (HT: Scott James at the NY Times and Craig Newmark).  From the NY Times story:

Ms. Pries said it took two years to open the restaurant, due largely to the city’s morass of permits, procedures and approvals required to start a small business. While waiting for permission to operate, she still had to pay rent and other costs, going deeper into debt each passing month without knowing for sure if she would ever be allowed to open.

“It’s just a huge risk,” she said, noting that the financing came from family and friends, not a bank. “At several points you wonder if you should just walk away and take the loss.”

Ms. Pries said she had to endure months of runaround and pay a lawyer to determine whether her location (a former grocery, vacant for years) was eligible to become a restaurant. There were permit fees of $20,000; a demand that she create a detailed map of all existing area businesses (the city didn’t have one); and an $11,000 charge just to turn on the water.

The ice cream shop’s travails are at odds with the frequent promises made by the mayor and many supervisors that small businesses and job creation are top priorities. ….

Even after she acceded to all the city’s demands, her paperwork sat unprocessed for months. Ms. Pries would not say exactly how much it all cost, including construction, but smiled and nodded when asked if it was in the hundreds of thousands of dollars.

I suspect the pernicious economic effects of local barriers to entry, rather than those at the state or federal level, are significantly greater than commonly thought.  They are certainly understudied.

 

Posted in business, economics, regulation | Comments Off

The Magical World of Mandates

Posted by Michael Sykuta on February 10, 2012

It seems President Obama has discovered a magical cure for his contraception controversy: simply force insurance companies to provide free coverage for contraceptive services, but only for women who work for organizations that qualify for exemption from the original mandate that requires contraceptive coverage be part of any respectable (i.e., Obama-approved) health plan. Never mind the whole religious liberty issue. I think that pales in comparison to the economic liberty argument against the mandates to begin with. But the President’s proposed solution should strike fear into the hearts of any person who likes to be paid for what they do.

The underlying premise of the Administration’s decision is that the federal government has the right to force people to give away the products and services they produce. If the government can force insurance companies to “give away” health care coverage to avoid a political embarrassment, what is to prevent the government from requiring other companies or industries to give away their products if such a mandate would be politically expedient? And more importantly, does Mr Obama really believe any company is going to simply write-off the cost of the “free” service and not cover it by raising the cost of other services? In essence, insurance companies will have incentive simply to raise the price of the health plans they offer to exemption-qualifying employers. Either way, the employer will pay for it. It just might not be listed on the receipt.

Or perhaps Mr. Obama plans to make the cost of the “free” contraceptive care a qualifying charitable contribution for health insurers, since it will only apply to non-profits.

What makes the proposed solution even more ludicrous is that health insurance companies neither manufacture nor deliver, in most cases, contraceptive pills. So why should insurance companies even be involved in this great giveaway? A more direct solution would be to require pharmaceutical manufacturers to give the pills away to begin with. Or to require pharmacies to distribute them for free to qualifying individuals.

Regardless of where one stands on women’s reproductive rights, women’s health or religious liberty, we all make our living by getting paid for what we do. The President’s mandate attempts to create something from nothing by forcing insurers to provide services without getting paid for them. That should violate the sensibilities of anyone who works for their pay.

Posted in health care reform debate, politics, regulation, Sykuta | 14 Comments »

Randomizing Regulation

Posted by Josh Wright on February 10, 2012

An interesting post on the University of Pennsylvania Reg Blog from Michael Abramowicz, Ian Ayres, and Yair Listokin (AAY) on “Randomizing Regulation,” based upon their piece in the U Penn L. Rev.

If legislators disagree about the efficacy of a proposed policy, why not resolve the disagreement with a bet?  One approach would be to impose one policy approach randomly on some members of the population, but not on others, to determine whether the policy meets its goals. This solution would overcome the measurement problems of conventional regression analysis and would provide a useful way to compare regulations and promote bipartisan agreement. Legislators might agree that once such a test is complete, the winning approach would apply to everyone.

