Truth on the Market

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Archive for April, 2009

"Goldman reports $1.8 billion profit"

Posted by Elizabeth Nowicki on April 13, 2009

Cnn.com tells us the good news that “Goldman reports $1.8 billion profit,” but the totality of the information in the cnn.com article strikes me as mildly curious.

While announcing that “Goldman reports $1.8 billion profit,” the article points out that Goldman needed $10 B in TARP funds only a few months ago.  Yet now Goldman is planning to sell stock in order to raise $5 B in order to pay down the TARP obligation.  Further, Goldman reported earnings of $3.39 per share for the quarter ended March 31, which is more than double the earnings per share amount projected by analysts.

All of this together paints a picture that strikes me as mildly curious.  I suppose the fact that Goldman took $10 B in TARP funds but is now, merely months later, parading $1.8 billion in quarterly profit could be chalked up to “short term liquidity problems.”  But the analysts’ 100% miss on Goldman’s earnings per share is a pretty big miss given that usually banks offer enough guidance for the analysts to stay on the ball field.

Goldman’s plan to raise $5 B in a stock offering has me similarly ruminating, given that now would not have struck me as the ideal time for Goldman to tap the stock market for $5 B.

The whole situation harkens back to 1999, and I cannot help but wonder what Arthur Levitt might think of it.

Posted in markets | 2 Comments »

GMU/Microsoft Conference on the Law & Economics of Innovation

Posted by Geoffrey Manne on April 12, 2009

UPDATE 3:  It just keeps getting better.  Now we’ve added Mike Baye, formerly Director of the Bureau of Economics at the FTC, now returned to his post at Indiana.  He’ll be moderating and I’m sure commenting on many of the papers. 

UPDATE 2: And now Susan DeSanti, newly-appointed Director of the Office of Policy and Planning at the FTC has signed on for our industry/regulator roundtable.  A not-to-be-missed event! 

UPDATE:  We’re delighted to announce that Bill Kovacic will be joining us to deliver the conference’s morning keynote, as well.  A great conference just got even better!

 For the third year, Josh and I have organized the annual George Mason Law School/Microsoft Conference on the Law and Economics of Innovation.  The conference is at the Arlington Hilton on May 7; registration is free. 

This year’s conference is on “Online Markets vs. Traditional Markets,” and once again we have a stellar line-up.  The (beautifully re-designed) conference website is here.  You can register for the conference here

This year features a keynote address from Susan Athey (Harvard Economics; Clark Medal winner), as well as the following presentations:

Peter Klein (Missouri Economics)– Does the New Economy Need a New Economics?
Thomas W. Hazlett (George Mason Law) – The Role of Exclusive Spectrum Rights in Wireless Network Innovations: Of Newtons, Blackberries, iPhones & G-Phones
Eric Goldman (Santa Clara Law) – The Economics of Reputational Information

Florencia Marotta-Wurgler (NYU Law) – Does Anyone Read Fine Print? A Test of the Informed Minority Hypothesis
Howard Beales (George Washington Business) – Public Goods, Private Information, and Anonymous Transactions: Providing a Safe and Interesting Internet
Peter Swire (Ohio State Law) – Privacy and Antitrust

Philip J. Weiser (Colorado Law; DOJ)— Re-evaluating the Theory and Realities of Online Contracts
Randal C. Picker (Chicago Law) — The Mediated Book
F. Scott Kieff (Wash U. Law (moving to George Washington Law)) — Commerce in the Shadow of the Commons: Business Models in Cyberspace

We’ll also have an industry roundtable to reflect on the day with representatives from Microsoft, Amazon and Facebook.

Should be a great conference–Please join us!

Posted in announcements, google, law and economics, privacy, technology | Comments Off

Dont Call It A Comeback

Posted by Josh Wright on April 11, 2009

When I came onto the job market in 2004, a number of advisers told me that I should not market myself as an “antitrust guy.”  The prevailing view on the job market was that “antitrust was dead.”  This perception was conveyed one way or another in interviews or conversations with folks in the legal academy.  The conventional wisdom was that nothing exciting had happened in the antitrust world since the Reagan era.  On top of that, the story goes, there were few important questions that remained to be answered and not only minor contributions left around the margins.  I ignored the advice at the time thanks to an uncle (and antitrust lawyer) who had turned me on to economics and antitrust in high school.  Truth be told I really didn’t want to study or write about anything else at the time and really wasn’t interested in saying otherwise. 

