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Archive for the ‘privacy’ Category

Privacy and Tracking

Posted by Paul H. Rubin on March 12, 2011

First I would like to thank Geoff Manne for inviting me to join this blog.  I know most of my fellow bloggers and it is a group I am proud to be associated with.

For my first few posts I am going to write about privacy.  This is a hot topic.  Senators McCain and Kerry are floating a privacy bill, and the FTC is also looking at privacy. I have written a lot about privacy (mostly with Tom Lenard of the Technology Policy Institute, where I am a senior fellow).

The issue of the day is “tracking.”  There are several proposals for “do not track” legislation and polls show that consumers do not want to be tracked.

The entire fear of being tracked is based on an illusion.  It is a deep illusion, and difficult or impossible to eliminate, but still an illusion.   People are uncomfortable with the idea that someone knows what they are doing.  (It is “creepy.”)  But in fact no person knows what you are doing, even if you are being tracked. Only a machine knows.

As humans, we have difficulty understanding that something can be “known” but nonetheless not known by anyone.   We do not understand that we can be “tracked” but that no one is tracking us.  That is, data on our searches may exist on a server somewhere so that the server “knows” it, but no human knows it.  We don’t intuitively grasp this concept because it it entirely alien to our evolved intelligence.

In my most recent paper (with Michael Hammock, coming out in Competition Policy International) we cite two books by Clifford Nass ( C. Nass & C. Yen, The Man Who Lied to His Laptop: What Machines Teach Us About Human Relationships (2010), and B. Reeves & C. Nass, The Media Equation: How People Treat Computers, Television, and New Media Like Real People and Places (1996, 2002).)  Nass and his coauthors show that people automatically treat intelligent machines like other people.  For example, if asked to fill out a questionnaire about the quality of a computer, they rate the machine higher if they are filling out the form on the computer being rated than if it on another computer — they don’t want to hurt the computer’s feelings.  Privacy is like that — people can’t adapt to the notion that a machine knows something. They assume (probably unconsciously) that if somethingis known then a person knows it, and this is why they do not like being tracked.

One final point about tracking.  Even if you are tracked, the purpose is to find out what you want and sell it to you.  Selling people things they want is the essence of the market economy, and if tracking does a better job of this, then it is helping the market function better, and also helping consumers get products that are a better fit.  Why should this make anyone mad?

Posted in advertising, consumer protection, privacy, regulation, truth on the market | Tagged: , , | 14 Comments »

Watch me discuss the future of the Internet and its regulation on Ideas in Action

Posted by Geoffrey Manne on March 8, 2011

Larry Downes (who, like me, is a senior fellow at TechFreedom and a contributor to the excellent book, The Next Digital Decade: Essays on the Future of the Internet) and I taped an episode of Jim Glassman’s talking head show, Ideas in Action, a couple months ago, and it is airing this week on PBS stations around the country.  Except in Portland, where I live.  But have no fear–because the Internet remains sufficiently unregulated, you can get it right here.  The topic is “The Next Digital Decade: How Will the Internet Change by 2020?”  It’s a narrow topic.  In the 27 minutes allotted, we manage to cover telecom regulation, antitrust, net neutrality, privacy, IP, standards, public choice theory, culture, political repression, technological innovation and a few more topics for good measure.  Not to spoil the ending, but asked at the end what we thought the biggest danger to the Internet is in the coming decade, I answered errant antitrust enforcement (when the only tool you have is a hammer . . .); Larry answered privacy.  Enjoy.

Posted in announcements, antitrust, business, google, intellectual property, law and economics, markets, politics, privacy, regulation, technology, television | Tagged: , , , , , , , , , | 1 Comment »

The FTC and the Internet

Posted by Josh Wright on January 16, 2011

I will be discussing the titular topic at a Federalist Society panel (sponsored by the NY City Lawyers Chapter) along with Richard Epstein (NYU Law) and Jonathan Baker (Chief Economist, FCC) Tuesday night at the Cornell Club.  Registration details are available at the link above.  Here is the event description:

The Federal Trade Commission is more active than ever in its assertion of authority in the virtual world. The FTC’s role is generally understood to include competition analysis, consumer protection, and policy advocacy. How are each of these functions best accomplished by the FTC in the virtual world? Are there special attributes of the internet and e-commerce that require the FTC to modify its traditional regulatory approach? Will the FTC’s planned “Do Not Track” policy be an overall good, or a market inhibiter? Our experts will examine these and other questions.

