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	<title>Comments on: The EU Intel Decision, Error Costs, and What Happens in the US?</title>
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	<link>http://truthonthemarket.com/2009/05/14/the-eu-intel-decision-error-costs-and-what-happens-in-the-us/</link>
	<description>Academic commentary on law, business, economics and more</description>
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		<title>By: TRUTH ON THE MARKET &#187; Features v. Bugs: Intel and the Relationship Between Sections 2 and 5</title>
		<link>http://truthonthemarket.com/2009/05/14/the-eu-intel-decision-error-costs-and-what-happens-in-the-us/#comment-7749</link>
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[TRUTH ON THE MARKET &#187; Features v. Bugs: Intel and the Relationship Between Sections 2 and 5]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Wed, 16 Dec 2009 21:52:43 +0000</pubDate>
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		<description><![CDATA[[...] the Federal Trade Commission&#8217;s Intel complaint in the coming months.  And we&#8217;ve said quite a bit already.  But having just read the complaint and the statements from Chairman Leibowitz and Commissioner [...]]]></description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>[...] the Federal Trade Commission&#8217;s Intel complaint in the coming months.  And we&#8217;ve said quite a bit already.  But having just read the complaint and the statements from Chairman Leibowitz and Commissioner [...]</p>
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		<title>By: TRUTH ON THE MARKET &#187; The seeds of an antitrust disaster</title>
		<link>http://truthonthemarket.com/2009/05/14/the-eu-intel-decision-error-costs-and-what-happens-in-the-us/#comment-7748</link>
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[TRUTH ON THE MARKET &#187; The seeds of an antitrust disaster]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Tue, 15 Dec 2009 04:45:24 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.truthonthemarket.com/?p=2237#comment-7748</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[[...] forward to learning more about these contracts and discussing their competitive implications.  As has been well-explored on this blog, loyalty rebates are hardly necessarily anticompetitive, and, as in [...]]]></description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>[...] forward to learning more about these contracts and discussing their competitive implications.  As has been well-explored on this blog, loyalty rebates are hardly necessarily anticompetitive, and, as in [...]</p>
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		<title>By: TRUTH ON THE MARKET &#187; Is the Intel/AMD Settlement Illegal?</title>
		<link>http://truthonthemarket.com/2009/05/14/the-eu-intel-decision-error-costs-and-what-happens-in-the-us/#comment-7747</link>
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[TRUTH ON THE MARKET &#187; Is the Intel/AMD Settlement Illegal?]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Fri, 13 Nov 2009 20:43:53 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.truthonthemarket.com/?p=2237#comment-7747</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[[...] AMD and Intel settled.  Its a case we&#8217;ve covered here in significant detail.  Terms haven&#8217;t been announced publicly.  AAI has predictably [...]]]></description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>[...] AMD and Intel settled.  Its a case we&#8217;ve covered here in significant detail.  Terms haven&#8217;t been announced publicly.  AAI has predictably [...]</p>
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		<title>By: TRUTH ON THE MARKET &#187; EU Intel Fines Attract Rebuke</title>
		<link>http://truthonthemarket.com/2009/05/14/the-eu-intel-decision-error-costs-and-what-happens-in-the-us/#comment-7746</link>
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[TRUTH ON THE MARKET &#187; EU Intel Fines Attract Rebuke]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 17 Sep 2009 19:07:53 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.truthonthemarket.com/?p=2237#comment-7746</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[[...] criticized the European Commission&#8217;s antitrust attack against Intel here and the resulting $1.44 billion [...]]]></description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>[...] criticized the European Commission&#8217;s antitrust attack against Intel here and the resulting $1.44 billion [...]</p>
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		<title>By: Josh</title>
		<link>http://truthonthemarket.com/2009/05/14/the-eu-intel-decision-error-costs-and-what-happens-in-the-us/#comment-7745</link>
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Josh]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 14 May 2009 16:17:59 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.truthonthemarket.com/?p=2237#comment-7745</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[Let me play law professor hypothetical for a second and raise the following unlikely possibility.  What if in the private US suit between AMD and Intel, the parties agree to resolve the matter with a commitment to stop loyalty rebates?  Wouldn&#039;t the FTC position in the pharmaceutical settlement cases extend to an argument that this settlement --- a naked agreement to stop discounting --- falls into the same category?  Of course, this would create some internal divergence at the FTC.  Of course, is the FTC/DOJ endorsed the European approach that a horizontal agreement to cease loyalty discounting is efficiency enhancing because those rebates harm consumers, all sorts of silliness could arise under Section 1.]]></description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Let me play law professor hypothetical for a second and raise the following unlikely possibility.  What if in the private US suit between AMD and Intel, the parties agree to resolve the matter with a commitment to stop loyalty rebates?  Wouldn&#8217;t the FTC position in the pharmaceutical settlement cases extend to an argument that this settlement &#8212; a naked agreement to stop discounting &#8212; falls into the same category?  Of course, this would create some internal divergence at the FTC.  Of course, is the FTC/DOJ endorsed the European approach that a horizontal agreement to cease loyalty discounting is efficiency enhancing because those rebates harm consumers, all sorts of silliness could arise under Section 1.</p>
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		<title>By: Geoffrey Manne</title>
		<link>http://truthonthemarket.com/2009/05/14/the-eu-intel-decision-error-costs-and-what-happens-in-the-us/#comment-7744</link>
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Geoffrey Manne]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 14 May 2009 16:03:50 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.truthonthemarket.com/?p=2237#comment-7744</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[Great post, Josh.  It will be interesting to see if the EU purports to extend its remedy outside the EU.  In this cae, I have to say that seems likely--in fact it&#039;s not clear how the remedy could be at all effective otherwise (not that the EU is very concerned with effective rememdies--see Windows XP-N).  In which case there will remain a political battle between the EU and US agencies, even if there is not an intellectual one.  Does the US government stake out a claim to decide for itself what competition rules will govern internally, or does it accede more global enforcement authority to the EU?  Of course it&#039;s not clear what the US could do about it, especially if it won&#039;t complain about logical, economic or legal flaws in the EU&#039;s case.]]></description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Great post, Josh.  It will be interesting to see if the EU purports to extend its remedy outside the EU.  In this cae, I have to say that seems likely&#8211;in fact it&#8217;s not clear how the remedy could be at all effective otherwise (not that the EU is very concerned with effective rememdies&#8211;see Windows XP-N).  In which case there will remain a political battle between the EU and US agencies, even if there is not an intellectual one.  Does the US government stake out a claim to decide for itself what competition rules will govern internally, or does it accede more global enforcement authority to the EU?  Of course it&#8217;s not clear what the US could do about it, especially if it won&#8217;t complain about logical, economic or legal flaws in the EU&#8217;s case.</p>
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