Five years later it is my impression that outside the antitrust community this conventional wisdom still prevails.  Antitrust, to many, is viewed as a “luxury” which I take to mean that a serious law school can get along quite fine without having a faculty member whose primary teaching and research interests is antitrust.  Antitrust, they say (I paraphrase and oversimplify but not by much), is in low demand in the legal academy because with the exception of a few big names cases from time it’s a field of little practical importance, there is not tremendous demand from students, and it’s a less intellectually interesting field than other areas of commercial law that have thus far had less exposure to economic and empirical thinking. 

To the extent that this is the conventional wisdom in the legal academy (and I’ve heard it often enough to suggest that its at least a widely held view), it is mistaken and has been for the last decade or so.  And that’s not just the case at George Mason where law and economics is a research and teaching priority and where antitrust has had fairly stable and relatively high demand.  For several reasons, contrary to the conventional wisdom I hear from the legal academy, it is an incredibly exciting time to practice, think about, and write about antitrust issues.  I obviously can’t make the comparisons from firsthand knowledge, but I suspect that right now is one of the most intellectually active antitrust eras in history.  I suspect that most antitrust practitioners and academics would agree with that proposition, perhaps with quibbles over whether it ranks at the top of the list or somewhere like second or third.  I don’t want to get bogged down in that debate here.  But when I explain to colleagues how exciting of a time it is in antitrust right now (and especially as an antitrust academic) the response is normally surprise more than anything else.   The interesting point though is not that antitrust has really been around and in a growth phase for the last decade or so.  Rather, the more interesting point to me is that the legal academy appears to finally be catching on to these changes.

While my sense is that most TOTM readers have some familiarity (or at least interest) in the field and a sense of the growth over the past decade, the frequent expression of surprise and interest from colleagues outside the antitrust community suggests that a post explaining these developments might be of general interest.  First, let me start with some evidence that the antitrust is no longer should be considered a law school luxury and that the legal academy is starting to catch on this new state of affairs.  Then I’ll talk a bit about some underlying causes.

THE LEGAL ACADEMY FINDS ANTITRUST AGAIN

Recent antitrust movements on the lateral market, and especially at highly ranked schools, are one type of evidence that the field is attracting attention.  In just the last year, consider the recent moves of Dan Crane to Michigan, Howard Shelanski to Georgetown, Christopher Leslie to Irvine, and Abe Wickelgren to Texas (and I might be missing others).  On top of those moves, there are several other schools in the top 20 and top 10 that either have current visitors, are considering various antitrust candidates for the future or have scheduled visits.   For this reason, my sense is that 2009 is not a one-time phenomenon for antitrust moves.  Another reason that this trend is likely to continue is demographics.  Many of the prominent antitrust scholars who were prominent figures in the antitrust battles of the 1970s and 80s are nearing retirement age or have already retired, leaving a number of schools in the top 15 or so that either have no significant antitrust presence or will not in the near future.

Another piece of evidence that the legal academy is learning that antitrust is back as a high demand area for scholars is the attention it is paid at conferences and in top journals.  Consider, for example, the reemergence of antitrust at ALEA where it will have a total of four panels this year — which is as many or more than all other fields.

The growth in intellectual activity in antitrust can also be observed in the expansion of journals dedicated to the area and the number of publications in prominent journals.  For example, in recent years new journals like Competition Policy International, Global Competition Policy, and the Journal of Competition Law and Economics (among others) have emerged and published a steady stream of high quality scholarship.  On top of that, my more casual empirical observation is that the number of antitrust articles in JLE, JLS, and top law reviews has increased in recent years.

Another observation is the emergence and activities of antitrust related centers and institutes at law schools across the country.  For example, we’ve noted the recent emergence of such centers at GW, and the competition related programs at the Searle Center at Northwestern.  These are in addition to similar centers at Berkeley, Loyola, across the Atlantic, as well as more familiar domestic and non-academic voices in the antitrust policy landscape like AAI.