I’m very much looking forward to it.

Posted in antitrust, economics, federal trade commission, google, privacy, regulation, technology | Comments Off

Competition in the Evolving Digital Marketplace–Congressional Hearing

Posted by Geoffrey Manne on September 15, 2010

I will be testifying tomorrow before the House Judiciary Committee’s Subcommittee on Courts and Competition Policy on competition in the digital marketplace.  My testimony won’t be surprising to readers of this blog–in fact some of it was lifted directly from blog posts that have appeared here.  Also on the panel are Richard Feinstein from the FTC, Edward Black from CCIA, Morgan Reed from ACT, Scott Cleland from Precursor LLP and Mark Cooper from the Consumer Federation of America.

For some reason the links to written testimony on the House website don’t seem to be working, but my testimony is available here.

A taste for those who prefer not to devour the whole thing:

In brief, given the link between innovation and economic growth, the stakes of “getting it right” are high.  Caution and humility are warranted in light of both the historical hostility towards innovative business practices by competition policy as well as the large gaps of empirically-validated theory in the economic literature on competition and innovation.  The traditional problem of identifying and distinguishing pro-competitive from anticompetitive conduct faced by enforcers and courts in all antitrust cases is a difficult one.  But those difficulties are exacerbated in innovative industries.

Both product and business innovations involve novel practices, and such practices generally result in monopoly explanations from the economics profession followed by hostility from the courts (though sometimes in reverse order) and then a subsequent, more nuanced economic understanding of the business practice usually recognizing its pro-competitive virtues.  This sequence and outcome is exactly what one might expect in a world where economists’ career incentives skew in favor of generating models that demonstrate inefficiencies and debunk the economics status quo, while defendants engaged in business practices that have evolved over time through trial and error have a difficult time articulating a justification that fits one of a court’s checklist of acceptable answers.  In the words of Nobel economist Ronald Coase,

[i]f an economist finds something—a business practice of one sort or another—that he does not understand, he looks for a monopoly explanation.  And as in this field we are rather ignorant, the number of un-understandable practices tends to be rather large, and the reliance on monopoly explanations frequent.”

From an error-cost perspective, the critical point is that antitrust scrutiny of innovation and innovative business practices is likely to be biased in the direction of assigning higher likelihood that a given practice is anticompetitive than the subsequent literature and evidence will ultimately suggest is reasonable or accurate.

I look forward to mixing it up again with Scott Cleland.  Last time we met it was over similar issues (specifically revolving around Google), and the audio of that event is available here.

Posted in antitrust, google, international center for law & economics, law and economics, privacy, technology | Tagged: , , , , , , | 2 Comments »

Facile claims of behavioral economics: too much choice; not enough privacy

Posted by Geoffrey Manne on May 17, 2010

Chris Hoofnagle writing at the TAP blog about Facebook’s comprehensive privacy options (“To opt out of full disclosure of most information, it is necessary to click through more than 50 privacy buttons, which then require choosing among a total of more than 170 options.”) claims that:

This approach is brilliant. The company can appease regulators with this approach (e.g. Facebook’s Elliot Schrage is quoted as saying, “We have tried to offer the most comprehensive and detailed controls and comprehensive and detailed information about them.”), and at the same time appear to be giving consumers the maximum number of options.

But this approach is manipulative and is based upon a well-known problem in behavioral economics known as the “paradox of choice.”

Too much choice can make decisions more difficult, and once made, those choices tend to be regretted.

But most importantly, too much choice causes paralysis. This is the genius of the Facebook approach: give consumer too much choice, and they will 1) take poor choices, thereby increasing revelation of personal information and higher ROI or 2) take no choice, with the same result. In any case, the fault is the consumer’s, because they were given a choice!

Of all the policy claims made on behalf of behavioral economics, the one that says there is value in suppressing available choices is one of the most pernicious–and absurd.  First, the problem may be “well-known,” but it is not, in fact, well-established.  Citing to one (famous) study purporting to find that decisions are made more difficult when decision-makers are confronted with a wider range of choices is not compelling when the full range of studies demonstrates a “mean effect size of virtually zero.”  In other words, on average, more choice has no discernible effect on decision-making.

