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Archive for the ‘patent’ Category

Epstein, Kieff & Spulber Eviscerate the FTC’s Proposal on Regulating SSOs

Posted by Geoffrey Manne on August 24, 2011

In a thorough and convincing paper, “The FTC’s Proposal for Regulating IP through SSOs Would Replace Private Coordination with Government Hold-Up,” Richard Epstein, Scott Kieff and Dan Spulber assess and then decimate the FTC’s proposal on patent notice and remedies, “The Evolving IP Marketplace: Aligning Patent Notice and Remedies with Competition.”  Note Epstein, Kieff and Spulber:

In its recent report entitled “The Evolving IP Marketplace,” the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) advances a far‐reaching regulatory approach (Proposal) whose likely effect would be to distort the operation of the intellectual property (IP) marketplace in ways that will hamper the innovation and commercialization of new technologies. The gist of the FTC Proposal is to rely on highly non-­standard and misguided definitions of economic terms of art such as “ex ante” and “hold-­up,” while urging new inefficient rules for calculating damages for patent infringement. Stripped of the technicalities, the FTC Proposal would so reduce the costs of infringement by downstream users that the rate of infringement would unduly increase, as potential infringers find it in their interest to abandon the voluntary market in favor of a more attractive system of judicial pricing. As the number of nonmarket transactions increases, the courts will play an ever larger role in deciding the terms on which the patents of one party may be used by another party. The adverse effects of this new trend will do more than reduce the incentives for innovation; it will upset the current set of well-­‐functioning private coordination activities in the IP marketplace that are needed to accomplish the commercialization of new technologies. Such a trend would seriously undermine capital formation, job growth, competition, and the consumer welfare the FTC seeks to promote.

Focusing in particular on SSOs, the trio homes in on the potential incentive problem created by the FTC’s proposal:

The central problem with the FTC’s approach is that it would interfere seriously with the helpful incentives all parties in the IP marketplace presently have to contract with each other. The FTC’s approach ignores the powerful incentives that it creates in putative licenses to spurn the voluntary market in order to obtain a strategic advantage over the licensor. In any voluntary market, the low rates that go to initial licensees reflect the uncertainty of the value of the patented technology at the time the license is issued. Once that technology has proven its worth, there is no sound reason to allow any potential licensee who instead held out from the originally offered deal to get bargain rates down the road. Allowing such an option would make the holdout better off than the contracting party. Such holdouts would not need to take licenses for technologies with low value, while resting assured they would still get technologies with high value at below market rates. The FTC seems to overlook that a well-­‐functioning patent damage system should do more than merely calibrate damages after the fact. An efficient approach to damages is one that also reduces the number of infringements overall by making sure that the infringer cannot improve his economic position by his own wrong.

The FTC Proposal rests on the misguided conviction that the law should not allow a licensor to “demand and obtain royalty payments based on the infringer’s switching costs” once the manufacturer has “sunk costs into using the technology;” and it labels any such payments as the result of “hold-­up.”

As Epstein, et al. discuss, current private ordering (reciprocal dealing, repeat play, RAND terms, etc.) works perfectly well to address real hold-up problems, and the FTC seems to be both defining the problem oddly and, thus, creating a problem that doesn’t really exist.

Although not discussed directly, the paper owes a great deal to the great Ben Klein and especially his paper, Why Hold-Ups Occur: The Self-Enforcing Range of Contractual Relationships (to say nothing of Klein, Crawford & Alchian, of course).  Likewise, although not discussed in the paper, Josh and Bruce Kobayashi’s excellent paper, Federalism, Substantive Preemption and Limits on Antitrust: An Application to Patent Holdup is an essential precursor to this paper, addressing the comparative merits of antitrust  and contract-based evaluation of claimed patent holdups in SSOs.

Highly-recommended and an important addition to the ever-interesting antitrust/IP discussion.

