Truth on the Market

Academic commentary on law, business, economics and more

Archive for February, 2010

Government ownership of land

Posted by Todd Henderson on February 18, 2010

I love our national parks as much as the next guy (probably more, having visited every major one and dozens of smaller ones, and loving every minute of nearly every visit), but can someone tell me why the federal government owns so much of our country? Some maps tell the story. See here and here. Now comes news from the Obama administration that there are plans to make more land off limits to economic uses. See here. I understand the temptation to think of nature as benign, aesthetically valuable, and like a piece of antiquity to be preserved, but I think we go too far when we sacrifice economic progress for desert plants, tall trees, fish, and other nonhuman things. Fundamentally the claims of favoring these things for some abstract goals of perservation are antihuman. They are also often ways for politicians to serve their own interests and those of favored constituents over the general welfare.

The examples of hypocrisy from politicians on this subject are innumerable. The Obama administration favors more solar power, but Senator Feinstein wants to make sure it doesn’t happen in “her” desert. See here. The Kennedy family favors non-fossil fuels for energy, but not if it spoils their view. See here. Everyone is in favor of less reliance on foreign oil, but we don’t drill off the coast of California, so Jennifer Aniston can avoid seeing oil platforms from her Malibu mansion, and in Alaska, so caribou are not offended by our presence and the tundra is “preserved.”

Would our world really be worse off if the federal government sold all federal lands, except a limited number of areas for national parks and essential military facilities? Is it really true that the government does a better job of balancing the tradeoff between economic returns from land and preservation of land? It is time to get the government out of the business of issuing mining permits, oil drilling permits, logging permits, and on and on. There used to be a time when corporate charters were passed out by the state in this way, and the result was a disaster of exploitation, bribery of public officials, and reduced economic efficiency. One of the most important legal innovations of the past century was getting the government out of the business of telling people what business organizations they could form.

In that spirit, we should sell nearly all of the 60% of this country owned by the federal government, and use the vast sums such sales would generate to pay down some of our massive debt. Private property is not a recipe for spoliation but our best hope to get everything we can from our resources, including recreation, preserving natural beauty, minerals, and everything else the Earth has to offer. It is time to put people, all people, not just the rich ones who can afford to visit the wild places, first.

Posted in markets | 4 Comments »

Some thoughts on the Olympics

Posted by Todd Henderson on February 18, 2010

I just love the Olympics. Exhibit A for me was the face of American skier Lindsey Vonn in the starting gate last night before her gold-medal-winning race. Vonn was the overwhelming favorite, having proved herself the greatest skier in the world for the past few years. She was, however, plagued by a nasty shin injury and was only able to ski because the weather gods delayed her race by several days. She was also preceded by several near-tragic crashes of her competitors. The look on Vonn’s face was pure intensity. She embodied the human spirit of accomplish and excellence in that moment.

Exhibit B was Shaun White’s second run in the halfpipe competition. White had already won the gold before his last run, and instead of taking it easy, he pushed the envelope of human capabilities. He proceeded to perform the greatest halfpipe run of all time, doing a trick that have never been done, and, if I’d seen it on YouTube, would have been convinced it was a trick of editing.

But the Olympics got me thinking about the odd role that political history plays on the competition. Take my favorite sport of ice hockey. What would the competition look like if the Cold War was still going on? Imagine the Czechs and the Slovaks, who had an epic battle against each other last night, playing for the same team? Or how about reuniting all the Soviet republics? Or giving Finland back to Sweden (sorry to my Finish colleague Anu Bradford for even suggesting this)?How about a combined American-Canadian team, say based on an American victory in the war of 1812? We can imagine a few mighty teams had history been not that much different, but would the competition be better? Is a tournament better with a few great teams or a larger number of nearly great ones?

Compare the US and Europe. These regions have a similar number of people, similar GDP, and similar living standards. And yet the fact that we 50 are 1, and their 27 are 27, means that they send more athletes and win many more medals than we do. In fact, one European state, Germany, will likely win as many medals as the US will. We could imagine instead an Olympics with US states competing individually, say as the territories of the United Kingdom do (e.g., England, Scotland, Wales, Northern Ireland, etc.). Minnesota, California, and New York, which send most of our winter Olympians would do well, but would they do better if they competed as states? In other words, would American medal totals be higher with our states competing individually, as in Europe, or as a union?

