Truth on the Market

Academic commentary on law, business, economics and more

Archive for September, 2009

How Competitive Is the Health Insurance Market, Really?

Posted by Josh Wright on September 19, 2009

Not very, according to the President in his recent health care speech, making the case that lack of competition and for-profit monopolists are what ails the health care market:

“Consumers do better when there is choice and competition. Unfortunately, in 34 states, 75% of the insurance market is controlled by five or fewer companies. In Alabama, almost 90% is controlled by just one company. Without competition, the price of insurance goes up and the quality goes down…an additional step we can take to keep insurance companies honest is by making a not-for-profit public option available in the insurance exchange…”

I wondered where these figures came from when I heard the President rattle them off during the speech.  Indeed, a 75 percent share protected by regulation that immunizes firms from out of state competition might well be sufficient to allow monopoly pricing.  So, are these figures correct?

The short answer is no.  Economist John Lott re-runs the numbers correcting for an important error: the figures the President gave mistakenly leave out employers that self-insure and fund their own plans.  This is not a trivial omission as one source estimates that approximately 55 percent of employees are insured under such plans.  Lott corrects this error and recalculates shares for the top 15 most concentrated states (uncorrected):

Table-2_for_Lot's_Fox_column_doomsday_604x341

As you can see from the Table (click on it), the corrected shares are significantly lower. Lott also points out that the largest insurer in most states is already a non-profit enterprise.   If competition, monopoly power, and barriers to entry are going to be an important part of the health care discussion, as with any discussion in involving industrial organization economics, it is important to get the details right in order to generate accurate predictions and policy prescriptions.

Posted in markets | 1 Comment »

The Economic Benefits of Secrecy

Posted by Josh Wright on September 19, 2009

The ABA Journal (HT: Steve Salop) has an interesting item suggesting that Jones Day’s policy of keeping compensation secret might be paying dividends in a tough economic climate:

Jones Day’s secrecy surrounding compensation may be aiding its rapid expansion in the San Francisco Bay area.  Jones Day has grown from a couple of dozen Bay Area lawyers in 2003 to 137 lawyers in its San Francisco and Palo Alto offices, the Recorder (sub. req.) reports. Observers say the law firm’s closed compensation system is helping its efforts to hire quality laterals because partners don’t know what the new hires are paid and can’t complain.  Often laterals are paid a premium that is higher than the average partner salary, the story says. Secrecy aids hiring and collegiality.

The article notes that the business card for Joe Sims, the lawyer heading up the West Coast expansion, doesn’t indicate his title or business area. His explanation: “We don’t do titles here.”

The story concludes that there are a lot of things Jones Day doesn’t do. “It doesn’t tell its partners what other partners make, it doesn’t issue profit figures, it doesn’t pay bonuses, it doesn’t let partners vote on who will head the firm, it hasn’t conducted mass layoffs, and it doesn’t pay associates in lockstep.”  The lack of mass layoffs has also helped the law firm grow, since about half the firm’s headcount in the San Francisco area came from hiring new law school graduates, many of whom remain at the law firm.  Partners at Jones Day are paid based on contribution, leadership, collegiality and reputation—not client originations, according to Robert Mittelstaedt, the partner in charge of the San Francisco office.

“There have been a handful of people that have said I don’t want to go to a place where I’m not paid in bonuses if I bring in more business,” Mittelstaedt told the Recorder. “When people have that reaction, I just tell them Jones Day is not for them.”

Posted in business, economics | Comments Off

President Obama, the Consumer Financial Protection Agency, and Consumer Choice

Posted by Josh Wright on September 14, 2009

My colleague Todd Zywicki and I have a piece out in Lombard Street today on the proposed new Consumer Financial Protection Agency.   The issue has a number of contributions from proponents and critics of the new agency.   The piece is well timed, with President Obama making the case for the CFPA in his Wall Street speech and specifically linking failures of consumer protection with the financial crisis:

First, we’re proposing new rules to protect consumers and a new Consumer Financial Protection Agency to enforce those rules. This crisis was not just the result of decisions made by the mightiest of financial firms. It was also the result of decisions made by ordinary Americans to open credit cards and take on mortgages. And while there were many who took out loans they knew they couldn’t afford, there were also millions of Americans who signed contracts they didn’t fully understand offered by lenders who didn’t always tell the truth.