But there is more–and it is what proponents of this canard opportunistically (and disingenuously, I believe) leave out:  There is evidence (hardly surprising) that more choices leads to greater satisfaction with the decisions that are made.  And of course this is the case:  People have heterogeneous preferences.  The availability of a wider range of choices is not necessarily optimal for any given decision-maker, particularly one with already-well-formed preferences.  But a wider range of choices is more likely to include the optimal choice for the greatest number of heterogeneous decision-makers selecting from the same set of options.  Even if it is true (and it appears not to be true) that more choice impairs decision-making, there is a trade-off that advocates like Hoofnagle (not himself a behavioral economist, so I don’t necessarily want to tar the discipline with the irresponsible use of its output by outsiders with policy agendas and no expertise in the field) typically ignore.  Confronting each individual decision-maker with more choices is a by-product of offering a greater range of choices to accommodate variation across decision-makers.  Of course we can offer everyone cars only in black.  And some people will be quite happy with the outcome, and delighted also that they have avoided the terrible pain of being forced to decide among a wealth of options that they didn’t even want.  But many other people, still perhaps benefiting from avoiding the onerous decision-making process, will nevertheless be disappointed that there was no option they really preferred. Read the rest of this entry »

Posted in economics, google, law and economics, politics, privacy, technology | Tagged: , , , , , , | Comments Off

Debating Google

Posted by Geoffrey Manne on December 16, 2009

Apologies for the late notice on this.  Last week I was on a Federalist Society panel discussing Google’s antitrust issues with Rick Rule, Susan Creighton and Scott Cleland.  The event description follows, and you can find audio of the panel here.  It was an interesting discussion, full of nice ironies in that Microsoft’s chief outside antitrust defender was attacking Google with theories similar to those used against him in the DOJ case, and Google’s chief outside antitrust defender was the author of antitrust case against Microsoft and author of the paper (on cheap exclusion) that was being used as the basis for the case against . . . Google.  Good fun.  Any thoughts from anyone who attended?

Is Google Monopolizing Something, and If So, What?

Federalist Society Corporations, Securities and Antitrust Practice Group

December 7, 2009Is Google Monopolizing Something, and If So, What?.  Last June, Christine Varney, then a lawyer in private practice, now President Obama’s nominee to be the next Assistant Attorney General for Antitrust, warned that Google, not Microsoft, is the monopolist of the future.  “For me, Microsoft is so last century. They are not the problem,” Varney said at a June 19 panel discussion sponsored by the American Antitrust Institute. The U.S. economy will “continually see a problem — potentially with Google” because it already “has acquired a monopoly in Internet online advertising.”  Concerns of this nature ultimately led Tom Barnett, the last Assistant Attorney General for Antitrust, to threaten a Sherman Act monopolization lawsuit if Google went through with plans to buy Yahoo.  Google, on the other hand, contends that the concerns are completely misplaced.  “The nature of the Internet is just a fundamentally different world from the sale of packaged software or the bundling of software with OEMs (original equipment manufacturers),” according to Kent Walker, Google’s General Counsel.  “The standard line we have is that competition is just one click away.”

[ Full Audio]
Audio Running Time: 01:32:58

Panelists:

  • Mr. Scott Cleland, President, Precursor LLC and Chairman, NetCompetition.org
  • Ms. Susan Creighton, Partner, Wilson Sonsini Goodrich & Rosati, PC
  • Prof. Geoffrey Manne, Founder and Executive Director, International Center for Law & Economics and Lecturer in Law, Lewis & Clark Law School
  • Mr. Rick Rule, Partner, Cadwalader, Wickersham & Taft LLP
  • Moderator: Mr. Montgomery N. Kosma, Vice President of Legal Services Outsourcing, CPA Global

Posted in announcements, antitrust, google, law and economics, privacy | Comments Off

Is Google or the government the problem?

Posted by Geoffrey Manne on December 3, 2009

Well, you probably know my answer to that one.

I was interested to read Fred von Lohmann’s short take on the privacy aspects of the Google Books Settlement, available here.

Fred and the EFF have, basically, two concerns.  The first is that

[t]he products and services envisioned by the proposed settlement will give Google not only an unprecedented abililty to track our reading habits, but to do so at an unprecedented level of granularity. Because the books will be accessed on Google’s servers, Google will not only know what books readers search for and access, but will also know which pages they read, how long they stayed on each page, what book they read before, and which books they access next. This is a level of reader surveillance that no library or bookstore has ever had.