We might expect state-based teams to produce more athletes but lose a bit of enthusiasm — who wants to hear the state anthem of Illinois (do we have one?) on the podium? We might expect more innovation in techniques, styles, coaching, and technology, but perhaps a centralized body like the USOC does a good job of learning and implementing the best of the world. It is unlikely we will ever know how many medals Americans would win on state teams, but someday we may have a competition between America and Europe on equal geographic terms. Until then, I’ll enjoy watching how incredible we humans are, no matter how trivial the goals we pursue. I’ll also continue cheering for strangers just because they live nearer to me than those they compete against, and I’ll keep getting choked up watching the Stars & Stripes fly high over the medal stand.

Posted in markets | 2 Comments »

Thoughts on "The Small Bill"

Posted by Todd Henderson on February 17, 2010

Writing in the Weekly Standard, Jeffrey Anderson offers an alternative to Obamacare (or should we call it Pelosireidcare?). The seven provisions in the “Small Bill” seem sensible to this nonexpert. Allowing insurance to be sold interstate is likely to bring down costs and improve service — wouldn’t some competition from Geico Health Insurance be a good thing? I can already imagine the commercials. Another proposal is to cap noneconomic damages in medical malpractice suits. Again, this seems like a no-brainer.

But I was most interested in proposal #3:

Cut costs by allowing lower premiums for healthier lifestyles.  Federal regulations ban companies from offering more than a 20 percent discount to those who eat and drink in moderation, exercise, or don’t smoke.  Such regulations handcuff private cost-cutting efforts and should be eliminated.  (No increase in government spending.*)

I’ve written about this in an article forthcoming in the University of Chicago Law Review. You can find a version of the paper here. Based on my review of corporate nannyism, I fully endorse proposal #3 of the Small Bill.

Posted in markets | 1 Comment »

Should Antitrust Education Be Mandatory (for Law Firm Recruiters and Law School Placement Directors)?

Posted by Thom Lambert on February 15, 2010

A few years back, my colleague Royce Barondes and I wrote an essay entitled Should Antitrust Education Be Mandatory (for Law School Administrators)? The essay, whose title was intended to be tongue-in-cheek, argued that the members of the Association of American Law Schools were engaged in an illegal conspiracy to limit competition for professor talent. The focus of our criticism was an AALS “good practice” under which the law schools agree not to extend offers of employment to professors at competing law schools after March 1.

Law school administrators maintain that their agreement not to compete is justifiable because unbridled competition for professor talent causes them inconvenience (e.g., having to reschedule the fall semester courses of a professor who gets hired away during the spring or summer). But law schools could always rely on non-collusive, unilateral means of avoiding these difficulties. They could, for example, execute employment contracts that preclude professors from departing after some particular date and specify some amount of liquidated damages as a remedy for breach. In any event, the Supreme Court has made clear that the law schools’ argument — “Competition for professor talent is just too hard!” — amounts to a frontal assault on the Sherman Act and is entitled to no weight. (See Professional Engineers.)

Perhaps Royce and I should have included law firm recruiters and law school placement directors in our proposed antitrust education program. A few weeks back, a prominent group of those folks — acting through the National Association for Law Placement, or “NALP” — proposed a similarly collusive agreement not to compete for legal talent. The centerpiece of the proposed scheme is a pact among law firms, which currently interview law students whenever they want and make offers on a rolling basis, to refuse to extend offers of summer employment to second-year law students before a set date in January. The law schools, then, agree to punish gun-jumping firms (which the NALP proposal revealingly terms “cheaters”) by barring them from on-campus recruiting. NALP attempts to justify this law school-policed collusion among employers on grounds that it (1) allows firms to make staffing decisions when they have a better idea of their employment needs (i.e., after their year-end accounting); (2) enables firms to utilize better, but more time-consuming, interview methods (tests, simulations, “McKinsey-style group projects,” etc.); and (3) prevents firms from having to interview law students in the late summer and early fall, when lawyers like to vacation. (I’m serious. Read the proposal linked above.)

This agreement among law firms to limit competition in entry-level hiring is a bad idea for a number of reasons. For example, do the firms really want to extend the wining and dining period until January? Do they really want to replace the current system of rolling offers, in which the timing of an offer doesn’t reveal much information, with a system that signals to second-round offerees that they were not first choice? Relative to the current rolling offer system, won’t a scheme that encourages firms to make all or most of their offers at once (lest they lose attractive candidates to other firms) exacerbate, rather than alleviate, the difficulty of managing yield?

