Here is the abstract:

The potential complementarities between antitrust and consumer protection law— collectively, “consumer law”—are well known. The rise of the newly established Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) portends a deep rift in the intellectual infrastructure of consumer law that threatens the consumer-welfare oriented development of both bodies of law. This Feature describes the emerging paradox that rift has created: a body of consumer law at war with itself. The CFPB’s behavioral approach to consumer protection rejects revealed preference— the core economic link between consumer choice and economic welfare and the fundamental building block of the rational choice approach underlying antitrust law. This Feature analyzes the economic, legal, and political institutions underlying the potential rise of an incoherent consumer law and concludes that, unfortunately, there are several reasons to believe the intellectual rift shaping the development of antitrust and consumer protection will continue for some time.

Go read the whole thing.

Matt Reilly, former Assistant Director of the Federal Trade Commission, is joining Simpson Thacher & Bartlett. Reilly will partner the firm’s Antitrust Practice and be based in its D.C. office. His move comes after 13 years at the FTC, where he was the lead litigator in high-profile cases like the agency’s challenge to the Whole Foods-Wild Oats merger. From 2007, Reilly served as head of the Mergers IV decision.

Congratulations to Matt — formerly head of Mergers IV — and to Simpson Thacher.

Call for Papers Announcement

AALS Section on Antitrust and Economic Regulation

Google and Antitrust

2013 AALS Annual Meeting

January 4-7, 2013

New Orleans, Louisiana

The AALS Section on Antitrust and Economic Regulation will hold a program on Google and Antitrust during the AALS 2013 Annual Meeting in New Orleans. The program will explore the Federal Trade Commission’s potential antitrust case against Google and the Google Book Search settlement. The program will feature a roundtable panel involving leading scholars who have addressed these issues: Dan Crane (Michigan), Marina Lao (Seton Hall), Frank Pasquale (Seton Hall), and Pam Samuelson (Berkeley). We are looking to add one additional panelist through this Call for Papers.

Submission procedure:

Anyone interested in participating is encouraged to submit a draft paper (preferred, and roughly in the range of 20-40 pages) or proposal by e-mail to Michael A. Carrier, at mcarrier@camlaw.rutgers.edu by September 4, 2012.

Eligibility:

Full-time faculty members of AALS member law schools are eligible to submit papers. Faculty at fee-paid law schools; foreign, visiting and adjunct faculty members; graduate students; fellows; and non-law school faculty are not eligible to submit. Papers may already be accepted for publication, as long as the paper will not be published before the AALS meeting.

Registration fee and expenses:

Call-for-Paper participants will be responsible for paying their annual meeting registration fee and travel expenses.

How will papers be reviewed?

Papers will be reviewed and selected by members of the Executive Committee of the AALS Section on Antirust and Economic Regulation: Darren Bush (Houston), Michael Carrier (Rutgers-Camden), Daniel Crane (Michigan), Hillary Greene (Connecticut), Scott Hemphill (Columbia), and D. Daniel Sokol (Florida).

Will the program be published in a journal?

Yes, as a symposium in the Harvard Journal of Law & Technology Digest.

Deadline date for submission:

September 4, 2012. Decisions will be announced by September 28, 2012.

Program date and time:

Saturday, January 5, 2013, 10:30am – 12:15pm.

Contact for submission and inquires:

Michael A. Carrier

Chair, AALS Section on Antitrust and Economic Regulation

Rutgers Law School – Camden
217 North Fifth Street
Camden, NJ 08102
(856) 225-6380
mcarrier@camlaw.rutgers.edu

Drip pricing is a pricing technique in which firms advertise only part of a product’s price and reveal other charges later as the customer goes through the buying process. The additional charges can be mandatory charges, such as hotel resort fees, or fees for optional upgrades and add-ons. Drip pricing is used by many types of firms, including internet sellers, automobile dealers, financial institutions, and rental car companies.

Economists and marketing academics will be brought together to examine the theoretical motivation for drip pricing and its impact on consumers, empirical studies, and policy issues pertaining to drip pricing. The sessions will address the following questions: Why do firms engage in drip pricing? How does drip pricing affect consumer search? Where does drip pricing occur? When is drip pricing harmful? Are there efficiency justifications for the practice in some situations? Can competition prevent firms from harming consumers through drip pricing? Can consumer experience or firm reputation limit harm from drip pricing? What types of policies could lead to improved consumer decision making and under what circumstances should such policies be applied?