Posted in antitrust, armen alchian, economics, federal trade commission, law and economics, legal scholarship, patent, scholarship | Tagged: , , | 3 Comments »

New on SSRN: Kobayashi and Ribstein on private lawmaking

Posted by Larry Ribstein on July 18, 2011

The paper, with Kobayashi, is Law As A Byproduct: Theories Of Private Law Production.  Here’s the abstract:

Public lawmakers lack incentives to engage in a socially optimal amount of legal innovation. Private lawmaking is a potential solution to this problem. However, private lawmaking faces a dilemma: In order to be effective privately produced laws need to be publicly enacted, but under current law enactment eliminates the intellectual property rights that are essential to motivate private lawmakers. Because of this dilemma, much private lawmaking is done as a byproduct of other activities. The mixed incentives entailed in this “byproduct” approach make it a second-best response to the problems of public lawmaking. Potential solutions involve finding a better balance between public access and private rights.

The paper treats the creation of law as a form of intellectual property.  The central problem the paper identifies is the weakness of intellectual property protection of law.  This forces private lawmaking into the second-best world of “byproduct” lawmaking, where private lawmaking is essentially a form of lobbying.  This particularly includes the practicing bar’s significant role in lawmaking, and uniform laws.  The paper draws illustrations of byproduct laws from the development of the limited liability company, including the “L3C” spinoff.  We conclude with suggestions of how to fix intellectual property law to bring private lawmaking closer to a first-best world.

This paper is a natural outgrowth of several strands of my work alone and with others, including on LLCs and uncorporations, jurisdictional competition, lawyers as lawmakers, uniform laws, the “information revolution’s” effect on the law industry, and law teaching.

Posted in copyright, intellectual property, Jurisdictional competition, lawyers, legal profession, limited liability companies, patent, uncorporations | 1 Comment »

Advance praise for Manne & Wright book on regulating innovation

Posted by Geoffrey Manne on May 25, 2011

Our book, Competition Policy and Patent Law Under Uncertainty: Regulating Innovation will be published by Cambridge University Press in July.  The book’s page on the CUP website is here.

I just looked at the site to check on the publication date and I was delighted to see the advance reviews of the book.  They are pretty incredible, and we’re honored to have such impressive scholars, among the very top in our field and among our most significant influences, saying such nice things about the book:

After a century of exponential growth in innovation, we have reached an era of serious doubts about the sustainability of the trend. Manne and Wright have put together a first-rate collection of essays addressing two of the important policy levers – competition law and patent law – that society can pull to stimulate or retard technological progress. Anyone interested in the future of innovation should read it.

Daniel A. Crane, University of Michigan

Here, in one volume, is a collection of papers by outstanding scholars who offer readers insightful new discussions of a wide variety of patent policy problems and puzzles. If you seek fresh, bright thoughts on these matters, this is your source.

Harold Demsetz, University of California, Los Angeles

This volume is an essential compendium of the best current thinking on a range of intersecting subjects – antitrust and patent law, dynamic versus static competition analysis, incentives for innovation, and the importance of humility in the formulation of policies concerning these subjects, about which all but first principles are uncertain and disputed. The essays originate in two conferences organized by the editors, who attracted the leading scholars in their respective fields to make contributions; the result is that rara avis, a contributed volume more valuable even than the sum of its considerable parts.

Douglas H. Ginsburg, Judge, US Court of Appeals, Washington, DC

Competition Policy and Patent Law under Uncertainty is a splendid collection of essays edited by two top scholars of competition policy and intellectual property. The contributions come from many of the world’s leading experts in patent law, competition policy, and industrial economics. This anthology takes on a broad range of topics in a comprehensive and even-handed way, including the political economy of patents, the patent process, and patent law as a system of property rights. It also includes excellent essays on post-issuance patent practices, the types of practices that might be deemed anticompetitive, the appropriate role of antitrust law, and even network effects and some legal history. This volume is a must-read for every serious scholar of patent and antitrust law. I cannot think of another book that offers this broad and rich a view of its subject.

