Truth on the Market

Academic commentary on law, business, economics and more

Archive for April, 2009

Web Seminar: Antitrust Economics 101

Posted by Josh Wright on April 30, 2009

I’ll be teaching an interactive web seminar on basic microeconomic concepts that form the basis of antitrust analysis through Competition Policy International’s Learning Center on three consecutive Wednesdays: May 13, 20, and 27th. CLE credit is available for practicing lawyers. Though I think the material will be useful for antitrust lawyers, law students interested in antitrust (or who might be doing antitrust this summer), and generally those interested in brushing up on basic economics.

Here’s the relevant information from the course advertisement:

I would like to invite you to join us for the CPI Learning Center’s next interactive web seminar, “Antitrust Economics 101”, presented by Professor Joshua Wright. This course is a three-part series taking place over consecutive weeks.

Session One, “Demand” will take place on Wednesday, May 13 at 12 pm E.S.T.

Session 2 (Supply and Cost) and Session 3 (Examples and Applications) will take place on the following Wednesdays, also at Noon E.S.T.

In the context of modern antitrust litigation, Professor Wright will focus on the key economic concepts underlying modern antitrust law, such as demand, substitution and income effects, elasticity, optimal pricing, price discrimination, supply, cost, consumer and producer surplus, cartel formation, and critical loss analysis.

This course is especially recommended for those who need or want a solid knowledge of the economics that drive antitrust analysis and decisions.  It will also be useful for those who would like to brush up on economic concepts. Although not just for lawyers, Professor Wright’s course has significant professional and practical content for attorneys practicing in the antitrust and competition policy arenas, both domestically and abroad.

This series will be presented over CPI’s Global Learning Platform which delivers lectures globally in real time. The only technology required is a computer with a flash player and a telephone.

<span To register: visit our website at https://www.competitionpolicyinternational.com/course_main.html>. The fee for all three classes, with CLE credit, is $355; without CLE credit the cost is $129. Discounts for multiple users from the same organization and courtesy admissions for competition authorities are available.

This course is approved for CLE in PA, as CPI is an Approved Provider of Distance Learning Courses in PA. CLE credit is also available to New York attorneys, and has been applied for in additional states including Illinois and California. For complete information regarding discounts and the availability of CLE credit, special registration needs, or for any other questions, contact us at LearningCenter@competitionpolicyinternational.com.

I hope you can join us.

Posted in antitrust, economics | Comments Off

Mossoff on the Rise and Fall of the Sewing Machine Patent Thicket

Posted by Josh Wright on April 29, 2009

My colleague Adam Mossoff is blogging over at the Volokh Conspiracy on his fascinating paper, A Stitch in Time: The Rise and Fall of the Sewing Machine Patent Thicket. Here’s an excerpt from the first post:

The debate centers on whether patent thicket theory accurately explains or predicts such problems in practice, and the empirical studies produced thus far are arguably in equipoise. In speaking about anticommons theory, Professor Heller acknowledges that “the empirical studies that prove — or disprove — our theory remain inconclusive.” Nonetheless, in the patent literature and in the popular press, vivid anecdotes abound about patent thickets obstructing development of new drugs or preventing the distribution of life-enhancing genetically engineered foods to the developing world.

Given the heightened interest today amongst scholars and lawyers concerning the existence and policy significance of patent thickets, a historical analysis of the sewing machine patent thicket in the 1850s — called the “Sewing Machine War” at the time — and the denouement of this patent thicket in the Sewing Machine Combination of 1856 is important.

On one hand, it is an empirical case study of a patent thicket that (temporarily) prevented the commercial development of an important product of the Industrial Revolution. The sewing machine was the result of numerous incremental and complementary inventive contributions, which led to a morass of patent infringement litigation given overlapping patent claims to the final commercial product. The Sewing Machine War thus confirms that patent thickets exist, and that they can lead to what Professor Heller has identified as the tragedy of the anticommons.  On the other hand, the story of the sewing machine challenges some underlying assumptions in the current discourse about patent thickets.

The posts and the paper are highly recommended material for TOTM readers interested in issues involving IP and antitrust.

Posted in antitrust, economics, intellectual property, patent, technology | Comments Off

What does Tyler know about law and economics, anyway?

Posted by Geoffrey Manne on April 28, 2009

Over at Crooked Timber, Tyler Cowen comments on Steve Teles’ book on conservative legal movements.  I never get tired of plugging Steve’s book (as he knows), so I’ll do it again here:  It’s a great book, a riveting read, and instructive, to boot.  Buy a copy today!