Most importantly, though, this agreement is a bad idea because it constitutes an illegal restraint of trade among competitors. A group of competitors has effectively said: “We don’t like having to make quick hiring decisions to catch the best talent, so we’re going to agree to limit competition amongst ourselves, and we’re going to enlist the law schools, who desperately want us to hire their grads, to act as our policemen.” That, my friends, is a naked restraint of trade. It seeks to level the playing field by removing an advantage from those well-managed law firms that are good at identifying and wooing talent and that can confidently predict their future business prospects, and it doesn’t create notable efficiencies (e.g., transaction cost reductions) or enable the creation of a new product or service.

Moreover, its purported justifications fail. The agreement isn’t necessary to achieve the first two putative benefits — enabling firms to make hiring decisions when they have a better idea of future labor needs and permitting them to utilize more time-consuming interview methods. Under the current system, firms are free to delay making offers until they get year-end accounting data, and they can take as long as they want to evaluate job candidates. While they might find that they lose candidates to employers who are more confident about future needs and who are speedier evaluators, no one’s stopping them from taking their sweet time if they want to. As for the third purported benefit — less need to interrupt attorneys’ late summer vacations, etc. — courts have not looked favorably on the “But competition makes us work too hard!” defense.

Fortunately, one prominent law firm — Jones Day — has objected to the NALP recommendations on grounds similar to those set forth above. Perhaps we should put that firm’s excellent antitrust lawyers in charge of our mandatory antitrust education program for law school administrators and law firm recruiters.

Posted in antitrust, law school | 5 Comments »

What caused the crisis?

Posted by Todd Henderson on February 13, 2010

Writing in the Wall Street Journal, Alan Greenspan, who was at the helm of the Fed during the relevant time period, tells us (surprise!) it wasn’t the Fed’s fault. Greenspan notes that short-term interest rates, which the Fed controls, are only loosely correlated with long-term interest rates, which are most relevant to real estate investing (think, 30-year mortgages). Therefore, the Fed (read: Greenspan) can’t be to blame.

So what caused the drop in long-term interest rates? Greenspan blames, well, capitalism. He writes:

[T]he presumptive cause of the world-wide decline in long-term rates was the tectonic shift in the early 1990s by much of the developing world from heavy emphasis on central planning to increasingly dynamic, export-led market competition.

In other words, China and others abandoned idiotic political control of markets, and the resulting flood of wealth created needed somewhere to go. It went to invest in US houses. Ergo, the lowering of rates and the rise in values.

This certainly sounds plausible, but why did China invest in my mortgage instead of Google? I’m not an economist, although sometimes I pretend, but it seems like Fed rates, which made T-bills less attractive on the margin, and silly policies about housing, such as forced lending to poor people and guarantees of Fannie and Freddie bonds, made the latter much more attractive. If Chinese investors could only get 2% return on T-bills (guaranteed by the full faith and credit of our government) but could get 8% return on investments in housing (guaranteed by the full faith and credit of our government), then why would they ever choose the former?

So I think it is probably unfair to blame the Fed or Mr. Greenspan for the crisis. It was not loose monetary policy alone that led to the state we are in. A combination of factors led to the boom and the bust. We will probably never know exactly what the relative weight of them was in causing the crisis, but they all have one thing in common — bad government policy. Sure the market acted greedily, selfishly, narrowly, and all the other ways that humans act, but that is to be expected in all states of the world. But for bad government policies, including Mr. Greenspan’s loose money policies, we wouldn’t be where we are today. The real trick is to find ways to harness the good and bad instincts of the market, something that we utterly failed to do given political pressures at home to force people to live a particular vision of the “American dream,” and given the fundamental changes in the global economy. Until we rethink the role of government in our lives, we are as likely to get this wrong as we are right.

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The Environmental Responsibility of Business? Make Profit!

Posted by Michael Sykuta on February 12, 2010

That’s the punchline of a recent paper by Pierre Desrochers (U Toronto). Pierre has written some interesting papers on a range of topics related to economic development, technological innovation, and the intersection of business and the environment.   He argues that it is governmental (regulatory) failures that distort the environmental consequences of corporate behavior, not market failures. Should be an interesting read.

The environmental responsibility of business is to increase its profits (by creating value within the bounds of private property rights).” Industrial and Corporate Change, vol. 19, no 1 (February 2010), pp. 161-204.