Herbert Hovenkamp, University of Iowa

With these contributors:

Robert Cooter, Richard A. Epstein, Stan J. Liebowitz, Stephen E. Margolis, Daniel F. Spulber, Marco Iansiti, Greg Richards, David Teece, Joshua D. Wright, Keith N. Hylton, Haizhen Lee, Vincenzo Denicolò, Luigi Alberto Franzoni, Mark Lemley, Douglas G. Lichtman, Michael Meurer, Adam Mossoff, Henry Smith, F. Scott Kieff, Anne Layne-Farrar, Gerard Llobet, Jorge Padilla, Damien Geradin and Bruce H. Kobayashi

I would have said the book was self-recommending.  But I’ll take these recommendations any day.

Posted in announcements, antitrust, economics, law and economics, patent, scholarship | 1 Comment »

Sprigman and Buccafusco on Behavioral Law and Economics and the Road from Lab to Law

Posted by Josh Wright on December 7, 2010

Christopher Sprigman is Professor of Law at the University of Virginia

Christopher J. Buccafusco is Assistant Professor of Law at Chicago-Kent College of Law

In our second post, we want to discuss some of the implications of the study (the details of which we described in our first post). One of the consistent concerns about BL&E in this symposium is about the too-quick jump from data to policy. We should emphasize that we think more work needs to be done to support these potential policy suggestions, but, importantly,we think that the answers to the policy issues rest fundamentally on empirical questions.

As we noted in the previous post, our research supports the idea that creators of new works will value them substantially more than will either mere owners or would-be purchasers of the works. These valuation anomalies are likely to create sub-optimal transaction levels in IP markets. The higher transaction and negotiation costs associated with bridging a large bargaining gap are particularly troubling in the IP context where efficient transfer of rights proves crucial. In both the copyright and patent contexts, initial rights-holders (usually authors in the case of copyright and inventors in patent) often are not particularly well positioned to exploit their work. Given the gap between initial entitlement and effective commercial exploitation, an efficient IP law must provide a smooth transition between the initial rights-holder and the eventual transferee or licensee. In this post, we want to suggest two possible solutions to the transaction costs problems – one based on private contracting and another based on changes to legal entitlements.

Read the rest of this entry »

Posted in behavioral economics, copyright, free to choose symposium, intellectual property, patent | 5 Comments »

Sprigman and Buccafusco on Valuing Intellectual Property

Posted by Josh Wright on December 6, 2010

Christopher Sprigman is Professor or Law at the University of Virginia

Christopher J. Buccafusco is Assistant Professor of Law at Chicago-Kent College of Law

We would like to start by thanking Josh for inviting us to participate in what promises to be a fascinating discussion on an important subject.  We’re looking forward to engaging with the other members of the symposium.

To begin with, we would like to talk about some of our own experimental research on the valuation anomaly widely known as the “endowment effect.”  Over the past quarter century, laboratory and field research in the social sciences has provided considerable evidence for the existence of a significant gap between the valuations that people attach to goods that they own and the valuations they attach to goods they are considering purchasing.  Thus, in one classic and well-replicated study, subjects to whom a university coffee mug was given indicated substantially higher willingness-to-accept values than subjects who indicated their willingness-to-pay for the mug.  This and similar studies suggest that aspects of goods that should be irrelevant from the perspective of neoclassical economics – such as the fact of prior ownership – can systematically bias valuations of those goods and lead to sub-optimal exchanges and inefficiencies.