CFPA proponents, and now President Obama, have made this claim repeatedly in defending the CFPA.  But to my knowledge, there is no empirical evidence to demonstrate that consumer mistakes in lending markets played a substantial role in causing the financial crisis.  Zywicki and I expand on this point in the short article.

President Obama goes on to explain the claimed benefits of the new agency:

This is in part because there is no single agency charged with making sure it doesn’t happen. That is what we’ll change. The Consumer Financial Protection Agency will have the power to ensure that consumers get information that is clear and concise, and to prevent the worst kinds of abuses. Consumers shouldn’t have to worry about loan contracts designed to be unintelligible, hidden fees attached to their mortgages, and financial penalties – whether through a credit card or debit card – that appear without warning  on their statements. And responsible lenders, including community banks, doing the right thing shouldn’t have to worry about ruinous competition from unregulated competitors.

Now there are those who are suggesting that somehow this will restrict the choices available to consumers. Nothing could be further from the truth. The lack of clear rules in the past meant we had innovation of the wrong kind: the firm that could make its products look best by doing the best job of hiding the real costs won.  For example, we had “teaser” rates on credit cards and mortgages that lured people in and then surprised them with big rate increases.  By setting ground rules, we’ll increase the kind of competition that actually provides people better and greater choices, as companies compete to offer the best product, not the one that’s most complex or confusing.

This last paragraph doesn’t make any sense to me.  The President denies that the CFPA will restrict consume choice and says nothing could be further from the truth.   But in the very next sentence, the President explains exactly how the agency will restrict consumer choice.  The defense of the restrictions in consumer choice is that the CFPA will pick out choices that are bad for consumers, e.g. teaser rates on credit cards and mortgages.   A restriction of choices viewed as “bad” by the new agency is still a restriction in choice.  The Obama administration’s defense is that this restriction in choice is good for consumers because they make bad choices in financial product markets.  Many have been persuaded by that argument.  I am not.   But I want to make highlight that I find it interesting that the President really seems to be saying that the CFPA will identify choices and “the kind of competition” that generates “bad” choices for consumers and eliminate them from the menu.   I don’t understand how, given this argument, claims that the agency will restrict choice are “far from the truth.”

One can make a slightly more sophisticated claim that there will be no reduction in choice because, as those who have been following the CFPA debate will know, the new agency would also have power to approve “plain vanilla” lending products and could force lenders to offer the plain vanilla product before any alternative. In this scenario, proponents argue, consumer choice is not reduced because the non-vanilla product can still be offered.  But notice that this “choice-neutral” interpretation of the CFPA assumes that: (1) the CFPA does not have the authority to simply prohibit some products outright, and (2) that any costs that the CFPA imposes on consumers demanding non-standard products or lenders wishing to offer them will not impact their profitability and, in turn, likelihood that lenders are willing to offer them or consumers incur the cost to select their preferred product.  To the contrary, the CFPA does have the authority to ban products.  And it is a relatively straightforward argument that just because the CFPA will allow the sale of non-vanilla products does not mean that we will not see a reduction in choice if the costs of buying and selling those products increase (and profitability decreases).

More generally, critics of the CFPA,  including myself, are worried about the extremely wide latitutde the proposed agency will be granted  in its ability to design products, prohibit products, and impose costs on consumer decisions to purchase (and lender decisions to offer) non-vanilla products.  Given the CFPA’s explicit and deep links to the behavioral law and economics literature and its style of cost-benefit analysis, one can quite logically be concerned that the CFPA will exercise its authority to identify and prohibit “bad choices” for consumers in a manner that chills welfare-increasing forms of competition and product variety.

In any event, the right economic question, it seems to me, is whether the regulations promulgated by the CFPA with its authority are likely to improve consumer outcomes.  This includes contributing to avoiding future financial crisis, obviously.  With respect to the latter, I’ve seen no convincing evidence proferred by the administration or CFPA proponents that failures of consumer protection contributed to the financial crisis.   With respect to the former, as discussed in greater length in the Lombard Street piece (and even greater length in a forthcoming paper on the CFPA with David Evans — look here soon for the link), the claims that consumer mistakes in consumer financial product markets justify the contemplated restriction in consumer choice and reduction in availability of credit from an economic perspective are even more dubious.