For example, regulators could test the Sarbanes-Oxley Act’s most controversial provisions, such as those requiring public companies to institute internal controls and then to have their CEOs and CFOs certify their financial statements, by randomly repealing one or more of those provisions for some corporations for some period of time. Randomization would enable analysts to determine which regulatory regime is optimal by assessing which test-group of corporations has the highest level of success, whether measured by stock price, investor confidence in financial reporting, lack of fraud, or other yardsticks.

Conventional statistical and econometric analytical techniques are often used to measure the efficacy of statutes and regulations, but they face problems that randomized trials would not. Researchers may purposefully or mistakenly omit variables from their regression analyses, leading to incorrect results. Publishers are more likely to feature work that provides statistically significant results, even if those results are not correct, a phenomenon known as publication bias.

No doubt many economists and empiricists are nodding their heads in agreement and drooling at the opportunity to more accurately identify and measure the effects of regulation.  Randomization would allow application of techniques far superior to what is typically used.  AAY discuss some of the common critiques of randomization in the blog post, and at greater length in the paper.  The longer version is worth reading, but here is the short version from the blog post:

Ethical concerns are important, but may not present a significant barrier to using randomized tests. While legal randomized tests would lack the informed consent provided in medical experiments, the government regularly imposes regulations on the public – within constitutional and other legal bounds. Also, randomization sometimes makes the imposition more equal than regulation imposed using predetermined criteria. We tend to think it is worse to impose rules on people because the selected people are unpopular rather than simply because they were selected randomly.
How should randomized trials work? The experiments should be large enough to produce meaningful results. The test groups, meanwhile, should be the smallest possible without changing the results outside those test groups. For example, driving speed limits cannot be randomized at the individual level because such a test group size would significantly increase the risk of accidents. However, the test group could be at the county level.
Experiments should also be of sufficiently long durations to prevent test subjects from changing their behavior temporarily for the duration of the experiment. For example, if different income tax levels are imposed on different people to see if imposing a higher income tax reduces work output, an experiment of short duration would be more likely to be biased. Workers could wait out a temporary increase in income tax level by temporarily working less, and plan to work more once their income tax level decreases.
There is no problem, under current standards of judicial review, with administrative agencies testing out different regulations on their own. Agencies could put their proposed experimental regulations through the regular notice and comment process. After running the experiment, the agencies could provide a randomization impact statement explaining why the agency decided to test regulations through that process, describing the experiment, and providing its results. Because randomization provides for more objective analysis of policy results, courts should be more deferential in conducting hard look review to agencies that have selected policies through this approach.
Interesting stuff.

Posted in economics, regulation, scholarship | 3 Comments »

Religious Liberty for Dummies

Posted by Thom Lambert on February 9, 2012

According to Senators Barbara Boxer, Jeanne Shaheen, and Patty Murray, the Catholic Church is the real bully in the fight over whether religious employers must include coverage for contraception in the insurance policies they offer their employees.  In yesterday’s Wall Street Journal, the three responded to, in their words, the “aggressive and misleading campaign” against this new Obamacare mandate.  They wrote:

Those now attacking the new health-coverage requirement claim that it is an assault on religious liberty, but the opposite is true.  Religious freedom means that Catholic women who want to follow their church’s doctrine can do so, avoiding the use of contraception in any form.  But the millions of American women who choose to use contraception should not be forced to follow religious doctrine, whether Catholic or non-Catholic.

The three Senators seem to believe that as long as the government doesn’t force Catholic women to use birth control and the morning after pill, religious liberty is protected.  They also believe that in praying to the Almighty One (not that Almighty One) for permission not to pay for a medical intervention that offends their deeply and sincerely held religious beliefs, Catholic officials are trying to force women to follow their religious doctrine.

That’s ridiculous, and it shows how desperate the defenders of President Obama’s intrusion on individual conscience have become.  In a world in which religious employers were exempt from paying for a measure that violates their sacred beliefs, any woman who didn’t share those beliefs would be perfectly free to obtain birth control.  The Catholic Church, after all, doesn’t have the power to overrule Griswold v. Connecticut.