In a series of recent studies, we sought to extend these findings into the realm of intellectual property law.  We hypothesized that the valuations that creators attach to their works will be even higher than those of mere owners and would-be purchasers. Read the rest of this entry »

Posted in behavioral economics, copyright, free to choose symposium, intellectual property, patent | 8 Comments »

More on EchoStar’s questionable litigation tactics

Posted by Geoffrey Manne on November 24, 2010

The day before yesterday I posted on the fascinating and important TiVo v. EchoStar case.  Today I wanted to follow up with some, let’s say, color commentary on EchoStar’s litigation tactics.  This isn’t dispositive, of course, but it does seem to add some insight into the notion that EchoStar is taking advantage of questionable litigation tactics rather than respecting property rights in its dealings with TiVo.

You’ll recall that, in the case, EchoStar lost at trial, ignored the judge’s order to stop infringing, was held in contempt, and continues infringing today.  This has resulted in numerous legal proceedings, all managing to keep TiVo bogged down in litigation as EchoStar continues to misappropriate TiVo’s intellectual property.  Although EchoStar has accrued substantial legal expenses—and damage awards from both a jury and the judge—they are dwarfed by its DVR revenues.

It turns out that courtroom shenanigans are no stranger to EchoStar.

Just last week, a state trial judge in Manhattan found that EchoStar exhibited grossly negligent behavior in a case involving Cablevision’s VOOM subsidiary.  The language in VOOM v. EchoStar characterized EchoStar’s misconduct  (allowing critical e-mail evidence to be destroyed) in an exceedingly harsh manner, holding that EchoStar “systematically destroyed evidence in direct violation of the law and in the face of a ruling by a federal court that criticized EchoStar for the same bad-faith conduct . . . .” The judge went on to characterize EchoStar as engaging in “procedural gamesmanship” and noted “EchoStar’s pattern of questionable — and, at times, blatantly improper — litigation tactics.”

The court further described EchoStar’s conduct as “precisely the type of offensive conduct that cannot be tolerated by the courts.” It rebuked “EchoStar’s last-minute finagling with expert reports, believing that it can play fast and loose with the rules of procedure in order to enhance its litigation posture . . . throughout this litigation, EchoStar has been hoist by its own petard.”

Arguably EchoStar has made this type of legal strategy part of its business model.

In the TiVo case, like many others, EchoStar’s gamesmanship and its propensity to abuse the law has become a central issue. In an amicus brief submitted by agricultural organizations in the TiVo case, the groups argue: “EchoStar’s conduct in this case . . . and in other cases, displays a propensity to flout court orders,” and goes on to cite several examples of this behavior, including:

  • breaking promises to the court (CBS Broad. Inc. v. EchoStarCommc’ns Corp., 276 F. Supp. 2d 1237, 1246 (S.D. Fl. 2003));
  • patently unmeritorious claims of error (CBS Broadcasting Inc. v. EchoStar Commc’ns Corp., 450 F.3d 505, 523, 526 (11th Cir. 2006));
  • misleading and coercive communication (Air Commun. & Satellite Inc. v. Echostar Satellite Corp., 38 P.3d 1246, 1254 (Colo. 2002));
  • and even frivolous actions (Dominion Video Satellite, Inc. v. EchoStar Satellite L.L.C., 430 F.3d 1269, 1278 (10th Cir. 2005)).
  • Further, in a 2004 case, one federal judge claimed that “EchoStar’s action rises to the level of conscious wrongdoing” (EchoStar Satellite Corp. v. Brockbank Ins. Servs., No. 00-MK-1513, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 31130 (D. Colo. Feb. 4, 2004)),
  • another chided EchoStar for failing “in its duty of candor . . . .We admonish EchoStar for this abuse of process” (EchoStar Satellite Corp. v. Young Broad. Inc., 16 F.C.C.R. 15070, 15076 (Aug. 2, 2001)).

Of course any good lawyer advocating for his client may push the envelope, and some of these procedural matters are governed by standards that are less than clear.  But this is a worrisome list of excesses, and should certainly raise eyebrows in the TiVo case.