Posted in business, economics, law and economics, markets | Comments Off

Economic Illiteracy of the Week

Posted by Josh Wright on September 12, 2009

Comes by way of US Trade Representative Ron Kirk defending the protectionist White House move to impose a 35% tariff on imported Chinese tires as … wait for it … well, just read for yourself:

The three-year remedies, consisting of an additional tariff of 35 percent ad valorem in the first year, 30 percent ad valorem in the second, and 25 percent ad valorem in the third year, are being imposed after a finding by the United States International Trade Commission that a harmful surge of imports of Chinese tires disrupted the U.S. market for those products. . . .

This Administration is doing what is necessary to enforce trade agreements on behalf of American workers and manufacturers. Enforcing trade laws is key to maintaining an open and free trading system.

HT: Peter Klein.

Posted in business, economics, international politics | Comments Off

Onion: Apple Works on Novel iPhone Lock-In Strategy

Posted by Josh Wright on September 9, 2009

Rewarding loyal consumers with a product they can really believe in:

“I am proud today to introduce to those who really, truly deserve it, our most incredible iPhone yet,” announced Apple CEO Steve Jobs, extending his seemingly empty left palm toward the eagerly awaiting crowd. “Not only is this our lightest and slimmest model ever, but as any truly savvy Apple customer can clearly see, it’s also the most handsome product we’ve ever designed.”

The packed auditorium, which had been listening to Jobs in hushed reverence for several minutes, then erupted into applause, with hundreds of men and women suddenly jumping to their feet and shouting, “I can see it!” “Look, there it is!” and “God, it’s so beautiful!”

Apple Claims Jump - KeynoteSteve Jobs unveils the updated iPhone exclusively to those who really, really want to see it.

Screams of “Of course, yes, I too can see the phone,” were also heard at this time.

Retailing for $599, the iPhone 3GI offers only the most special Apple consumers—the ones who believe in the company more than anything else in the world, and who would never, ever dream of questioning it—the ability to open dozens of powerful applications at once. In addition, the new multimedia device will provide true Apple fans with a high-definition video camera, one-tap editing with Final Cut Pro, and cut and paste.

“The selection of colors is amazing,” said Paul Conrad, a Fairfield, VA native who purchased phones in black, white, and silver. “Not only does it look awesome, but it can do pretty much anything you want as long as you believe in it.”

“The AppleCare Plan doesn’t cover dropping your phone, though, so I’d recommend buying one of these designer protective cases,” Conrad added.

While the new iPhone has been greatly admired and widely touted for its impressive voice and data communication capabilities, some Americans remain skeptical.

“Daddy isn’t talking into anything at all,” said 4-year-old Ella Conrad, pointing at her father, Paul, who has been obsessively staring at, playing with, and customizing the invisible phone since purchasing it Monday. “Daddy’s pretending to be on hold with an operator.”

Posted in blogging, economics, musings | Comments Off

Professor Werner Z. Hirsch (1920-2009)

Posted by Josh Wright on September 8, 2009

I worked for Professor Hirsch as a graduate student working my way through the economics and law programs at UCLA.  We wrote an article together on the law and economics of regulatory takings before the antitrust bug had taken hold of me.  I’ve still got a draft somewhere, I think.  I remember him as being extremely generous with his time and wisdom.  He shared an office with Armen Alchian, who would sit on my dissertation committee.  I spent a lot of time in that office.   Professor Hirsch passed in July from pancreatic cancer.  A memorial service will be held for him September 21.  Details here.  He will be missed.  The LA Times Obituary is here.

Posted in economics, law and economics | Comments Off

Zingales on Capitalism After the Crisis

Posted by Josh Wright on September 8, 2009

A very, very good essay.

The whole thing is very much worth reading.  I suspect the concluding three paragraphs will get the most attention:

We thus stand at a crossroads for American capitalism. One path would channel popular rage into political support for some genuinely pro-market reforms, even if they do not serve the interests of large financial firms. By appealing to the best of the populist tradition, we can introduce limits to the power of the financial industry — or any business, for that matter — and restore those fundamental principles that give an ethical dimension to capitalism: freedom, meritocracy, a direct link between reward and effort, and a sense of responsibility that ensures that those who reap the gains also bear the losses. This would mean abandoning the notion that any firm is too big to fail, and putting rules in place that keep large financial firms from manipulating government connections to the detriment of markets. It would mean adopting a pro-market, rather than pro-business, approach to the economy.

The alternative path is to soothe the popular rage with measures like limits on executive bonuses while shoring up the position of the largest financial players, making them dependent on government and making the larger economy dependent on them. Such measures play to the crowd in the moment, but threaten the financial system and the public standing of American capitalism in the long run. They also reinforce the very practices that caused the crisis. This is the path to big-business capitalism: a path that blurs the distinction between pro-market and pro-business policies, and so imperils the unique faith the American people have long displayed in the legitimacy of democratic capitalism.