Tyler comments (among a series of comments in an ongoing Crooked Timber symposium 0n the book) on the section of the book on law and economics.  It’s about a third of the book (and of course it’s the most interesting third!), but over at Crooked Timber, as near as I can tell, they have no one who actually, you know, does law and economics to comment on the book, and only Tyler who comes close. 

Tyler is a great blogger, a great economist, and a great eater, among other things.  On this, however, Tyler doesn’t do a very good job. 

Here’s the key part (for me) of his post:

I view the relatively conservative nature of the law and economics movement as a historical accident which is already more or less obsolete. For better or worse, the wave of the future is scholars such as Cass Sunstein, not Henry Manne. The simple lesson is simply that in the long run “mainstream” usually wins out, even if the efforts of Henry Manne shifted or accelerated what later became mainstream trends.

One topic which interests me is how the “conservative” law and economics movement, as it is found in legal academia, differs from “market-oriented” economics, as it is found in the economics profession. The “right wing” economist and legal scholar will agree on many issues but you also will find fundamental variations in their temperament and political stances.

Market-oriented economists tend to be libertarian and it is rare that they have much respect for the U.S. Constitution beyond the pragmatic level. The common view is that while a constitution may be better than the alternatives, it is political incentives which really matter. James M. Buchanan’s program for a “constitutional economics” never quite took off and insofar as it did it has led to the analytic deconstruction of constitutions rather than their glorification. It isn’t hard to find libertarian economists who take “reductionist” views of constitutions and trumpet them loudly.

The conservative wing of the law and economics movement, in contrast, often canonizes constitutions. Many law and economics scholars build their reputations from studying, interpreting, or defending the U.S. Constitution. You don’t get to higher political or judicial office by treating a constitution in purely economic terms.

What I don’t understand is who these “conservative” law and economics scholars are.  OK, I know a couple.  But if the relevant distinction for Tyler is between “conservative” and “market-oriented,” I’d hold the law and economics stalwarts up to Tyler’s favored economists any day.  In what fashion are the following people”conservative” and not “market-oriented”?  Henry Manne, Paul Mahoney, Dick Posner (in the old days), Frank Easterbrook, Dan Fischel, Josh Wright, Ed Kitch, Bill Landes, Henry Butler, Richard Epstein, George Priest, Alan Schwartz, Roberta Romano, etc., etc. 

Moreover, among these–just the first few who popped into my head–I’d say only one is known for any really significant constitutional analysis–and it’s hardly reverence, at that.  To be sure, these folks are trained in the law, and take institutions seriously.  The Constitution is a pretty important part of the institutional landscape in the US.  Taking it seriously is a part of taking the law seriously.  Fetishizing it–that’s different.  But I know very few law and economics scholars who fetishize the Constitution.  Liberal legal scholars–even some liberal economists? Absolutely.  Law and economics scholars?  Not so much.  So–who are the law and economics scholars who built “their reputations from . . .defending the U.S. Constitution?” 

Finally, Tyler claims that the students at GMU Law are just like law students everywhere–with no greater an appreciation for the Coase Theorem or moral hazard than law students anywhere else.  If that is true–and it may well be true; certainly GMU Law seems to be losing its clear focus on law and economics–it is a change from the days when my dad was dean.  The goal (and as far as I know it was achieved) was that the students at GMU would have a very different experience and training than law students elsewhere, with the possible exception of Chicago.  If Tyler’s students don’t reflect this, I’d say things have changed.  Or else it’s self-selection–a concept that any self-respecting George Mason Law student would well understand.

Posted in economics, law and economics, universities | 3 Comments »

Ribstein on Business, Film and Law

Posted by Josh Wright on April 25, 2009

Wrapping up what looks like a very interesting conference at the University of Illinois on the interaction between business, film, and law, Larry Ribstein shares some thoughts in an excellent post.  Readers of Ideoblog will be familiar with Professor Ribstein’s take on how artists’ negative views of capitalists find their way into film. In summing up his retrospective thoughts on the conference, Ribstein concludes:

The bottom line is that it is pretty clear that a narrative of business is being constructed both in film and the popular press (though Mae Kuykendall has her doubts). Law and economics types like me generally eschew narrative theory as soft stuff, lacking rigor. But that leaves the construction of the critical stories to others. Moreover, this is an area that is susceptible to both rigorous public choice analysis and data about the construction and effect of the story. That’s the discussion I’m trying to promote.

Finally, this conference further convinced me of the value of this type of gathering. Unlike the typical law school conference, this was not a law-review-driven collection of mini-workshops on papers in process. Though that sort of conference can be valuable, too often it amounts to the retailing of ideas that are best done in other ways. This was instead an extended discussion that, I hope, contributed to the process of forming ideas. In our digital age, this could end up being the primary function of physical meetings among academics.

Go read the whole thing.

