Showing results for: “jose guerena”
March-Right-on-In Rights?
The National Institute for Standards and Technology (NIST) published a request for information (RFI) in December 2023 on its “Draft Interagency Guidance Framework for Considering the Exercise of March-In Rights.” It’s quite something, if not in a good way. March-In Rights Provide Very Limited Exceptions to Intellectual-Property Rights What are “march-in” rights? In brief, they ... March-Right-on-In Rights?
Using Bayh-Dole March-in to Set Patent Price Controls: An Assault on American Innovation
Under the Bayh-Dole Act, the federal government has the right to “march in” on patents on inventions created using taxpayer funds—to require the patentholder to license the federally funded patent to other applicants. The terms of the license must be “reasonable under the circumstances.” The act limits the exercise of march-in to specific circumstances related ... Using Bayh-Dole March-in to Set Patent Price Controls: An Assault on American Innovation
A Consumer-Welfare-Centric Reform Agenda for the Federal Trade Commission
As we approach a presidential election year, it is time to begin developing a comprehensive reform agenda for the Federal Trade Commission (FTC). In that spirit, this post proposes 12 reforms that could be implemented by new leadership, either through unilateral action by a new chair or (in some cases) majority votes of the commission. ... A Consumer-Welfare-Centric Reform Agenda for the Federal Trade Commission
Latin America Should Follow Its Own Path on Digital-Markets Competition
In order to promote competition in digital markets,[1] Latin American countries should not copy and paste “solutions” from other jurisdictions, but rather design their own set of policies. In short, Latin American countries—like my own, Peru—should not “put the cart before the horse” and regulate markets that are not yet mature. Digital or “tech” markets ... Latin America Should Follow Its Own Path on Digital-Markets Competition
Market Power as a Limiting Principle in Merger Enforcement
One of the most important changes in the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) and U.S. Justice Department’s (DOJ) draft merger guidelines is the abandonment of market power as the central element of merger enforcement. The “unifying theme” of the 2010 horizontal merger guidelines was that “mergers should not be permitted to create, enhance, or entrench market ... Market Power as a Limiting Principle in Merger Enforcement
Competition Increases Concentration
A market with 1,000 tiny sellers is not some ideal market. Concentration can be extremely beneficial, leading to economies of scale and stiffer competition to win a big share of the market. Yet the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) and U.S. Justice Department’s (DOJ) draft merger guidelines double down on the idea that concentration is inherently a problem. ... Competition Increases Concentration
The Road to Antitrust’s Least Glorious Hour
Things are heating up in the antitrust world. There is considerable pressure to pass the American Innovation and Choice Online Act (AICOA) before the congressional recess in August—a short legislative window before members of Congress shift their focus almost entirely to campaigning for the mid-term elections. While it would not be impossible to advance the ... The Road to Antitrust’s Least Glorious Hour
10 Things the American Innovation and Choice Online Act Gets Wrong
The Senate Judiciary Committee is set to debate S. 2992, the American Innovation and Choice Online Act (or AICOA) during a markup session Thursday. If passed into law, the bill would force online platforms to treat rivals’ services as they would their own, while ensuring their platforms interoperate seamlessly. The bill marks the culmination of ... 10 Things the American Innovation and Choice Online Act Gets Wrong
The Contestable Platform Paradox
Why do digital industries routinely lead to one company having a very large share of the market (at least if one defines markets narrowly)? To anyone familiar with competition policy discussions, the answer might seem obvious: network effects, scale-related economies, and other barriers to entry lead to winner-take-all dynamics in platform industries. Accordingly, it is ... The Contestable Platform Paradox
Technology Mergers and the Market for Corporate Control
In recent years, a growing chorus of voices has argued that existing merger rules fail to apprehend competitively significant mergers, either because they fall below existing merger-filing thresholds or because they affect innovation in ways that are purportedly ignored. These fears are particularly acute in the pharmaceutical and tech industries, where several high-profile academic articles ... Technology Mergers and the Market for Corporate Control
The Virtues and Pitfalls of Economic Models
Interrogations concerning the role that economic theory should play in policy decisions are nothing new. Milton Friedman famously drew a distinction between “positive” and “normative” economics, notably arguing that theoretical models were valuable, despite their unrealistic assumptions. Kenneth Arrow and Gerard Debreu’s highly theoretical work on General Equilibrium Theory is widely acknowledged as one of ... The Virtues and Pitfalls of Economic Models
The DOJ’s Antitrust Case Against Google: A Tough Slog, but Maybe an Intriguing Possibility?
The U.S. Department of Justice’s (DOJ) antitrust case against Google, which was filed in October 2020, will be a tough slog.[1] It is an alleged monopolization (Sherman Act, Sec. 2) case; and monopolization cases are always a tough slog. In this brief essay I will lay out some of the issues in the case and raise ... The DOJ’s Antitrust Case Against Google: A Tough Slog, but Maybe an Intriguing Possibility?