By contrast, in the world of Mr. Obama’s contraception mandate, Catholic officials who choose to follow their consciences by refusing to subsidize interventions that violate their religious beliefs may ultimately be thrown in jail.  That, Honorable Senators, is a full-frontal assault on religious liberty.

[More on the deeply misguided contraception mandate here.]

Posted in constitutional law, First amendment, free to choose, health care reform debate, musings, politics, regulation | 15 Comments »

Collective Moral Hazard, Maturity Mismatch, and Systemic Bailouts

Posted by Michael Sykuta on February 8, 2012

That’s the title of an interesting article by Emmanuel Farhi and Jean Tirole in the current issue of the  American Economic Review. Here’s the abstract (emphasis added):

The article shows that time-consistent, imperfectly targeted support to distressed institutions makes private leverage choices strategic complements. When everyone engages in maturity mismatch, authorities have little choice but intervening, creating both current and deferred (sowing the seeds of the next crisis) social costs. In turn, it is profitable to adopt a risky balance sheet. These insights have important consequences, from banks choosing to correlate their risk exposures to the need for macro-prudential supervision.

Posted in banking, economics, regulation, Sykuta | 1 Comment »

Options Have Value, Even If DOT Doesn’t Get It

Posted by Michael Sykuta on February 2, 2012

Last week Thom posted about the government’s attempt to hide the cost of taxes and regulatory fees in commercial airfares. Apparently Spirit Airlines is highlighting another government-imposed cost of doing business by advertising a new $2/ticket fee that the airline has imposed. According a CNN report yesterday:

Spirit Airlines says a new federal regulation aimed at protecting consumers is forcing it to charge passengers an additional $2 for a ticket.

The fee, which Spirit calls the “Department of Transportation Unintended Consequences Fee,” has been added to each ticket effective immediately, according to Misty Pinson, a Spirit spokeswoman.

The new DOT regulation allows passengers to change flights within 24 hours of booking without paying a penalty. The airline says the regulation forces them to hold the seat for someone who may or may not want to fly. As a consequence, someone who really does want to fly wouldn’t be able to buy that seat because the airline is holding it for someone who might or might not end up taking it.

In short, DOT is requiring airlines to give consumers a real option to change their flight plans at zero cost within a 24 hour window. Spirit rightly recognizes that options have value. Not only is there a value to consumers in ‘buying’ such an option, there is a cost associated with providing the option; in this case, the opportunity cost of selling seats that may be held for someone that will exercise the option to cancel without a fee.

Obviously, DOT head Ray LaHood is unimpressed.

“This is just another example of the disrespect with which too many airlines treat their passengers,” Department of Transportation Secretary Ray LaHood said in an e-mailed statement. “Rather than coming up with new and unnecessary fees to charge their customers, airlines should focus on providing fair and transparent service — that’s what our common sense rules are designed to ensure.”

Perhaps Mr. LaHood doesn’t understand the concept of options and option value. The right, but not the obligation, to undertake an activity (particularly under pre-specified terms) is clearly an economic good.  The very notion that DOT’s new regulation is touted as “consumer friendly” recognizes that it creates additional value for consumers. That is, it’s giving something away that is of value…a property right to change one’s mind at zero cost. However, it is disingenuous of Mr. LaHood to object to the idea that giving away value imposes a cost on the one providing the value (and I don’t mean the DOT, but the airlines who must honor the consumer’s exercise of the option).

A better solution might be to require airlines to explicitly offer the option of a no-penalty change within a 24-hour window. Then consumers could choose whether to pay the fee and airlines might discover the true market value of that option. Spirits’ $2 may be too high. More likely, it’s too low. Many airlines already do offer the option of a no-fee cancellation and the fare differential is much higher than $2, but that option typically has a much longer maturity…any time after booking up until departure. A shorter maturity window should command a lower option value.