But who–or what–is “Google” in this statement?  Is there ever an actual person, rather than a software program, tracking our reading habits?  If not, what’s the concern?  Computers don’t judge, and any chilling effect would have to be severely, if not completely, mitigated by the knowledge that the only tracking being done is being done by a string of 1s and 0s in a computer.  And even if there is an actual person at Google with access, who cares?  I don’t mean that rhetorically.  I mean, how many people care if some random Google employee could possibly, maybe know their reading habits?  How likely is it that out of the massive amount of data streaming through Google’s computers, any particular person’s data would be noticed or viewed by a person?  I’d have to say the risk is statistically indistinguishable from zero.

Moreover, privacy advocates like the EFF often act as if there are no corresponding benefits to Google’s ability to track our reading habits.  In fact, I can think of many, and at first glance it seems like these dramatically outweigh the potential cost of Google’s computers “knowing” even everything about me, let alone just my reading habits.

The EFF’s second concern is that

it’s not just Google that might want records about your reading habits. A core concern EFF has with the proposed settlement is that under it Google need not insist on a warrant before turning over this sensitive reader information to governmental authorities or private third parties. This is hardly a hypothetical risk: between 2001 and 2005, libraries were contacted by law enforcement seeking information on patrons at least 200 times. And in 2006 alone, AOL received almost 1,000 requests each month for information in civil and criminal cases.

Now I have much more sympathy with the concern about the government snooping–after all, even if “Google” knows my reading habits perfectly, it’s not clear to me that they have any incentive or ability to do anything about it.  The government, on the other hand, is very different.  I just don’t see how this is Google’s problem.

I have never understood why organizations like the EFF and commentators like Larry Lessig make so little of the distinction between private and public access to personal information.  In one case, the consequence could be the use of force by the state; in the other the consequence could be . . . that a computer programmer in Mountain View laughs at the fact that you read “Getting It Up Without Viagra” 4 times last month.

Why this should be Google’s problem, I have no idea.  I discussed this issue before:

I find it interesting that the “blame” for privacy incursions by the government is being laid at Google’s feet. Google isn’t doing the . . . incursioning, and we wouldn’t have to saddle Google with any costs of protection (perhaps even lessening functionality) if we just nipped the problem in the bud. Importantly, the implication here is that government should not have access to the information in question–a decision that sounds inherently political to me. I’m just a little surprised to hear anyone (other than me) saying that corporations should take it upon themselves to “fix” government policy by, in effect, destroying records.

If the problem is government access to private information, then take away the government’s right to access that information.  In fact, as Fred points out,

This lack of protections for reader privacy stands in sharp contrast to the privacy protections that librarians and bookstores have been fighting for in connection with physical books for decades. Nearly every state has laws protecting the privacy of library patrons. Yet when Google scans books it got from libraries, privacy protections could be left behind at the digital threshold if Google doesn’t stand up for them.

Precisely.  Pass a law.  This is not an issue for Google, and certainly not a reason to oppose the settlement.  Use of Google Books is entirely voluntary, and the only appreciable threat is from the government’s access to private information via Google.  So stop the government, don’t stop Google.

Posted in intellectual property, markets, privacy, technology | Comments Off

GMU/Microsoft Conference on the Law & Economics of Innovation

Posted by Geoffrey Manne on April 12, 2009

UPDATE 3:  It just keeps getting better.  Now we’ve added Mike Baye, formerly Director of the Bureau of Economics at the FTC, now returned to his post at Indiana.  He’ll be moderating and I’m sure commenting on many of the papers. 

UPDATE 2: And now Susan DeSanti, newly-appointed Director of the Office of Policy and Planning at the FTC has signed on for our industry/regulator roundtable.  A not-to-be-missed event! 

UPDATE:  We’re delighted to announce that Bill Kovacic will be joining us to deliver the conference’s morning keynote, as well.  A great conference just got even better!

 For the third year, Josh and I have organized the annual George Mason Law School/Microsoft Conference on the Law and Economics of Innovation.  The conference is at the Arlington Hilton on May 7; registration is free. 