WHY THE GROWTH IN DEMAND FOR ANTITRUST AT LAW SCHOOLS?

So why has antitrust come back in this way over the past decade or so?  I think there are 4 primary causes. 

The first is the emergence of antitrust & intellectual property as a field.  Not only has the growth of this field and the intersection of patent and antitrust in particular created jobs for lawyers, but its raised to the forefront a number of new intellectual challenges for antitrust law in areas such as licensing, patent holdup, patent pools, reverse payments, and monopolization generally.

The second is the proliferation of antitrust internationally.  There are two components here that I think explain much of the growth in addition to the fact that we now have more than one hundred national antitrust laws — which creates all sorts of special challenges but would not itself, in my view, create the explosion in demand that we’ve seen in the legal academy.  The first is the emerging Chinese antitrust law and the high stakes battle between US and European regulators to influence the analytical underpinnings of applications of that law.  The second is the emergence of the European Commission as the most active and aggressive enforcer of single firm conduct in cases involving US firms like Intel, Qualcomm, Rambus and others.

The third cause is the unprecedented flurry of activity from the Supreme Court in recent years and the apparent willingness to address important antitrust issues.  For a number of reasons I suspect that this trend will continue and we’ll see the Supreme Court continue to take cases for the next few years.

A fourth factor is related to the others.  Over the last few years it has become difficult to read popular news sources without seeing an antitrust issue getting coverage.  The sheer number of high profile cases in recent years has a lot of attention. Consider recent cases that have got mainstream press: Whole Foods, all permutations of deals involving Google-Yahoo-Doubleclick, Ticketmaster-Live Nation, Sirius-XM, Whirlpool-Maytag, Intel, Microsoft, Rambus, and others. 

There are other factors  I think are at play here as well but probably have less influence despite contributing to the overall sense that antitrust is important again.  For example, political change has resulted in considerable debate over the Section 2 Report and also generated proposed legislation involving RPM and reverse payments that has raised the overall profile of antitrust.  Increasing concerns over consumer protection have given rise to a growth in antitrust related consumer protection actions. 

Overall, my sense is that these developments have created significant antitrust activity in practice, but more importantly for the changes in the legal academy, generated important new topics to think and write about.  For example, intellectual battles are now raging in antitrust scholarship over the appropriate scope of Section 5, antitrust analysis of single firm conduct (see, e.g., the AMC/Section 2 Report), the prospects of re-writing the Merger Guidelines, consumer protection and antitrust, empirical antitrust and evaluation of agency performance, patent holdup, resale price maintenance, reverse payments amongst other topics.   In turn, my sense is that the growth in practice has made antitrust a high demand subject for students (here’s a post on why to take antitrust).

Posted in antitrust, law school, markets, musings | 6 Comments »

Shelanski from Berkeley to Georgetown

Posted by Josh Wright on April 9, 2009

Congratulations to Professor Shelanski (HT: Brian Leiter).  Berkeley’s strength in antitrust is impressive.  Note that even with the likely departures of Joe Farrell (FTC Bureau of Economics), Carl Shapiro (DOJ) and Shelanski (Georgetown, and maybe into the administration?), the group still includes at least Dan Rubinfeld and Aaron Edlin and should still be considered amongst the handful of very strong antitrust groups in the country.

Posted in antitrust, law school, markets, musings | 2 Comments »

My interview with Bill Isaac

Posted by Geoffrey Manne on April 8, 2009

Over at finreg21–a new site devoted to news, analysis and commentary on financial regulatory reform with which I am affiliated–I interview Bill Isaac, former Chairman of the FDIC (during the savings and loan crisis).  We talk about his views on mark to market accounting and his testimony before congress (and a smidge about his views on a systemic risk regulator).  Arnold Kling has a pointedly-titled post on Bill’s views here.  The interview is quite interesting, and Bill has strongly-held and strongly-argued views (with which I don’t entirely agree).  Check it, and the rest of the site, out.

Posted in business, financial regulation, regulation | Comments Off

Is the Chicago School Really Dead? How Do You Know?