Of a piece with this, in addition to the problem of EchoStar’s overall strategy of delay, avoidance and misappropriation in the TiVo case, is also EchoStar’s fantastic claim that upholding the lower court’s contempt proceeding would inflict serious hardship on the firm, causing it to lose a substantial fraction of its present and future customer base (to the tune of $90 million per month).  Unfortunately, this customer base was built, indisputably (that is, undisputed even by EchoStar which does not challenge the underlying infringement finding), on the back of TiVo’s misappropriated technology.  It is like the child who murders her parents and then throws herself on the mercy of the court as an orphan. It seems absurd to listen to EchoStar claim hardship from the prospect of losing business it never earned in the first place.

As Richard Epstein noted in his amicus brief in the case:

In effect EchoStar’s argument is that once it has built up a large business on the back of someone else’s patents, it should be allowed to reap those profits for the indefinite future.  The size of its own illicit gains becomes the tool it deftly uses to extend its illicit activity indefinitely.  This approach creates the perverse outcome that the longer the defendant is able to wiggle away from legal sanctions, the stronger is its case to continue on its unlawful path.  EchoStar’s claims of large future losses prove only one thing: that its large monthly losses make the damages awarded for TiVo in 2006 look puny relative to the continuing harm from EchoStar’s misbehavior.

The VOOM holding is just the latest in a serial pattern of courtroom distractions and legal delays. It seems EchoStar has made a practice out of disobeying court orders and pushing the legal system to the limits. Like the TiVo case, VOOM and others demonstrate that a determined party can drag out the legal process and prevent the other side from obtaining a remedy for harm it has suffered. As I noted the other day, this is particularly true for software devices and other complex products, where trivial changes can be exaggerated in an effort to run out the clock on a patent.

In the TiVo case the stakes are enormous. EchoStar is working to undermine the role of the courts in enforcing the intellectual property rights that facilitate innovation.  And more, a victory for EchoStar would send a message to large and small companies, innovators and capitalists that abusing the court’s rules of procedure is not only fair game, but also a legitimate business tactic.

Posted in business, intellectual property, litigation, markets, patent, technology | Tagged: , , , , , , | 3 Comments »

Congratulations to the GMU Law and Economic Center’s Samantha Zyontz: Samsung-Stanford Patent Prize Competition Winner

Posted by Josh Wright on November 24, 2010

Congratulations to Samantha Zyontz, a Senior Research Associate at the Searle Civil Justice Institute here at George Mason.   Samantha and two co-authors, Michael Mazzeo (Kellogg) and Jonathan Hillel (Northwestern), are one of several recipients of the Inaugural Samsung-Stanford Patent Prize for their paper Are Patent Infringement Awards Excessive?: The Data Behind the Patent Reform Debate.  Its a really neat project and worth a read for those following the field.  No link available as of yet.  The papers will be presented at the February 8 patent remedies conference to be held at Stanford Law School on Friday, February 18, 2011.

I’ve had the pleasure of working with Samantha on a number of empirical projects — both at the Searle Center at Northwestern and now at George Mason.    No doubt the many who have also had the opportunity to work with Sam will agree this is a well deserved accolade.   Congratulations!

Read the rest of this entry »

Posted in announcements, economics, intellectual property, legal scholarship, patent, scholarship, technology | Comments Off

TiVo v. EchoStar: A study in abusing the courts instead of just respecting the patent

Posted by Geoffrey Manne on November 22, 2010

On November 9, the en banc US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit heard oral arguments in an extremely important patent infringement case (mp3 of oral argument here). Hanging in the balance are the very incentives for technological innovation and the seeds of economic progress. The arguments made in the case by the infringer, EchoStar, would have the effect of reducing the certainty and thus the efficacy of patent rights by weakening the ability of the courts to define and enforce patents clearly, quickly and efficiently. While for some commentators this is probably a feature, and not a bug, of EchoStar’s position, I find its stance and its claims to be extremely troublesome.