Spirit Airlines may be the epitome of nickle-and-diming air travel consumers, something many consumers (myself included in some cases) don’t appreciate. However, there is no denying that Spirit understands the nature of options and their value. And there’s also no denying that, based on its stock price over the past year, Spirit is doing at least as well as industry leaders in providing consumers value for the options they choose. Perhaps instead of casting aspersions, Mr LaHood and his staff should invite Spirit to teach them about this fairly fundamental concept of options and option value rather than imposing regulations with so little regard for their true costs.

Posted in business, consumer protection, regulation, Sykuta | Tagged: , , | 1 Comment »

“Protecting” Consumers from the Truth About the Cost of Government

Posted by Thom Lambert on January 26, 2012

A new rule kicks in today requiring airlines to include all taxes and mandatory fees in their advertised fares.  The rule, part of a broader “passengers’ bill of rights”-type regulation promulgated by the Department of Transportation, is being sold as a proconsumer mandate:  It purportedly protects consumers from the sticker shock that results when they learn that the true consumer price for a flight, due to taxes and mandatory fees, is much higher than the advertised price.

But how consumer-friendly is this rule?  Won’t it be easier to raise taxes and fees when they aren’t presented as a line item, when consumers aren’t “startled” to see the exorbitant amount they’re paying for government services?  Value-added taxes (VATs), which tax the incremental value added at each stage of production and are generally included in the posted price for an item, have proven easier to raise than sales taxes, which are added at the register.  That’s because the latter are more visible so that increases are more likely to generate political opposition.  While VATs are common throughout Europe, they’re virtually non-existent in the United States, in part because we Americans have recognized the important role “tax sticker shock” plays in creating political accountability.

Consumer advocates, nevertheless, are lauding the new Department of Transportation rule.  They don’t seem to realize that higher taxes are bad for consumers and that taxes are more likely to rise when the government can hide them.  They also seem to care little about consumer sovereignty.  Don’t consumers have a right to know how much they’re paying to have scads of Homeland Security officers bark orders at them and gawk at their privates?

 

Posted in advertising, consumer protection, regulation, taxes | 8 Comments »

What if the Government Ordered the Human Rights Campaign to Cover Conversion Therapy for Gays?

Posted by Thom Lambert on January 23, 2012

A thought experiment:

It’s late January 2016.  Newt Gingrich is President.  The House of Representatives is solidly Republican, and there’s a slight Republican majority in the Senate.  Because Republicans lack a filibuster-proof majority in the Senate, the Affordable Care Act (a.k.a. Obamacare) remains on the books.  (The reconciliation process, which allowed the law to be enacted without supermajority support in the Senate, could not be used to repeal the law.)  The Act continues to require employer-provided insurance to provide full coverage for all preventive care measures.

Secretary Rick Santorum of the Department of Health and Human Services has determined that conversion therapy for gay males will help prevent all sorts of costly health problems.  HIV and related health problems, it seems, are extremely costly to treat and are far more common among gay men than among straight men.  HHS has determined that the most modern conversion therapies can cheaply and successfully alter sexual orientation or, at a minimum, reduce homosexual impulses so that they can be managed by homosexually oriented patients who would prefer not to engage in homosexual activity.

President Gingrich and Secretary Santorum have therefore mandated that employer-provided health insurance policies cover gay conversion therapies.  Claiming to be sensitive to the concerns of gay groups, they have included a narrow exemption for employers who don’t employ or serve significant numbers of straight people.  In reality, though, none of the major gay and lesbian advocacy groups (e.g., the Human Rights Campaign, GLAAD) or publishing organizations (e.g., The Advocate, OUT Magazine) could qualify for this exemption because all employ a great many gay-affirming straight people and include outreach to heterosexuals as one of their objectives.     

Can you imagine the howls from the New York Times, the television networks, and basically every other political commentator in America?  Andrew Sullivan might just explode.  And rightly so.  Forcing gay groups to pay for a procedure that so deeply offends their core principles would be beyond the pale in a liberal society that respects personal conscience and the right of individuals to associate in groups that share their values – a right that can exist only if groups are allowed to express those values and, to the extent they aren’t hurting others, order their affairs according to them.  