This year’s conference is on “Online Markets vs. Traditional Markets,” and once again we have a stellar line-up.  The (beautifully re-designed) conference website is here.  You can register for the conference here

This year features a keynote address from Susan Athey (Harvard Economics; Clark Medal winner), as well as the following presentations:

Peter Klein (Missouri Economics)– Does the New Economy Need a New Economics?
Thomas W. Hazlett (George Mason Law) – The Role of Exclusive Spectrum Rights in Wireless Network Innovations: Of Newtons, Blackberries, iPhones & G-Phones
Eric Goldman (Santa Clara Law) – The Economics of Reputational Information

Florencia Marotta-Wurgler (NYU Law) – Does Anyone Read Fine Print? A Test of the Informed Minority Hypothesis
Howard Beales (George Washington Business) – Public Goods, Private Information, and Anonymous Transactions: Providing a Safe and Interesting Internet
Peter Swire (Ohio State Law) – Privacy and Antitrust

Philip J. Weiser (Colorado Law; DOJ)— Re-evaluating the Theory and Realities of Online Contracts
Randal C. Picker (Chicago Law) — The Mediated Book
F. Scott Kieff (Wash U. Law (moving to George Washington Law)) — Commerce in the Shadow of the Commons: Business Models in Cyberspace

We’ll also have an industry roundtable to reflect on the day with representatives from Microsoft, Amazon and Facebook.

Should be a great conference–Please join us!

Posted in announcements, google, law and economics, privacy, technology | Comments Off

A Few Thoughts on Privacy and Antitrust

Posted by Josh Wright on July 8, 2008

In the comments to this post, Peter Swire (Ohio State) points to some recent comments (see also here and  here) he submitted to the Federal Trade Commission on how to incorporate privacy into conventional antitrust analysis.  The privacy and antitrust link appears to be something that will receive quite a bit of attention in the coming months and years.  The basic argument in favor of incorporating privacy into antitrust analysis under appropriate circumstances is not too controversial:

  • Antitrust exists to protect against the exercise of market power that reduces consumer welfare
  • Reductions in non-price competition can reduce consumer welfare
  • Privacy can be a form of non-price competition in some markets
  • Ergo, antitrust analysis ought to be concerned with privacy concerns

The first three bullet points are easy to understand.  I agree with Swire’s comments that to the extent that privacy amenities (or services or rights) can be an important dimension of non-price competition, antitrust analysis must be flexible enough to incorporate those concerns.  Indeed, each of the Commissioners evaluating the Google/Doubleclick merger agreed that privacy concerns are part of the consumer welfare analysis.

What seems to me to be missing in this discussion is a theory of how a particular merger will change the incentives of the firm to provide privacy amenities as a form of non-price competition.  Modern merger analysis, especially in the unilateral effects context which seems most relevant here, focuses on the question of how the pricing incentives of the post-merger firm change after the merger.   There is a substantial economics literature now which has increased our understanding of how mergers might impact pricing incentives.  It is generally no longer sufficient in merger cases to point to an increase in concentration by itself as support for the assertion that consumer welfare will be harmed.  An agency challenging a merger must present a compelling competitive effects story.  Here, the competitive effects are going to be privacy-related.  It seems to me that to move forward from “privacy should count in antitrust analysis because it is a form of non-price competition” to “this merger will reduce privacy and harm consumers” one must have a theory that explains: (1) why the specific merger changes the firms incentives to provide privacy amenities above and beyond a showing that the merger increases concentration, and (2) if the merger creates market power, why the firm will exercise that power in the form of reducing privacy rather than increasing the price.

Thoughts?

Posted in antitrust, economics, mergers & acquisitions, privacy, regulation, technology | Comments Off

Picker on Competition, Privacy and Web 2.0

Posted by Josh Wright on July 5, 2008

Randy Picker (HT: Randy) has posted an interesting new paper to SSRN entitled “Competition and Privacy in Web 2.0 and the Cloud“.   It is an insightful look at the how privacy rules imposed on Web intermediaries might raise competition concerns.  Consider, for example, the relationship between privacy rules and vertical integration that Picker highlights as a potential unintended consequence of privacy rules:

As most disclosure limits don’t prevent disclosure within a particular firm but only bar disclosure across firm boundaries, a firm will have an artificial incentive to expand the size and scope of the firm so as to use the information fully. Vertical integration renders the disclosure limit ineffective. We might see mergers that would otherwise be unattractive as a way to end-run the
across-firm disclosure limits.

A related issue that is outside the scope of Picker’s short essay, but will likely remain a hot-button issue in the years to come, is the question of whether antitrust law should incorporate privacy concerns into its competitive effects analysis, and if so, how?  (See, e.g. the various positions taken by Commissioners in approving the recent Google/Doubleclick matter at the FTC)

Posted in antitrust, economics, federal trade commission, google, legal scholarship, mergers & acquisitions, privacy, regulation, scholarship, technology | 2 Comments »

 
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