Abstract:

Proponents of corporate social responsibility (CSR) typically consider “business as usual” unsustainable. Building on historical evidence that long predates the modern environmental movement, the contrary case is made that the interplay of voluntary exchange, private property rights, and self-interest has generally resulted in the so-called “triple bottom line” (economic, social, and environmental) through more efficient use of materials and the continual creation of higher quality resources. However, because market processes continually eliminate less competitive firms and tend to concentrate business activities geographically, political pressure brought to bear by adversely affected vested interests often results in the creation of policies that cause greater environmental harm than would otherwise be evident. Environmental CSR proponents often misinterpret these government failures as market failures, and characteristically advocate policies that further distract firms from their core objective and resulting triple bottom line. The article concludes by arguing that the most promising path toward truly sustainable development lies in the unwavering pursuit of profitability within the bounds of well-defined and enforced private property rights.

Posted in corporate social responsibility, environment, regulation, Sykuta | Comments Off

An Interesting Patent Holdup Decision out of the Central District of CA: Vizio v. Funai

Posted by Josh Wright on February 11, 2010

Readers may recall we highlighted the Vizio v. Funai complaint about a year ago, in large part because it involved antitrust and standard setting issues.  The case involves allegations that Funai breached a FRAND commitment, and thus, is an important decision in the debate over the appropriate scope of Section 2 in cases involving alleged breach of obligations made in the standard setting context (a subject I’ve written on with Bruce Kobayashi here and here, with former student Aubrey Stuempfle here, and on my own in partial defense of the D.C. Circuit’s Rambus decision here ).

Thanks to a TOTM reader, we’ve got some new information on the latest developments in Judge Matz’s opinion granting Funai’s motion to dismiss the Sherman Act Section 2 claims.  I think the opinion is an interesting addition to the growing body of case law on Section 2 and standard setting.  The entire opinion is available here.

For a brief primer for those interested, I’ll lay out some of the basic facts as they appear in the Complaint.  Thomson held a number of patents related to the transmission, receipt and use of specific program information in a digital broadcast signal.  In 1997, the Advanced TV Systems Committee (ATSC), an SSO, adopted a standard for digital TV broadcast signals and Thomson designated several patents as essential to the standard.  Thomson made FRAND commitments to ATSC, and subsequently, the FCC adopted major elements of the ATSC standard.   In September 2007, Thomson assigned the rights to two of the relevant patents to Funai, and retained the rights to another.  Vizio alleges that before selling some of its patents to Funai, Thomson licensed the bundle of relevant patents to licensees who needed only to deal Thomson, whose monopoly power was restrained by the FRAND commitment it made to the ATSC.  Vizio now alleges that its Funai charges prices much higher than those charged by Thomson, and that Funai and Thomson conspired to evade the FRAND commitment and split profits.

Right off the top, readers will recognize hints of both N-Data and Ovation, two FTC cases I’ve criticized for expanding the notion that exclusionary conduct might be defined as any business decision that “evades a pricing constraint.”   As I’ve written:

The implicit answer [adopted by the Commission] is that the antitrust laws condemn evasion of pricing constraints.  This answer is getting more and more familiar at the current Commission.  Let’s follow the pattern.  First, Rambus is based on the concept that evasion of patent disclosure rules in the standard setting context violation Section 2 and Section 5.  Second, N-Data is based on the concept that evasion of a contractual pricing constraint in the form of a RAND commitment is a violation of at least section 5 even when the monopoly power is lawfully acquired.  Third, Ovation now adds to the list the evasion of reputational constraints on pricing as the genesis of actionable antitrust conduct.

This case invokes some of the some basic ideas.  At least one of the underlying theories is that Thomson evaded the pricing constraint by transferring its patents to Funai, i.e. does transferring the patent from Thomson to Funai, who is unconstrained by the FRAND commitment, constitute exclusionary conduct under Section 2?