So why do President Obama and HHS Secretary Kathleen Sebelius get a pass when they order Catholic schools, hospitals, and social service agencies to cover birth control, sterilization, and the morning after pill?  The ridiculous “exemption” they created shows how little they know about what churches actually do:  Christ’s apostles themselves wouldn’t have qualified because they, like any church worth its salt, served multitudes of nonbelievers.  Providing an extra year to come into compliance does nothing to alleviate the fundamental problem (Is the doctrinal conflict going to disappear next year?) and is a transparent attempt to deflect media attention until after the 2012 election.  There are lots of Catholics in Ohio and Pennsylvania, after all.

One might say that my analogy fails because the science doesn’t show that gay conversion therapy actually works, and it therefore wouldn’t reduce total health care costs.  But that’s beside the point.  Even if there were a therapy that could cheaply and effectively make gay people straight (i.e., a pill or a quick surgical procedure) it would still be inappropriate to force groups whose central objective is to affirm gay people and fight anti-gay bias to provide coverage for such a therapy.

My point is not to defend the Catholic Church’s views on birth control (with which I disagree), to defend gay conversion therapy (which I think is a harmful crock), or to question the mission of gay rights organizations.  Instead, I mean to point out that governments in liberal societies do not force individuals or voluntary associations to violate their consciences where their conscience-following does not violate the rights of others.  Yet another example of Obamacare’s heavy hand.

Posted in free to choose, health care reform debate, musings, politics, regulation | 10 Comments »

A Decision-Theoretic Approach to Insider Trading Regulation

Posted by Thom Lambert on January 19, 2012

Regular readers will know that several of us TOTM bloggers are fans of the “decision-theoretic” approach to antitrust law.  Such an approach, which Josh and Geoff often call an “error cost” approach, recognizes that antitrust liability rules may misfire in two directions:  they may wrongly acquit harmful practices, and they may wrongly convict beneficial (or benign) behavior.  Accordingly, liability rules should be structured to minimize total error costs (welfare losses from condemning good stuff and acquitting bad stuff), while keeping in check the costs of administering the rules (e.g., the costs courts and business planners incur in applying the rules).  The goal, in other words, should be to minimize the sum of decision and error costs.  As I have elsewhere demonstrated, the Roberts Court’s antitrust jurisprudence seems to embrace this sort of approach.

One of my long-term projects (once I jettison some administrative responsibilities, like co-chairing my school’s dean search committee!) will be to apply the decision-theoretic approach to regulation generally.  I hope to build upon some classic regulatory scholarship, like Alfred Kahn’s Economics of Regulation (1970) and Justice Breyer’s Regulation and Its Reform (1984), to craft a systematic regulatory model that both avoids “regulatory mismatch” (applying the wrong regulatory fix to a particular type of market failure) and incorporates the decision-theoretic perspective. 

In the meantime, I’ve been thinking about insider trading regulation.  Our friend Professor Bainbridge recently invited me to contribute to a volume he’s editing on insider trading.  I’m planning to conduct a decision-theoretic analysis of actual and proposed insider trading regulation.

Such regulation is a terrific candidate for decision-theoretic analysis because stock trading on the basis of material, nonpublic information itself is a “mixed bag” practice:  Some instances of insider trading are, on net, socially beneficial; others create net welfare losses.  Contrast, for example, two famous insider trading cases:

  • In SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur, mining company insiders who knew of an unannounced ore discovery purchased stock in their company, knowing that the stock price would rise when the discovery was announced.  Their trading activity caused the stock price to rise over time.  Such price movement might have tipped off landowners in the vicinity of the deposit and caused them not to sell their property to the company (or to do so only at a high price), in which case the traders’ activity would have thwarted a valuable corporate opportunity.  If corporations cannot exploit their discoveries of hidden value (because of insider trading), they’ll be less likely to seek out hidden value in the first place, and social welfare will be reduced.  TGS thus represents “bad” insider trading.  
  • Dirks v. SEC, by contrast, illustrates “good” insider trading.  In that case, an insider tipped a securities analyst that a company was grossly overvalued because of rampant fraud.  The analyst recommended that his clients sell (or buy puts on) the stock of the fraud-ridden corporation.  That trading helped expose the fraud, creating social value in the form of more accurate stock prices.