The litigation, TiVo v. EchoStar, has been raging for more than six years, in which time TiVo has, in fact, prevailed at every turn. In brief, the substantive and procedural history of the case is as follows: The case revolves around TiVo’s valuable patent for digital video recorder (DVR) technology. In April 2006, a jury found that EchoStar had infringed TiVo’s patents and awarded TiVo close to $74 million in damages. The jury also found that EchoStar had acted willfully in infringing the patent. The District Court granted TiVo’s motion for an injunction, which required EchoStar to disable all DVR units for which it had not paid compensatory damages. In the ongoing litigation, EchoStar does not challenge the initial finding of infringement, the initial damage award, or the initial order for injunctive relief. Instead, it seeks to avoid a contempt citation issued by the District Court, in exercise of its continuing jurisdiction over the case, after EchoStar introduced a second device which purported to “design around” the original TiVo patent. After noting the similarity between EchoStar’s original and modified devices, the court conducted a short trial on the question of infringement, after which the court held that EchoStar’s modified device still infringed TiVo’s patent.

Upon examining the technology, the District Court found that EchoStar’s purported design workaround did not embody a new and independent device. Instead EchoStar consciously modified its original infringing device in small ways that it may have believed would preserve its desired functionality without violating TiVo’s ‘389 patent, but failed instead to remove itself from the reach of either TiVo’s patent or the court’s earlier order.

At no point prior to its deployment of its altered technology did EchoStar ask the District Court, which had continuing jurisdiction over the case, to review the new design for patent infringement. EchoStar announced the re-design in a January 2008 press release and in the following months, two years after the original jury verdict of infringement, the District Court learned of the use of the modified EchoStar device.

In light of its finding of near identity between EchoStar’s original and modified DVRs, the District Court relied on KSM Fastening Systems, Inc. v. H.A. Jones Co., Inc., 776 F.2d 1522 (Fed. Cir. 1985), to enter a contempt order against EchoStar for its violation of the original injunctive decree (first finding the two devices to be substantially similar and then assessing in a contempt hearing whether EchoStar’s unilateral deployment of the second device violated the Court’s injunction). EchoStar then sought a stay of the injunction pending appeal. The Federal Circuit granted a stay, but earlier this year it upheld the district court’s contempt finding. The matter was then rescheduled for an en banc hearing. During this entire time, EchoStar has continued to market and use its infringing devices to its immense profit. The question before the en banc Court is whether the District Court’s contempt decree was proper under the controlling precedent.

In essence, every federal judge who has heard this case (save the lone dissenter in the appeal from which the Federal Circuit rehearing was brought) has determined that TiVo was wronged and is owed significant monetary and equitable compensation from EchoStar, as well as the disablement of the adjudicated DVR devices. However, EchoStar has yet to curtail its infringing activity. EchoStar now argues that it should be allowed to continue to evade the judgments against it by forcing TiVo and the courts to endure yet another full trial—to start anew down an almost identical path assessing the propriety of EchoStar’s slightly-modified technology—rather than enforce the existing injunction.

EchoStar is seemingly within the reasonable bounds of due process to suggest that such an outcome might be required if its new technology is sufficiently different than its old. But the question is really one of process: who gets to decide if the technology is sufficiently similar—the District Court that heard the original case and issued the original injunction, or EchoStar? Seen this way, it is evident that the costly, strategic behavior lurking just under the surface of this case and that pervades EchoStar’s conduct belies the innocence of its arguments and points out the enormous cost that establishing such precedent could impose on innovation and the economy more broadly.

At root, this case tests whether courts can realistically enforce their judgments, including, as in this case, the judgment that a patentee has been denied the right to control the use of its patent. The central legal question presented is when a court may enforce its own injunction against an infringer who makes small tweaks to its infringing technology in an effort to avoid the reach of the injunction. Certainly, we want to encourage so-called “work-arounds” that add to the stock of innovation in our economy. But proponents of EchoStar’s view ignore or underweigh the effect on the original innovation itself, as well as the courts. If, by virtue of small tweaks, an infringer can tie up a patent in court for so long that it has the potential to run out the patent’s term, render its exclusivity period worthless, and all the while steal business from the patent-holder in violation of the patentee’s Constitutionally-empowered protection, then initial innovation will be sharply discouraged, to the public’s detriment. The courts should not (and the KSM case seems to me to make clear that they need not) abet this process.