Posted by Josh Wright on April 8, 2009

Answer: not by a long shot.  Not in the Supreme Court.  Not in the empirical economics literature.  But perhaps according to at least one FTC Commissioner in the new FTC annual report:

Commissioner J. Thomas Rosch believes the current financial crisis has undermined the Chicago school of economics that has so heavily influenced antitrust enforcement over the past forty years and has broad implications for the FTC’s mission. Markets are not perfect; imperfect markets do not always correct themselves, and business people do not always behave rationally. Commissioner Rosch believes the Commission may need to move more towards “behavioral economics” and must provide competition law enforcement at least as strict as during times of prosperity.

This is a variant of Commissioner Rosch’s earlier pronouncement that “the orthodox and unvarnished Chicago School of economic theory is on life support, if not dead.”

While these sorts of claims are increasingly popular in the current financial climate, repetition does not make the claim any more correct.  As I’ve blogged previously, reports of the death of the Chicago School of antitrust economics have been, as they say, greatly exaggerated.

A few responses:

  1. Does the financial crisis really say anything about microeconomics?  As a commenter to this post points out, while debate abounds about the causes of the current financial crisis, the appropriate share of blame to be placed on market failure versus government failure, and what it tells us about the merits of various macroeconomic theories — there’s just not much of a substantive argument to be made that it tells us anything about the applied microeconomics relevant to antitrust analysis.  I suspect that attempts to link the financial crisis to calls for greater antitrust fall into the “you never want to waste a good crisis” category.  Historically, of course, poor economic conditions have been correlated with imposition of impediments to vigorous competition.
  2. The Chicago Roots of the Post-Chicago Movement.  The Post-Chicago theoretical advances are well known to be built upon the foundation laid by Chicago School founders like Aaron Director — it is simply misleading to argue that Chicago School economists did not understand that certain business practices could lead to inefficient outcomes.  Not to mention that the foundation of modern coordinated effects theories, to the best of my knowledge, is still Stigler (1968).
  3. “Markets are Perfect”.   Did anybody really argue this?  The contributions of Stigler and Director and others suggest otherwise though they did often argue that some of these concerns were either empirically irrelevant, policy irrelevant (i.e. we could not identify and distinguish them from pro-competitive conduct), or that both markets and governments failed but that the latter errors were more costly.  This is decidedly different from the caricature offer by the Commissioner.  Of course, not only did Chicagoans anticipate many of the anticompetitive theories prevalent in the more interventionist literature today, but it is instructive to note that it is economists like Ben Klein (on Standard Oil) and Tom Hazlett (on predation) who have offered two of the only existing real world empirical accounts of the Post-Chicago “raising rivals’ cost” phenomenon, not to mention fundamental contributions to its theoretical development by Chicagoan Dennis Carlton.
  4. What about behavioral economics anyway?  It remains unclear to me why the observation that firms might act irrationally in markets leads to a conclusion that more interventionist antitrust is appropriate.  Perhaps entry will not occur when it would otherwise be profitable and so a monopolist can exercise monopoly power longer than if one supposed free entry.  But that’s not the only story one can tell about behavioral quirks.  What about the firm that irrationally chooses not to exercise monopoly power when it would be profitable to do so?  This is not to say that behavioral economic theories of firm behavior should be irrelevant.  Like the other theories, whether Chicago, Post-Chicago, behavioral or otherwise, the key question is one of model selection, i.e. which theories have the best empirical support and should guide policy decisions.
  5. Empirical Evidence.   Recent comprehensive literature surveys from folks very well respected IO economists, including some who have spent significant time at the enforcement agencies, conclude that the best available empirical evidence is that most forms of single firm conductare  predominantly pro-competitive in practice (See great slides here from Lafontaine & Slade, Dan O’Brien or the paper from Froeb, et al).
  6. Is It All Wrong?  If the Chicago School of the “past 40 years” has been undermined, where do we go from here?  Are folks that are arguing that the entire Chicago School antitrust revolution was folly because it was based on erroneous assumptions about markets working taking the position that everything based on that notion is wrong?  Are we willing to talk about which theories are right and which might be more suspect?  Can we agree that testing competing theories against the existing evidence is the right way to resolve these disputes?  Calling the past 40 years undermined sounds like we are making some serious claims about re-writing antitrust and not just tinkering with the margins. This is not a rhetorical question.  Which cases are wrong because they are “Chicago-based” and where is the evidence in support of the claim?