These are just two examples of how insider trading may reduce or enhance social welfare.  In general, instances of insider trading may reduce social welfare by preventing firms from exploiting and thus creating valuable information (as in TGS), by creating incentives for deliberate mismanagement (because insiders can benefit from “bad news” and might therefore be encouraged to “create” it), and perhaps by limiting stock market liquidity or reducing market efficiency by increasing bid-ask spreads.  On the other hand, instances of insider trading may enhance social welfare by making stock markets more efficient (so that prices better reflect firms’ expected profitability and capital is more appropriately channeled), by reducing firms’ compensation costs (as the right to engage in insider trading replaces managers’ cash compensation—on this point, see the excellent work by our former blog colleague, Todd Henderson), and by reducing the corporate mismanagement and subsequent wealth destruction that comes from stock mispricing (mainly overvaluation of equity—see work by Michael Jensen and yours truly).

Because insider trading is sometimes good and sometimes bad, rules restricting it may err in two directions:  they may acquit/encourage bad instances, or they may condemn/prevent good instances.  In either case, social welfare suffers.  Accordingly, the optimal regulatory regime would seek to minimize the sum of losses from improper condemnations and improper acquittals (total error costs), while keeping administrative costs in check.

My contribution to Prof. Bainbridge’s insider trading book will employ decision theory to evaluate three actual or proposed approaches to regulating insider trading:  (1) the “level playing field” paradigm, apparently favored by many prosecutors and securities regulators, which would condemn any stock trading on the basis of material, nonpublic information; (2) the legal status quo, which deems “fraudulent” any insider trading where the trader owes either a fiduciary duty to his trading partner or a duty of trust or confidence to the source of his nonpublic information; and (3) a laissez-faire, “contractarian” approach, which would permit corporations and sources of nonpublic information to posit their own rules about when insiders and informed outsiders may trade on the basis of material, nonpublic information.  I’ll then propose a fourth disclosure-based alternative aimed at maximizing social welfare by enhancing the social benefits and reducing the social costs of insider trading, while keeping decision costs in check. 

Stay tuned…I’ll be trying out a few of the paper’s ideas on TOTM.  I look forward to hearing our informed readers’ thoughts.

Posted in 10b-5, error costs, insider trading, law and economics, markets, regulation, securities regulation | Comments Off

Some Much-Needed Antitrust Skepticism on Senate Letter Urging FTC Google Investigation

Posted by Geoffrey Manne on December 20, 2011

By Geoffrey Manne and Berin Szoka

[Cross posted at TechFreedom.org]

Back in September, the Senate Judiciary Committee’s Antitrust Subcommittee held a hearing on “The Power of Google: Serving Consumers or Threatening Competition?” Given the harsh questioning from the Subcommittee’s Chairman Herb Kohl (D-WI) and Ranking Member Mike Lee (R-UT), no one should have been surprised by the letter they sent yesterday to the Federal Trade Commission asking for a “thorough investigation” of the company. At least this time the danger is somewhat limited: by calling for the FTC to investigate Google, the senators are thus urging the agency to do . . . exactly what it’s already doing.

So one must wonder about the real aim of the letter. Unfortunately, the goal does not appear to be to offer an objective appraisal of the complex issues intended to be addressed at the hearing. That’s disappointing (though hardly surprising) and underscores what we noted at the time of the hearing: There’s something backward about seeing a company hauled before a hostile congressional panel and asked to defend itself, rather than its self-appointed prosecutors being asked to defend their case.