Here’s an excerpt of Judge Matz’s analysis of the Section 2 allegations:

Nor does the allegation that Funai repudiated Thomson’s FRAND commitments constitute a harm to competition. Vizio cites to the Broadcom and Research in Motion cases for the proposition that deceiving a standard setting organization and then evading FRAND commitments can qualify as anticompetitive conduct and can constitute harm to competition. See Broadcom Corp. v. Qualcomm, Inc., 501 F.3d 297, 313-14 (3d Cir. 2007) (holding that a patent holder’s intentionally false promise to license essential proprietary technology on FRAND terms, coupled with a standard setting organization’s reliance on that promise, and the patent holder’s subsequent breach of that promise, constitutes actionable anticompetitive conduct); Research in Motion Ltd. v. Motorola, Inc., 2008 WL 5191922 at *4-7 (N.D. Tex. Dec. 11, 2008) (holding that a refusal to license on agreed-to FRAND terms constitutes a harm to competition). However, other courts have reached the opposite conclusion. See Rambus v. Federal Trade Commission, 522 F.3d 456, 467 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (holding that deceiving a standard-setting organization, thereby avoiding FRAND (there called “RAND”) limits on licensing fees, did not constitute a harm to competition under the Sherman Act). The court in Rambus explained that, even in the context of FRAND licensing agreements, “an otherwise lawful monopolist’s end-run around price constraints, even when deceptive or fraudulent, does not alone present a harm to competition in the monopolized marked.” Rambus, 522 F.3d at 466. The Rambus court cited NYNEX v. Discon, supra, for that proposition, after observing previously that “to the extent [the Broadcom ruling] may have rested on a supposition that there is a cognizable violation of the Sherman Act when a lawful monopolist’s deceit has the effect of raising prices (without an effect on competitive structure), it conflicts with NYNEX.” Id. (citing NYNEX, 525 U.S. 128). As discussed above, Vizio has not explained how the mere transfer of a valid patent from Thomson to Funai created an unlawful monopoly, and so its alleged conduct does not constitute a harm to competition.

Moreover, in both Broadcom and Research in Motion the antitrust defendant itself had entered into a FRAND obligation with the standard setting organization. Here, Vizio’s only allegation that suggests that Funai has any obligations to the ATSC is its conclusory statement that “[w]hen Funai acquired Thomson’s rights to the ’074 patent, specific encumbrances attached to that patent, including Thomson’s obligation to license the ’074 patent to implementers of the ATSC standards, such as Vizio, on a FRAND basis.” FAC ¶ 30. However, Thomson—not Funai—participated in the standard-setting process and entered into the FRAND agreement with the ATSC. FAC ¶¶ 14, 16, 18-19, Ex. C. And, as the FAC alleges, the ATSC Patent Policy requires only that participants provide a written agreement to license on FRAND terms. FAC ¶ 16. Although the allegations might suffice to state an antitrust claim against Thomson under the holding in Broadcom, they do not against Funai. Based on this analysis, Vizio’s claims of unlawful monopolization under Section 2 of the Sherman Act—claims three through five—and unlawful acquisition under Section 7 of the Clayton Act—claim one—must fail.

The next to last sentence is pretty interesting when read along with the first paragraph.  On the one hand, the court notes that the allegations might state a valid Section 2 claim against Thomson under the holding in Broadcom, suggesting that the evasion of constraint theory in Broadcom lives so long as the plaintiff has also alleged that Thomson’s promise as intentionally false at the time it was made to the ATSC, that there was reliance on that promise, and it was subsequently breached.  On the other hand, the first paragraph seems to at least weakly suggest that the court is aligning itself with the D.C. Circuit’s Rambus holding under which even an intentionally false promise or deceptive cannot constitute a Section 2 problem unless the plaintiff also can survive muster under NYNEX, i.e. prove that the defendant is not simply exercising its lawfully acquired ex ante monopoly power.  I don’t mean to suggest these two excerpts are contradictory.  The court is correctly pointing out that even under less restrictive standard in Broadcom, the Section 2 claim against Funai must fail.

As I point out here, I do not believe that Broadcom and Rambus create a circuit split because they turn on the court’s assessment of the defendant’s possession of ex ante monopoly power.  In Broadcom, at the pleading stage, the Third Circuit accepted the allegation as true that the defendant acquired monopoly power as the result of its deceptive conduct; in Rambus, the D.C. Circuit correctly held under NYNEX that the plaintiff faced the burden of proving that the price-increasing deception was also exclusionary, i.e. allowed the defendant to acquire or maintain monopoly power, and ruled that the FTC failed to carry that burden on the facts.

Posted in antitrust, intellectual property, patent, technology | 3 Comments »

Do motives matter?