We should continue to have the debate over which models present the best empirical and theoretical basis from which to build antitrust policy that will help consumers.  The debate should be one that is determined, as much as possible, by the quality of theory and evidence —- not t-shirt slogans and assertions.  In my view, a rigorous review of the empirical evidence suggests not only that the Chicago School of antitrust is not only alive, but in my view, that it is the “best available” mode of analysis for understanding many business practices relevant to antitrust enforcement.

What I hope is taken as my first contribution to this debate, including a fuller discussion of the available theory and evidence with respect to RPM and exclusive dealing, appears in my forthcoming book review: Overshot the Mark?  A Simple Explanation of the Chicago School’s Influence.

Posted in antitrust, economics, federal trade commission | 8 Comments »

The Future of Empirical Legal Scholarship

Posted by Josh Wright on April 7, 2009

Thoughts from John Pfaff (Fordham) here and here.  And here is an excerpt from his first post laying out some of the problems and challenges facing the empirical legal studies movement:

So what are the problems we face?

1. An explosion in empirical work. More empirical work is, at some level, a good thing: how can we decide what the best policy is without data? But the explosion in output has been matched by an explosion in the variation in quality (partly because user-friendly software allows people with little training to design empirical projects). The good work has never been better, and the bad work has never been worse. It could very well be that average quality has declined. Some of the bad work comes from honest errors, but some of it comes from cynical manipulation.

2. A bad philosophy of science. Social scientists cling to the idea that we are following in the footsteps of Sir Karl Popper, proposing hypotheses and then rejecting them. We are not. We never have. This is clear in any empirical paper: once the analyst calculates the point estimate, he draws implications from it (“My coefficient of 0.4 implies that a 1% increase in rainfall in Mongolia leads to a 0.4% increase in drug arrests in Brooklyn”). This is not falsification, which only allows him to say “I have rejected 0%.” Social science theory cannot produce the type of precise numerical hypothesis that falsification demands. We are trying to estimate an effect, which is inductive.

3. Limited tools for dealing with induction. Induction requires an overview of an entire empirical literature. Fields like medicine and epidemiology have started to develop rigorous methods for drawing these types of inferences. As far as I can tell, there has been no work in this direction in the social sciences, including ELS, of any sort.

This is partly the result of Problem 2: such overviews would be unnecessary were we actually in a falsificationist world, since all it takes is one black swan to refute the hypothesis that all swans are white.
As a result of these three problems, we produce empirical knowledge quite poorly.

To reuse a joke I’ve made before and will likely make again at least a dozen times this month, Newton’s Third Law roughly holds: for every empirical finding there is an opposite (though not necessarily equal) finding.

How about solutions?  John has promised to deliver some answers in future posts over at Prawfs.  See also Joe Doherty’s examination of the same issues over at ELS Blog from November 2008.

I believe there is some overlap with the problems John discusses and those I’ve pointed out in discussing the future of law and economics (blog posts available here) — and especially empirical law and economics in law schools.

In the case of law and economics, changes in economic science have led to a brand of L&E and L&E scholars less interested in “retailing” their work to legal academics and policy audiences.  This, I think, is a variant of the quality control problem that John is discussing in the empirical legal studies field.  John’s post makes me think that the fact that ELS carries a more diversified portfolio in terms of its methodological toolkit is more of a bug than a feature.   But I’m not sure.

Also, I wonder about the implications of the technical changes John discusses (reduced cost of producing legal scholarship, especially lower quality scholarship) for legal scholarship.  There is a lot of discussion about the available technological means of separating good empirical work from bad empirical work and identifying and synthesizing the information in the numerous “good” studies.  These are technological problems.  One could imagine lots of ways to reduce these problems with different sorts of quality controls.  This is a worthwhile exercise and I look forward to the rest of John’s posts.  But what if the real problem is that within the legal academy there is insufficient demand for the sorts of technological changes that would make the world of legal scholarship more empirically sound (i.e. truthier)?