Unfortunately, it looks for now like the Obama administration has chosen this latter path. It is a choice that threatens to launch us on that vicious spiral of more public resentment and more corporatist crony capitalism so common abroad — trampling in the process the economic exceptionalism that has been so crucial for American prosperity. When the dust has cleared and the panic has abated, this may well turn out to be the most serious and damaging consequence of the financial crisis for American capitalism.

HT: Mankiw.

Posted in business, economics | Comments Off

Shouldn't I Just Be Happy My Name is Spelled Correctly?

Posted by Josh Wright on September 7, 2009

I’m not generally a big fan of blogging to complain about law reviews or the way that my work has been interpreted by others.  I’m generally of the view that the risk of having my work misinterpreted within a reasonable range is my own to bear, and that if it happens, it’s probably due to my own failure to write clearly enough.  I’m not a big fan of either of those things.   With that kind of lead in, you can be pretty sure I’m going to do both in this post.

I recently opened my mail to see a reprint from Professor Alan White at Valparaiso University School of Law from his article, Behavior and Contract, published in the University of Minnesota Journal of Law and Inequality.  Unfortunately, the SSRN link above is not the finally published version to which I will refer in this post.  I read with some interest because Professor White’s article takes on a claim I make in this article that the behavioral law and economics literature has, at least as applied to the world of consumer contracts, overstated its case in terms of its predictive power relative to vanilla neoclassical economics.  My article is essentially a literature review of the real world evidence involving consumer behavior in these markets, evidence both supporting and contradicting claims in the behavioral literature, and concludes that the rational choice models outperform their behavioral counterparts.  The goal of the article was to draw attention to the existing empirical evidence, since proponents of both behavioral and traditional law and economics agree that predictive power of the models is of primary importance.  I attempted to do so carefully and thoroughly.

As I thumbed through the article, I was struck by the following passage in n. 143 referring to my article:

Wright relies on industry-sponsored research to contend that behavioral theories are not sufficiently predictive of credit card consumers’ choices, because a majority of credit card consumers are observed to make the “rational” (i.e., wealth-maximizing) choice based on the given data. See id.

I was really surprised and disappointed to read this.  My article is a literature survey.  As such, I cite and “rely” on dozens of studies in the field.  Professor White is referring to just one of these studies, a well known study in the credit card literature by Tom Brown & Lacey Plache, Paying with Plastic: Maybe Not so Crazy, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 63 (2006) which uses a unique dataset (the VISA Payment System Panel Study) provided by VISA (Brown is affiliated with Visa, as is made obvious in the paper).   No doubt, the Brown & Plache article is “industry sponsored” in some sense or another.   It should be noted that I cite to, and discuss in detail, the findings of a number of studies.  To my knowledge, the overwhelming majority of these studies do not involve any industry funding.  Nor do I see anywhere else in Professor White’s article where he makes this special designation regarding funding sources for other articles he either critiques or cites.

But that is a bit beside the point, which is that the natural interpretation of the footnote is misleading at best.  White implies that I either (1) relied exclusively on industry funded research to support my conclusion that credit card consumers appear to be acting rationally, or (2) tried to mislead readers of my article by emphasizing industry-sponsored research to the exclusion of “unbiased” studies.   I note, for the record, that Professor White does not address the merits of Brown & Plache in the slightest nor even acknowledge the other studies coming to similar conclusions (and there have been several more since the publication of my paper back in 2007).  The larger point is that I find the first sentence entirely misleading and suggesting something intellectually dishonest about my scholarship.  As such, I wanted to clear the record here.

It is literally true that I cite to Brown & Plache and rely on their empirical findings in supporting my conclusion that the rational choice models maintain predictive superiority in credit card markets.  But the message of the footnote is, in my view, pretty clearly that “one should dismiss Wright’s critique generally because he relies on industry-sponsored research and is biased”; it is NOT that “Wright cites to a bunch of studies and you should ignore one of them because it is co-authored by a VISA employee and uses VISA data.”  As such, I view the reference as misleading and calling for the clarification made here with the request that readers interested in taking a look at the evidence please just read my paper.

Finally, this raises several other tangential but I think interesting points.