The workshop, which will be free and open to the public, will be held at the FTC’s Conference Center, located at 601 New Jersey Avenue, N.W., Washington, DC. A government-issued photo ID is required for entry. Pre-registration for this workshop is not necessary, but is encouraged, so that we may better plan for the event.

Here is the conference agenda:

The comparison we conducted is one between institutions – the FTC and the federal judicial system – and not individual judges and commissioners. There is no doubt the antitrust and economic experts at the FTC are well equipped to analyze all modes of business dealings; in this sense, agencies certainly have greater economic expertise than courts as a general rule. However, like the FTC, courts incorporate economic expertise into their decision-making. While the FTC seeks to incorporate its staff’s expertise, courts seek to incorporate the expertise of expert witnesses. Both institutions are organizations with complex internal structures with different modes of transmitting economic expertise into decision-making outputs and different constraints and incentives.

We sought to determine whether the FTC’s institutional structure facilitates the transmission of economic inputs into its adjudicatory decisions more effectively than Article III judges in similar cases. The implicit assumption underlying the expertise hypothesis, and many of the calls for increased delegation to the agencies, is that they are better equipped to convert that expertise to litigation outcomes. If agencies do not hold such an advantage in converting expertise to outputs, interesting and important questions are raised concerning the optimal institutional design of the FTC and of administrative agencies generally. Our preliminary evidence suggests precisely this outcome as we find no advantage for administrative agencies.

This analysis evaluates the antitrust law ramifications of proposals requiring pharmacy benefit managers (“PBMs”) to open up their networks to “any willing provider” meeting the same terms and  conditions as other network members. Providers which have failed to meet a PBM’s terms have frequently sought the enactment of any-willing-provider (“AWP”) legislation (or comparable administrative action). A recent federal proposal, The Pharmacy Competition and Consumer Choice Act of 2011 (“the Act”)1 — provides a useful model for this analysis. Both economic analysis and available empirical evidence suggest  the bill will harm consumers by restricting competition.

In the paper, we describe the anticompetitive effects of AWP legislation and the benefits of selective contracting which are undermined by such laws.  On the existing empirical evidence, we conclude:

The empirical research on the topic consistently indicates that AWP laws increase per capita  healthcare spending generally and pharmaceutical expenditures in particular directly. The related literature  on the effect of these laws on HMO penetration also suggests these laws may increase spending indirectly given that the laws lead to lower penetration and HMOs control costs better than indemnity insurance plans.  These results are consistent with economic theory regarding selective contracting.

The article is available here.

In the context of U.S. antitrust law, many commentators have recently called for an expansion of the Federal Trade Commission’s adjudicatory decision-making authority pursuant to Section 5 of the FTC Act, increased rulemaking, and carving out exceptions for the agency from increased burdens of production facing private plaintiffs. These claims are often expressly grounded in the assertion that expert agencies generate higher quality decisions than federal district court judges. We call this assertion the expertise hypothesis and attempt to test it. The relevant question is whether the expert inputs available to generalist federal district court judges translate to higher quality outputs and better performance than the Commission produces in its role as an adjudicatory decision-maker. While many appear to assume agencies have courts beat on this margin, to our knowledge, this oft-cited reason to increase the discretion of agencies and the deference afforded them by reviewing courts is void of empirical support. Contrary to the expertise hypothesis, we find evidence suggesting the Commission does not perform as well as generalist judges in its adjudicatory antitrust decision-making role. Furthermore, while the available evidence is more limited, there is no clear evidence the Commission adds significant incremental value to the ALJ decisions it reviews. In light of these findings, we conclude there is little empirical basis for the various proposals to expand agency authority and deference to agency decisions. More generally, our results highlight the need for research on the relationship between institutional design and agency expertise in the antitrust context.

We are in the progress of expanding the analysis and, as always, comments welcome here or at my email address on the sidebar.

Joshua Wright, professor of law at George Mason University School of Law, took the position that there is no significant evidence that Google is guilty of antitrust violations. Even if Google, like other search engines, favors its own content when producing the results of a search request, he argued, dissatisfied customers can easily switch search engines. In other words, the competition is just a click away.

On the other side of the debate was Charles F. Rule, head of the antitrust practice at Cadwalader, Wickersham & Taft LLP. Rule, who has defended Microsoft in antitrust litigation, argued that ample anecdotal evidence exists that implicates Google in a mix of practices that have had the cumulative effect of excluding competitors’ content from appearing in a Google search, as well as monopolizing advertisers. He stressed that his opinions were his own.