Posted in economics, law and economics, legal scholarship, scholarship | Comments Off

TOTM Symposium Wrap Up

Posted by Josh Wright on April 4, 2009

I’d like to formally thank Mike Carrier, Geoff Manne, Phil Weiser, Dan Crane, Brett Frischmann, Scott Kieff and Dennis Crouch for participating in the first TOTM symposium on Mike’s book: Innovation for the 21st Century: Harnessing the Power of Intellectual Property and Antitrust Law.   Thanks also to Dennis for cross-posting at PatentlyO.  Each of the participants was asked to in a rather short time period to read the book and prepare a thoughtful and engaging post.  They all delivered marvelously.  We are grateful to them for making the symposium a success and, we hope, enjoyable for our readers.

Most of all, I’d like to thank Professor Carrier allowing his work to come center stage in our first blog symposium effort.  It is not easy to have one’s worked poked and prodded and critiqued from all possible angles.  As flattered as I am by Mike’s kind words about my efforts putting together the symposium and finding discussants, I’m quite sure his job was the tougher one (I didn’t write a book either!).  Besides, each of the discussants jumped at the opportunity and agreed to participate too quickly for it really to qualify as work.  In fact, by their individual and collective performance they’ve unwittingly ensured that I will come asking for more work from them down the road …

This was a new experiment for TOTM and one that we plan on continuing to try in the future.  If participants, commenters, or readers have comments or suggestions for possible future topics or for improving the format, I’d love to hear them via email or otherwise.

We do have one more exciting announcement about the symposium:

The folks at the Alabama Law Review have generously offered to publish modified and versions of the blog posts as essays in a forthcoming volume.  We will make sure to announce here when the final drafts are up and ready.

Finally, here are links to each of the posts and Professor Carrier’s response:

Posted in antitrust, business, copyright, economics, intellectual property, patent, technology, truth on the market | Comments Off

Did the Chicago School Overshoot the Mark?

Posted by Josh Wright on April 2, 2009

I’ve posted to SSRN a new essay entitled Overshot the Mark?  A Simple Explanation of the Chicago School’s Influence on Antitrust.  It is a book review of Robert Pitofsky’s recent volume How the Chicago School Overshot the Mark: The effect of Conservative Economic Analysis on U.S. Antitrust, and is forthcoming in Volume 5 of Competition Policy International.

The book review is a critical review of the Post-Chicago antitrust agenda adopted by many of the volume’s authors, and a defense of what the editors describe as conservative economics (but seem to mean Chicago School), from an empirical, evidence-based perspective.  The idea of the review is avoid the ideological component of the Chicago v. Post-Chicago debate by choosing to focus instead on the relative predictive power of the economic models.  In short, the evidence-based antitrust concept is one that requires running a horserace between the competing economic models of various forms of antitrust relevant behavior (I focus on RPM and exclusive dealing in the review) in order to identify the best available economic learning upon which antitrust policy can and should be built.  The standard requires flexibility over time but also commits policy makers to take seriously predictive power of models rather than grabbing whatever is convenient from the menu.

There are a number of other critical points about the volume, the approach to antitrust it advocates, and responses to specific essays in the review.

Here is the abstract:

Using George Stigler’s rules of intellectual engagement as a guide, and applying an evidence-based approach, this essay is a critical review of former Federal Trade Commission Chairman Robert Pitofsky’s How the Chicago School Overshot the Mark: The Effect of Conservative Economic Analysis on U.S. Antitrust, a collection of essays devoted to challenging the Chicago School’s approach to antitrust in favor of a commitment to Post-Chicago policies. Overshot the Mark is an important book and one that will be cited as intellectual support for a new and “reinvigorated” antitrust enforcement regime based on Post-Chicago economics. Its claims about the Chicago School’s stranglehold on modern antitrust, despite the existence of a perceived superior economic model in the Post-Chicago literature, are provocative. The central task of this review is to evaluate the book’s underlying premise that Post-Chicago economics literature provides better explanatory power than the “status quo” embodied in existing theory and evidence supporting Chicago School theory. I will conclude that the premise is mistaken. The simplest explanation of the Chicago School’s continued influence of U.S. antitrust policy — that its models provide superior explanatory power and policy relevance — cannot be rejected and is consistent with the available evidence.