Senators Kohl and Lee insist that they take no position on the legality of Google’s actions, but their lopsided characterization of the issues in the letter—and the fact that the FTC is already doing what they purport to desire as the sole outcome of the letter!—leaves little room for doubt about their aim: to put political pressure on the FTC not merely to investigate, but to reach a particular conclusion and bring a case in court (or simply to ratchet up public pressure from its bully pulpit).

The five page letter concludes with, literally, three sentences presenting Google’s case, one of which reads, in its entirety, “Google strongly denies the arguments of its critics.” The derision is palpable—as if only a craven monopolist would deign to actually deny the iron-clad arguments of Google’s competitors so painstakingly reproduced by Senators Kohl and Lee in the preceding four pages. This is neither rigorous analysis nor objective reporting on the contents of the Senate’s hearing.

While we worry about particularly successful companies being singled out for punishment, we hold no brief for Google in this debate. Instead, in all our writings, we’ve tried to present a consistently skeptical view about a worrisome trend in antitrust enforcement in high tech markets: error-prone and costly intervention in markets that are ill-understood and fast-moving, to the great detriment of consumers and progress generally. Although our institutions have received financial support from Google among a range of other companies, organizations and individuals, our work is focused on this broad mission; we have no obligation or intention to support any company simply because it finds value in supporting our mission.

We’ve defended (and one of us has even worked for) Microsoft in the past, and just yesterday, we lamented the fact that the Obama Justice Department and the FCC have effectively blocked Google’s arch-rival, AT&T, from buying T-Mobile. Rather than defend any particular company, our goal, to paraphrase Hayek, is to “demonstrate to [regulators] how little they really know about what they imagine they can design”—lest they undermine how competition actually works in the name of defending outdated models of how they think it should work. Unfortunately, the letter from Senators Kohl and Lee does nothing to assuage our concern and suggests instead that crass politics, rather than sensible economics, could determine the outcome of cases like this one—if not in a court of law, then in the court of public opinion and extra-legal intimidation.

To begin with, the letter asserts that “Google faces competition from only one general search engine, Bing,” suggesting that only Bing (and it, only ineffectively) could keep Google in check. In essence, the Senators are prejudging an essential question on which any case against Google would turn: market definition. But why would the market not include other tools for information retrieval? Is it not at least worth mentioning that more and more Internet users are finding information and spending time on social networks like Facebook and Twitter, while more and more advertisers are spending their money on these Google competitors? Isn’t it clear that search itself is evolving from “ten blue links” into something more social, multi-faceted and interactive?

In a remarkable leap, the senators then identify the specific alleged abuse that Google’s alleged market power leads to: search bias. That’s remarkable because, other than the breathless claims of disgruntled competitors (given plenty of air time at the September hearing), there is actually no evidence that search bias is, in fact, harmful to consumers—which is what antitrust is concerned with. (Read both sides of this debate in TechFreedom’s free ebook, The Next Digital Decade: Essays on the Future of the Internet.)

As our colleague, Josh Wright, has thoroughly demonstrated, this “own-content” bias is actually an infrequent phenomenon and is simply not consistent with an actionable claim of anticompetitive foreclosure. Moreover, among search engines, Google references its own content far less frequently than does Bing (which favors Microsoft content in the first search result when no other search engine does so more than twice as often as Google favors its own content).

Of course, none of this is even hinted at in the Senators’ letter, which seems intended to condemn Google for “preferencing” its own content (under the pretense of withholding judgment). It’s a little like condemning Target for deigning to use its trucks to supply inventory only to its own stores instead of Wal-Mart’s, or, say, condemning a congressman for targeting earmarks for his own state or district. Earmark bias! Read the rest of this entry »

Posted in antitrust, error costs, exclusionary conduct, federal trade commission, google, Internet search, law and economics, markets, monopolization, regulation, technology | Tagged: , , , , , , , , , | 3 Comments »

 
Follow

Get every new post delivered to your Inbox.

Join 1,034 other followers