And EchoStar is indeed stealing business from TiVo. The trial judge issued an injunction in this case precisely because EchoStar cannot compensate TiVo for the harm done once EchoStar had built its customer base on the back of TiVo’s unlicensed technology. Since the injunction was issued more than four years ago, EchoStar has continued to build and service its customer base, and has even gone so far as to argue that the lower court’s decision should not be upheld because doing so would harm EchoStar’s customers. These are the very customers who, if EchoStar had not violated TiVo’s intellectual property rights or if the injunction had been enforced, would never have been EchoStar’s customers at all!

Meanwhile, the uncertainty engendered by delayed enforcement and the curtailment of injunctive relief further erodes the value of patents and complicates, rather than eases, the process of economic development. In this case as in others, a potential licensee has chosen to misappropriate patented technology (and take its chances in court) rather than pay for it or forebear from its use. If EchoStar prevails, similarly-situated companies will have even less incentive to seek out deals with patent-holders, instead relying on the courts to carve out for them an extended period of unlicensed use with a bill that comes due years later—assuming the patent holder can afford to litigate for years—and in an amount almost certainly far below the actual benefit conferred.

It is difficult to see how either due process or economic efficiency is furthered by EchoStar’s position. This case demonstrates that a determined infringer can make minor changes, drag out judicial proceedings, and seek to run out the clock on a patent, thereby squandering both judicial resources as well as incentives for innovation. This is particularly true for devices that involve software or other complex products where inconsequential changes can be exaggerated. An EchoStar victory in this case will dim technological progress and diminish the role of the courts in enforcing the property rights that facilitate that progress.

Posted in business, intellectual property, litigation, markets, patent, technology | Tagged: , , , , , , , , | 2 Comments »

FTC Settlement Finalized

Posted by Josh Wright on November 2, 2010

The FTC settlement with Intel has been finalized with one change the Commission’s press release describes as follows:

After considering public comments, the FTC modified the proposed order to allow Intel to manufacture and sell a chip that it had in development before the proposed order was negotiated, but that would violate that order because it does not contain a required interface. The FTC modified the order to allow Intel to ship this product until June 2013. All future generations of this chip must fully comply with all specifications of the final Order.

One interesting point.  On an ABA-sponsored call earlier this month on the FTC settlement, and previously on TOTM, I shared my view that the settlement provisions giving the FTC oversight of Intel chip design would not prevent Intel from altering product design in a way that reduces interoperability so long as it could demonstrate any actual benefit from the design change.  Indeed, the settlement language in V.A reads:

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Respondent shall not make any engineering or design change to a Relevant Product if that change (1) degrades the performance of a Relevant Product sold by a competitor of Respondent and (2) does not provide an actual benefit to the Relevant Product sold by Respondent, including without limitation any improvement in performance, operation, cost, manufacturability, reliability, compatibility, or ability to operate or enhance the operation of another product; provided, however, that any degradation of the performance of a competing product shall not itself be deemed to be a benefit to the Relevant Product sold by Respondent. Respondent shall have the burden of demonstrating that any engineering or design change at issue complies with Section V. of this Order.

My interpretation of this language (emphasis added) was, in short, that “and” means that so long as Intel can show that the design change has any of these benefits, the change is not prohibited regardless of its impact on rivals.  Of course, the devil is in the details here for Intel with respect to what type of showing the Commission will require to qualify as an “actual benefit.”  Nonetheless, my interpretation attracted a few questions during the call.