One is that I think that, as the title of the post suggests, law review editors should be catching things like this and not letting them slide.  This is something that law review editors can and should be doing.  It does not require special technical skill in statistics or econometrics, just a basic cite check.

A second is that this raises interesting issues about the probative value of industry-sponsored research in law and economics.  Many have written about this.  And I do think it can be rational to apply some discount to funded work in appropriate circumstances.  But the larger point is that I view it as wholly insufficient to simply point to an article with serious empirical analysis (Brown & Plache in this instance) and dismiss it–as well as papers relying on it–simply because it is industry-sponsored and without taking on the methods, the data, results or anything of substance.

Third, there are other quibbles I have with Professor White’s article.  For instance, the rest of n. 143 reads:

On the other hand, he concedes that based on the evidence, consumer behavior is neither 100% rational nor 100% irrational. See id. at 509-10. Wright contends that behavioral economists “assume consistent irrationality,” and thereby set up a straw man. See id. at n.31. Rather than asserting that consumer behavior is always and predictably non-utilitarian, as Wright implies of behavioralists, behavioral economics is better understood as saying that consumer behavior is not entirely predictable by rational choice theory. What behavioralism loses in predictive certainty, it gains in descriptive depth.

White apparently does not understand the behavioral literature he is hoping will inform legal debates involving consumer contracts.   Of course behaviorists and the “new” paternalists assume consistent irrationality!  If errors from cognitive biases were randomly distributed around some central tendency towards rationality then the average consumer would be acting quite rationally despite there being a distribution that included both rational and irrational individuals.  We’d be back to a logical concession that the rational actor model predicted average consumer behavior incredibly well.  To make the claim that the insights of behavioral economics can help us do “better,” it must be the case that (and by the way, Sunstein, Thaler, Jolls and just about every behavioralist that I’ve read proudly claims that behavioral economics can do exactly this …) behavioral law and economics can identify systematic, consistent and predictable deviations from rationality.  The point of the behavioral literature is not simply to say that the rational choice model doesn’t entirely predict consumer behavior.  Its to offer a better alternative.  White’s denial on this point is not only puzzling, but undermines the intellectual basis for his reliance on behavioral economics in the first place.

Posted in bankruptcy, contracts, economics, law and economics, legal scholarship | Comments Off

Zywicki on the Consumer Financial Protection Agency on Reason TV

Posted by Josh Wright on September 2, 2009

Available here.

Posted in economics, financial regulation | Comments Off

Antitrust, Multi-Dimensional Competition, and Innovation: Do We Have an Antitrust-Relevant Theory of Competition Now?

Posted by Josh Wright on September 2, 2009

My essay on economics, innovation, and antitrust, forthcoming in Manne & Wright’s forthcoming volume on Regulating Innovation: Competition Policy and Patent Law Under Certainty (introductory chapter available here), is now available on SSRN.  The essay is a revisiting of a fundamental challenge Harold Demsetz offered to antitrust decades ago that I believe has gone, from a methodological perspective, largely unanswered.  The point primary point in Demsetz’s analysis was that when different dimensions of competition were negatively correlated, economics offered limited insight into how to translate shifts in the “mix” of competitive activities into changes in economic efficiency or other welfare measures of interest (total welfare, consumer welfare, etc.).  In the essay I explore this point in light of recent advances in economic theory and empirical knowledge, as well as policy implications.  Here’s the abstract:

Harold Demsetz once claimed that ‘economics has no antitrust relevant theory of competition.’ Demsetz offered this provocative statement as an introduction to an economic concept with critical implications for the antitrust enterprise: the multi-dimensional nature of competition. Competition does not take place upon a single margin, such as price competition, but several dimensions that are often inversely correlated such that a liability rule deterring one form of competition will result in more of another. This insight has important implications for the current policy debate concerning how to design antitrust liability standards for conduct involving both static product market competition and dynamic innovative activity. The primary purpose of this essay is to revisit Demsetz’s broader challenge to antitrust regulation in the context of the frequently discussed tradeoffs between innovation and price competition. I summarize recent developments in our knowledge of the relationship between competition and innovation, highlighting the deficiencies that significantly constrain antitrust enforcers’ abilities to confidently calculate inevitable welfare tradeoffs. I conclude by discussing policy implications that follow from these limitations.

Read the whole thing.

Posted in antitrust, economics, markets, technology | Comments Off

 
Follow

Get every new post delivered to your Inbox.

Join 1,035 other followers