Posted by Todd Henderson on February 11, 2010

I have the pleasure of co-leading a seminar this quarter with distinguished philosopher Brian Leiter. The seminar, entitled “Capitalism: For and Against,” (take a guess which side I’m on), meets periodically at either my home or Brian’s. About 12 students join us to discuss a reading. So far, we’ve read “A Communist Manifesto,” (how could such a silly book have caused such widespread destruction?), and “The Road to Serfdom.” For the next session, we are reading G.A. Cohen’s “Why Not Socialism?”

As it happens, my night-stand reading at the moment is Ursula Le Guin’s “The Dispossessed.” A particular idea mentioned in the novel in last night’s reading coincided with an idea from Cohen — we should care about the motives behind conduct that is subjectively and objectively desirable. Le Guin’s protagonist, Shevek, who inhabits a world of socialist anarchy, is visiting another world that resembles Earth. On his home world, there is no money, no property, and life is barren but, Shevek leads us to believe, deeply meaningful. Behind the eyes of the inhabitants of this world, plain as they are, we are told is a deep warmth of humanity. When Shevek visits the Earth-like world, he is flabbergasted at all of the bounty (think of an East German entering a West German grocery store), but disgusted by the fact that it is generated by such unclean motives, as profit and greed. After buying a coffee, which is itself a despicable act, and being treated more politely than he has ever been treated on his home world, Shevek wonders whether it is the profit that is generates the politeness, and therefore discounts it.

Cohen writes in a similar vein. He believes greed is an illegitimate and morally disgusting motive for anything: “The market is intrinsically repugnant…Every market . . .is a system of predation.”

Assuming politeness, bounty, equal treatment, and so on are products of well-functioning markets, should we care whether the underlying motives are ones that when examined in depth are philosophically troubling to us? I love my wife. I love my children. I would do anything to protect them. That is a good thing. Should we look deeply beneath that for the motives: an insecurity about being alone, a lust for the pleasures of the flesh, a desire for intellectual companionship, a gene-driven greed for perpetuating my DNA, etc. are all possible, even likely motives. But who cares? The issue is not unpacking the true reasons for why I act the way I do, but simply to look at what flows from my actions. This is, as most else is, just Adam Smith: we owe our daily bread not to benevolence but to greed. As long as getting bread is good, why should it matter whether it is because the baker loves me or sees me as purely instrumental to his own happiness?

Of course, society sometimes cares about motives — mens rea and scienter are common considerations in legal matters. But there is a limit to how much we should care about motives. When people do bad things, it may help us sort between those truly deserving of punishment and those who should escape sanction; but when people do good things, we should generally not ask why. Asking why is like looking for a subatomic answer for why there is love – the answer is that it serves human welfare. That should be enough.

Posted in markets | 3 Comments »

Competition in agriculture redux (cross-posted)

Posted by Geoffrey Manne on February 11, 2010

Antitrust & Competition Policy Blog is hosting a symposium on Competition in Agriculture.  Mike’s post from yesterday is available here.   So far in the symposium there are also posts by Ron Cass (BU Law), Jeff Harrison (Florida Law), Peter Carstensen (Wisconsin Law), and Kyle Stiegert (Wisconsin Applied Econ).  Additional posts should be forthcoming from Christina Bohannan (Iowa Law), Andrew Novakovic (Cornell Applied Economics), and the great George Priest (Yale Law), who I hope gets the blogging bug.

Josh, Scott Kieff and I have posted a short comment based on our submission to the DOJ/USDA Workshops on Agricultural Competition, co-authored by us and Mike. The comment should be available for download from the DOJ webpage when the public comments are posted (someday . . . ).  A copy is also available here (www.laweconcenter.org), and comments are most welcome at gmanne@laweconcenter.org Please leave comments on this post over at the A&CP Blog.

Regarding firm size and integration, it must be kept in mind that the agriculture industry in the U.S. has, for good reasons, moved beyond the historic, pastoral image of small family farms operating in quiet isolation, devoid of big business and modern technologies. The genetic traits that give modern seeds their value—traits that confer resistance to herbicide and high yields, for example—are often developed through processes that are technologically-advanced, time- and money-intensive, risky investments, and subject to various layers of regulation. It doesn’t take expertise in industrial organization to imagine why at least for some participants in this market these processes are likely to be more efficiently and effectively conducted within large agribusiness companies having enormous research and development budgets and significant expertise in managing complex business and legal operations, than they are by the somber couple depicted in the famous 1930 Grant Wood painting, “American Gothic.” Nor is such expertise required to imagine why complex contracting across firms, of any size, is likely to be of significant help in supporting the specialization and division of labor that is useful in allowing some businesses (even a small family farm is a business) to be good at planting and harvesting while others are good at inventing, investing, managing, developing, testing, manufacturing, marketing, and distributing the next wave of innovative crop technologies. This requires on the one hand that the government give reliable enforcement to contracts and property rights whether tangible or intangible (extremely important in this industry are patents, trade secrets, and even trademarks), while on the other hand it allows firms wide flexibility to decide for themselves which of these contracts and property rights they would like to enter into or obtain pursuant to the applicable bodies of contract and property law.