…

Wright discussed the evolution of search engines in the last ten years. He conceded that the allegation of search bias, in which a search engine favors its own content at the expense of rivals, is a possible violation of Section 2 of the Sherman Antitrust Act. But Wright noted that leading case law indicates that the behavior in question must harm the competitive process and thereby harm consumers, to be dubbed “exclusionary.”

“We demand evidence of real harm to competition before we break out the antitrust hammer,” he said, “and I don’t think there’s significant evidence of that here. It’s not hard to switch to get what you are looking for.”

Rule dismissed the “just-a-click-away” argument at the beginning of his talk.

“It’s not quite that simple,” he said. “The fact is that because of some of Google’s practices, the company has made it difficult for other search engines like Bing to achieve the same level of performance.”

Rule explained that search engines make their money by selling eyeballs to advertisers, and cited statistics that establish Google’s long-time share of the search-engine advertising market at 90 percent and up. He offered detailed descriptions of specific Google practices that have had the alleged effect of excluding competitive search engines—not just by blocking their content, but also by denying them opportunities to reach advertisers.

“With respect to bias, you can see specific anecdotes where it appears that Google has allegedly blacklisted certain companies intentionally and, in a very focused way, degraded their results so they appear lower on the page,” he said. “But also on the advertising side, there are anecdotes that when Google perceived a potential competitive threat, it automatically dramatically increases the price competitors have to pay, sometimes five to ten thousand percent overnight.”

The Federal Trade Commission has concluded and closed a six-month, nonpublic investigation of Zuffa LLC., the owners of the Ultimate Fighting Championship, and will not take further action at this time, an FTC spokesperson confirmed to SI.com on Tuesday.

According to closing letters to parties involved that were made public Tuesday, the FTC Bureau of Competition investigation focused on Zuffa’s March 2011 acquisition of Explosion Entertainment LLC., which owned the rival Strikeforce promotion, and whether the purchase violated Section 7 of the Clayton Antitrust Act or Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act.

Section 7 of the Clayton Act  “prohibits mergers and acquisitions when the effect may be substantially to lessen competition, or tend to a create a monopoly,” according to FTC guidelines.

Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act prohibits “unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce.’’

“No action has been taken in regards to this part of the investigation,” said the FTC spokesperson, though he said the governmental agency reserves the right to revisit the matter in the public’s interest.

Zuffa purchased Explosion Entertainment, established by Scott Coker and Silicon Valley Sports and Entertainment, a sports franchise company, for a reported $40 million. Coker became the general manager for Strikeforce, which plans to hold six events on Showtime this year.

A remarkable set back for the unilateral effects enforcement agenda at the agencies to be sure.

According to the bill, a windfall tax of 50 percent would be applied when the sale of oil or gas leads to a profit of between 100 percent and 102 percent of a reasonable profit. The windfall tax would jump to 75 percent when the profit is between 102 and 105 percent of a reasonable profit, and above that, the windfall tax would be 100 percent. The bill also specifies that the oil-and-gas companies, as the seller, would have to pay this tax.

We have a long archives of posts here at TOTM on a variety of forms of price gouging legislation in oil and gas.   Most recently, in discussing a White House Task Force aimed to detect price gouging and usurping jurisdiction from the Federal Trade Commission, I wrote:

One need only read the FTC’s 222 page report on gasoline prices post-Katrina and Rita to appreciate the Commission’s expertise in this area.  But perhaps most importantly, and undoubtedly related to the appointment of a working group outside the Commission, is that the Commission understands the relevant economics.  Indeed, as I noted just recently, then Bureau of Economics Director Michael Salinger gets it right when he observed  “as unpleasant as high-priced gasoline is, running out will be even worse.”  Further, it was the Commission Report that found not only scant evidence of what might be described as “gouging” — but did find examples of gas stations that shut down rather than risk a suit under a state price gouging law.  “Price Gouging Helps Consumers” doesn’t make for much of an election slogan, so perhaps this is all to be expected.  But nobody should be fooled into believing that enforcement of existing state price gouging laws, or a new federal task force devoted investigate “price gouging,” are going to make consumers better off.

The criticisms against price gouging laws become even stronger against a “Reasonable Profits Board,” which is even more blatantly political, even more likely to harm consumers, and even more likely to waste social resources than enforcement of state price gouging laws.