The OECD Provides Further Guidance on Assessing the Anticompetitive Impact of Laws and Regulations

Cite this Article
Alden Abbott, The OECD Provides Further Guidance on Assessing the Anticompetitive Impact of Laws and Regulations, Truth on the Market (June 30, 2015), https://truthonthemarket.com/2015/06/30/the-oecd-provides-further-guidance-on-assessing-the-anticompetitive-impact-of-laws-and-regulations/

The most welfare-inimical restrictions on competition stem from governmental action, and the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development’s newly promulgated “Competition Assessment Toolkit, Volume 3: Operational Manual” (“Toolkit 3,” approved by the OECD in late June 2015) provides useful additional guidance on how to evaluate and tackle such harmful market distortions. Toolkit 3 is a very helpful supplement to the second and third volumes of the Competition Assessment Toolkit. Commendably, Toolkit 3 promotes itself generally as a tool that can be employed by well-intentioned governments, rather than merely marketing itself as a manual for advocacy by national competition agencies (which may lack the political clout to sell reforms to other government bureaucracies or to legislators). It is a succinct non-highly-technical document that can be used by a wide range of governments, and applied flexibly, in light of their resource constraints and institutional capacities. Let’s briefly survey Toolkit 3’s key provisions.

Toolkit 3 begins with a “competition checklist” that states that a competition assessment should be undertaken if a regulatory or legislative proposal has any one of four effects: (1) it limits the number or range of suppliers; (2) it limits the ability of suppliers to compete; (3) it reduces the incentive of suppliers to compete; or (4) it limits the choices and information available to consumers. The Toolkit then sets forth basic guidance on competition assessments in seven relatively short, clearly written chapters.

Chapter one begins by explaining that Toolkit 3 “shows how to assess laws, regulations, and policies for their competition effects, and how to revise regulations or policies to make them more procompetitive.” To that end, the chapter introduces the concept of market studies and sectoral reviews, and outlines a six-part process for carrying out competition assessments: (1) identify policies to assess; (2) apply the competition checklist (see above); (3) identify alternative options for achieving a policy objective; (4) select the best option; (5) implement the best option; and (6) review the impacts of an option once it has been implemented.

Chapter two provides general guidance on the selection of public policies for examination, with particular attention to the identification of sectors of the economy, that have the greatest restraints on competition and a major impact on economic output and efficiency.

Chapter three focuses on competition screening through use of threshold questions embodied in the four-part competition checklist. It also provides examples of the sorts of regulations that fall into each category covered by the checklist.

Chapter four sets forth guidance for the examination of potential restrictions that have been flagged for evaluation by the checklist. It provides indicators for deciding whether or not “in-depth analysis” is required, delineates specific considerations that should be brought to bear in conducting an analysis, and provides a detailed example of the steps to be followed in assessing a hypothetical drug patent law (beginning with a preliminary assessment, followed by a detailed analysis, and ending with key findings).

Chapter five centers on identifying the policy options that allow a policymaker to achieve a desired objective with a minimum distortion of competition. It discusses: (1) identifying the purpose of a policy; (2) identifying the competition problems caused by the policy under examination and whether it is necessary to achieve the desired objective; (3) evaluating the technical features of the subject matter being regulated; (4) accounting for features of the broader regulatory environment that have an effect on the market in question, in order to develop alternatives; (5) understanding changes in the business or market environment that have occurred since the last policy implementation; and (6) identifying specific techniques that allow an objective to be achieved with a minimum distortion of competition. The chapter closes by briefly describing various policy approaches for achieving a hypothetical desired reform objective (promotion of generic drug competition).

Chapter six provides guidance on comparing the policy options that have been identified. After summarizing background concepts, it discusses qualitative analysis, quantitative analysis, and the measurement of costs and benefits. The cost-benefits section is particularly thorough, delving into data gathering, techniques of measurement, estimates of values, adjustments to values, and accounting for risk and uncertainty. These tools are then applied to a specific hypothetical involving pharmaceutical regulation, featuring an assessment of the advantages and disadvantages of alternative options.

Chapter seven outlines the steps that should be taken in submitting a recommendation for government action. Those involve: (1) selecting the best policy option; (2) presenting the recommendation to a decision-maker; (3) drafting a regulation that is needed to effectuate the desired policy option; (4) obtaining final approval; and (5) implementing the regulation. The chapter closes by applying this framework to hypothetical regulations.

Chapter 8 discusses the performance of ex post evaluations of competition assessments, in order to determine whether the option chosen following the review process had the anticipated effects and was most appropriate. Four examples of ex post evaluations are summarized.

Toolkit 3 closes with a brief annex that describes mathematically and graphically the consumer benefits that arise when moving from a restrictive market equilibrium to a competitive equilibrium.

In sum, the release of Toolkit 3 is best seen as one more small step forward in the long-term fight against state-managed regulatory capitalism and cronyism, on a par with increased attention to advocacy initiatives within the International Competition Network and growing World Bank efforts to highlight the welfare harm due to governmental regulatory impediments. Although anticompetitive government market distortions will remain a huge problem for the foreseeable future, at least international organizations are starting to acknowledge their severity and to provide conceptual tools for combatting them. Now it is up to free market proponents to work in the trenches to secure the political changes needed to bring such distortions – and their rent-seeking advocates – to heel. This is a long-term fight, but well worth the candle.