When courts and regulatory agencies like the DOJ Antitrust Division adopt special approaches to the body of antitrust law to address concerns that may arise from these property rights and contracts, they run the risk of crafting doctrines that inappropriately override well-established bodies of law that are informed by longstanding judicial and scholarly thought and consideration of each area, and creating the potential to reduce innovation and economic growth. A central countervailing concern is that the putative antitrust injuries that might arise are rooted in stylized economic models that are heavily dependent on a narrow set of assumptions, leaving significant room for erroneous antitrust enforcement. A modest but fundamental safeguard to protect against this concern of “false positives,” is an approach to antitrust that requires a strong demonstration of actual anticompetitive effect as a precondition for a monopolization violation.

Not only are patents not presumptive proof of market power in any static sense, but patents can also meaningfully improve both competition and access to patented technologies over time, in the dynamic sense. From the public record it appears that the driver of much of today’s antitrust enforcement in the agricultural industry boils down to intervention into business disputes between large and sophisticated parties. The inherent uncertainty regarding the economic consequences of specific conduct, coupled with competitors’ poor incentives and the huge costs of error, counsel strongly against antitrust intervention without strong empirical evidence that the conduct has reduced competition and harmed consumers in the form of higher prices, lower quality, or reduced innovation.

Posted in antitrust, blogging, business, contracts, economics, intellectual property, law and economics, markets, mergers & acquisitions, patent, technology | 1 Comment »

Competition in Agriculture (cross-posted)

Posted by Michael Sykuta on February 10, 2010

Antitrust & Competition Policy Blog is hosting a symposium on Competition in Agriculture. So far today, there are posts by Ron Cass (BU Law), Jeff Harrison (U of Florida Law), and me.  Additional posts should be forthcoming from Christina Bohannan (U. Iowa Law), Scott Kieff (GW Law), Andrew Novakovic (Cornell Applied Economics), George Priest (Yale Law), Kyle Stiegert (U. Wisconsin Agricultural and Applied Economics), and Josh Wright (George Mason Law). My contribution is reproduced below.  Please leave comments over at the A&CP Blog.

Learn from history, don’t repeat it.

Antitrust laws originated in Midwest states like Missouri in the late 1880s when small farmers banded together in the face of falling agricultural commodity prices to stand against the competitive pressures of larger, more efficient farming operations. Over a century later, it is, as Yogi Berra said, “déjà vu all over again.”

Of the almost 2.2 million farms in the USDA’s 2008 Agricultural Resource Management Survey, the 1.8 million smallest farms lost money on their farming operations (on average) even after accounting for government program payments. These farms represent only 10% of the value of agricultural production in the US, yet received roughly 28% of government payments.

In addition, these small-scale farmers are less likely than their larger competitors to shop beyond the nearest town for key inputs, to shop for the best price from suppliers, to negotiate price discounts, or to lock in prices for inputs. Small-scale farmers are also much less likely to market their products using contracts or to use market-based risk management tools. In short, small-scale farmers fail to (or are simply unable to) take advantage of market opportunities that larger, more efficient farms do. That large farms do engage in these activities suggest a very competitive agricultural economy.

Although antitrust has long been used as an anticompetitive club by economically inefficient competitors, such applications do more harm than good. The agriculture sector would be better served by eliminating the subsidies that sustain marginal producers than by using antitrust to penalize more efficient, better managed farming operations and other firms along the rest of the food value chain. DOJ’s antitrust inquiry will, at best, simply perpetuate the inefficient industry fringe or, more likely, inhibit the kinds of technological and market innovations that have provided US consumers and the world with a safe, reliable food supply.

Posted in antitrust, economics, law and economics, Sykuta | 3 Comments »

 
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