You can download it here.

Posted in antitrust, economics, law and economics, legal scholarship, scholarship, SSRN | 1 Comment »

The Cousins Recruiting Saga Continues (Again)

Posted by Josh Wright on April 2, 2009

It wasn’t too long ago that I blogged about the purported end of the Demarcus Cousins saga.  For TOTM readers that want to catch up to speed, here is how things stood about a month ago:

For those who haven’t, Cousins is a blue chip high school basketball recruit who has been bargaining hard with the University of Alabama-Birmingham (UAB) over signing his National Letter of Intent — the letter that commits a player to attend the university and imposes the penalty of giving up a full year of eligibility if the student-athlete transfers. Cousins wants to commit to UAB to play for former Indiana University coach Mike Davis but wanted to seek contractual insurance for the possibility that after signing the letter of intent and making specific investments to UAB, Davis might leave the program. Cousins alleged that Davis promised that UAB would release Cousins without penalty if Davis was no longer his coach.

When we last left Cousins, he was holding out, talking to other programs, and attempting to bargain for this term in his National Letter of Intent.  He’s now signed with Memphis.

Back then, I noted that I thought it was odd that UAB could not find a way to include the contractual provision in Cousins’ NLI and wondered whether other athletes were successful in doing so.  It turns out recent developments give answer to that question, and also involve Cousins.

As the college basketball world now knows, former Memphis coach John Calipari (who successfully got the verbal commitment from Cousins) has accepted the head coaching position at the University of Kentucky.

With Calipari accepting the Memphis job, the question now turns to whether his excellent recruiting class will stay at Memphis.  But what about the NLI provisions that commit a player to attend or take the one year penalty for transferring?  Apparently, Cousins only committed to Memphis verbally and so is free to transfer.  ESPN reports that Cousins may stay at Memphis but that Calipari is likely to have a wonderful shot at him heading to Kentucky.

But here is the interesting new fact (at least to me and as it has been reported on ESPN): Another blue chip recruit that had signed an NLI with Memphis, Xavier Henry, but ESPN reporters continue to reference his NLI including a provision that allows him release without penalty in the case of Coach Calipari leaving.  My immediate reaction is that the fact that the competitive process for top recruits allows those players to extract these sorts of commitments from programs like Memphis convinces me that the problem at UAB must be related to a dispute between their coach (Mike Davis) and the UAB administration.  Of course the coach wants the provision.  But perhaps administrations at mid-majors want to increase the cost of early departures by prohibiting coaches from leaving and keeping recruits at the new school whereas this is less of a problem at major programs that have other substitute methods of keeping their coaches on staff for long periods of time.  For example, this list of terms reported to be included in Calipari’s Kentucky deal are too good not to post:

  • The $31.65 million deal making John Calipari the highest-paid coach in college basketball is packed with perks beyond his annual salary, including membership to the country club of his choice, two cars and incentives for reaching the NCAA Sweet Sixteen and Final Four and winning a national title.
  • The Wildcats paid Memphis $200,000 as part of Calipari’s buyout of his Tigers’ contract, which had paid him $2.35 million per year.
  • Including $3 million in retention bonuses he’ll get for staying with Kentucky through March 31, 2016, Calipari is in line to receive an average of $4 million a year over the eight years.
  • Two “late model, quality automobiles,” plus mileage.
  • Membership in a country club of his choice, including monthly dues and initiation fees.
  • 20 prime “lower-level” season tickets to UK home games.
  • Eight tickets for each UK home football game.
  • Hundreds of thousands of dollars in incentives for reaching certain milestones, such as a 75 percent graduation rate or better ($50,000), winning the Southeastern Conference ($50,000), winning the SEC tournament ($50,000), making the NCAA tournament round of 16 ($100,000), making the Final Four ($175,000), or winning the national title ($375,000).
  • The right to income from conducting basketball camps using UK facilities.
  • Should the university fire Calipari without cause, he would still receive $3 million for each year left on the contract, double the annual buyout former Kentucky coach Billy Gillispie says he is entitled to under his memorandum of understanding.

Posted in markets, sports, universities | 1 Comment »

 
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