Here’s the interesting point.  The Commission seems to adopt the same interpretation.  In its response letter to VIA, an Intel rival who submitted detailed comments on the settlement (which it generally viewed as not going far enough), the Commission discussed V.A.:

Section V of the Consent Order prohibits Intel from designing or engineering its CPU or GPU products to solely disadvantage competitive or complementary products. This provision addresses allegations in the Complaint that Intel engaged in predatory innovation by cutting off competitors’ access to its CPUs and slowing down various connections to the CPU. The Proposed Consent Order would be violated if a design change degrades performance of a competitive or complementary product and Intel fails to demonstrate an actual benefit to the Intel product at issue. The burden is on Intel to demonstrate that any engineering or design change complies with the terms of Section V.

The emphasis is mine.  The Commission seems to agree with the plain meaning of the settlement language.  So I don’t think this is a surprise.  But I did want to highlight it because the interpretation generated some interesting debate previously.  Whether the “actual benefit” showing is a significant burden or not remains to be seen.  If it is not, whether the laxity of this provision is a good or bad thing, of course, turns on one’s view of Intel’s underlying business conduct and the settlement more generally.  As I’ve written previously, I’m a skeptic of the Commission’s antitrust claims against Intel and the proposition that the remedy here is going to make consumers better off.  In that sense, the suggestion that this provision will be essentially non-binding on Intel mitigates some of the damage here — especially in light of some of the contemplated relief (compulsory licensing of the x86 patent, prohibitions on volume discounts generally, etc.).  On the other hand, for those who believe the FTC was on the right side of the consumer welfare analysis (like VIA), I predict significant dissatisfaction with the outcome.

A colleague raised the possibility that perhaps a settlement that doesn’t make anybody happy is a sign of success?  I doubt it.  But it will be important to watch how some of the more intrusive provisions of the settlement are interpreted over time — and remember, the FTC has significant discretion to attempt to modify the terms as the market develops.

Posted in antitrust, economics, federal trade commission, monopolization, patent, technology | 1 Comment »

Patent Thickets: Lessons from the Sewing Machine War

Posted by Josh Wright on November 2, 2010

My colleague Adam Mossoff’s wonderful paper, A Stitch in Time: The Rise and Fall of the Sewing Machine Patent Thicket, was featured in a WSJ article focused on drawing implications for the smartphone market by studying our experience with the sewing machine patent pool.  Professor Mossoff is optimistic about the opportunities for players in the smartphone market to overcome any “anticommons” problem:

Mossoff takes several lessons from this historical example. First, he notes that despite the litigation, the smartphone market isn’t caught in a patent thicket yet, with production and marketing held up indefinitely as happened with the sewing machine. There are, of course, thousands of smartphones for sale, and new ones being developed.

Second, even if it gets to that point, it wouldn’t necessarily be cause for alarm. “If our intuition says, ‘The sky is falling,’ we can say, ‘OK, but did the sky fall in the 1850s?’” Though anti-trust legislation today would likely render a smartphone patent pool an impossibility, the fact remains that lawsuits are often no more than an invitation to negotiation. “Oftentimes the way a party signals to another party in one’s industry, ‘I’m serious about this–you need to speak with me,’ is by filing a lawsuit,” says Mossoff.

And most companies do reach amicable licensing agreements where they use one another’s technology for a fee. “The average cell phone has thousands of patents owned by entities that have licenses with each other,” says Mossoff. Earlier this month, for instance, Microsoft licensed patents by Palm, Palmsource, Bell Communications Research, and Geoworks.

So while the maze of patent lawsuits might seem like wasteful litigation, Mossoff cautions that the opposite might very well be true. Those who defend the patent system and intellectual property rights argue that it encourages innovation by ensuring that inventors get their due. “What the patent system is about is not what’s happening today or yesterday, but what’s going to happen tomorrow,” says Mossoff.

For those who would like the full length version of the paper, which is highly recommend, see here.

Posted in business, economics, intellectual property, patent, technology | 1 Comment »

 
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