Posted in business, economics, journalism, musings | Comments Off

Some Reading

Posted by Josh Wright on April 21, 2009

Posted in blogging | 1 Comment »

"We're Kinda Worried About the Monopoly Thing"

Posted by Josh Wright on April 20, 2009

That’s from Firefox chief software architect Mike Connor in an interview with PCPro.  Here’s an excerpt suggesting that Mozilla fears that its recent success might lead to antitrust liability in the United States or elsewhere:

Firefox has only just tipped past the 20% mark in worldwide browser market share, and is still a long way away from achieving the 90%+ market share that Internet Explorer enjoyed in its heyday.

Yet, Firefox has a market share of more than 50% in some countries and is hugely popular among PC enthusiasts: Firefox was used by around 40% of visitors to PCPro.co.uk last month, and Connor claims the browser is used by about 80% of visitors to Digg.com.

Connor admits the prospect of achieving monopoly status – defined as two thirds of the market in the US – has been a topic of discussion at Mozilla HQ.

Perhaps there are too such things as false positives.

Its an interesting article (see also here) especially in light of the recent EU investigation of Microsoft’s bundling of IE to the operating system.  Connor also commented that Firefox did not want to be bundled with Windows as a remedy.  The most interesting line of all was that Opera’s complaint that bundling had harmed competition in the browser market was “provably false” because it is “asserting that bundling leads to market share” and “I don’t know how you can make that claim with a straight face.”

It is unknown whether Mozilla Foundation chairperson Mitchell Baker was straight-faced when he wrote this post supporting the EU’s investigation of IE bundling an, of course, offering Mozilla’s assistance in crafting the appropriate remedial response.   The most curious line in Baker’s post, however, is the rebuttal to the proposition that Mozilla’s increasing share across the world is evidence of a competitive marketplace or at least one would not impede equally efficient competitors:

Equally important, the success of Mozilla and Firefox does not indicate a healthy marketplace for competitive products. Mozilla is a non-profit organization; a worldwide movement of people who strive to build the Internet we want to live in. I am convinced that we could not have been, and will not be, successful except as a public benefit organization living outside the commercial motivations. And I certainly hope that neither the EU nor any other government expects to maintain a healthy Internet ecosystem based on non-profits stepping in to correct market deficiencies.

Leaving aside the bit about the non-profit worldwide movement “living outside commercial motivations”, wouldn’t this claim cut the opposite direction.  That is, if bundling IE couldn’t even exclude from the marketplace an apparently spontaneous collective invariant to the profit motive then surely the mere presence of the bundle couldn’t exclude a greedy, profit-seeking rival could it?  I’m not suggesting this is the appropriate way to think about the antitrust analysis here.  But I find the line of argument curious and likely counterproductive.

Posted in antitrust, business, copyright, economics, google, intellectual property, markets, music, regulation, technology | 1 Comment »

Weekend Reading

Posted by Josh Wright on April 17, 2009

Posted in musings | Comments Off

Glaxo/Pfizer HIV Drug Collaboration

Posted by Josh Wright on April 17, 2009

There’s an interesting story in the WSJ about a merger between the HIV-drug businesses at Glaxo and Pfizer.  Some details from the story:

Examples of cooperation among drug giants are unusual — Pfizer and Glaxo are the world’s top two drug companies by sales, respectively — since big pharmaceutical companies compete to sell products, attract top talent and bring the best new drugs to market. Such arrangements aren’t unprecedented, though: In 2007, AstraZeneca PLC and Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. struck a partnership to develop and market two diabetes drugs.

Mitigating the high risk of drug development is one attraction of working together. Putting a drug through clinical trials can cost hundreds of millions of dollars, and many drugs fail.

HIV is a tough area of drug development. There are a few dozen good treatments available, and coming up with something better has proved difficult.

Companies also have drawn criticism from AIDS activists for charging too much in both wealthy and poor countries. This pressure has led most companies to lower prices in recent years to not-for-profit levels in the poorest nations.

The HIV business has been a drag on Glaxo’s sales growth. Glaxo had HIV sales of £1.5 billion last year, up 5% from 2007, while its total sales grew 7% to £24.4 billion. Pfizer’s pipeline will help Glaxo “stay in the game,” Mr. Witty said.

The venture also will allow the companies to combine some products into new combination pills, which are widely used in HIV treatment.

The agreement allows Pfizer to increase its stake in the venture to as much as 30.5% if enough of its HIV drugs make it to market. If Pfizer’s products don’t reach the market, its share will drop to 9%, the companies said.

Posted in antitrust, business | Comments Off

Randy Picker on the Google Book Settlement

Posted by Josh Wright on April 17, 2009

Randy Picker has posted The Google Book Settlement: A New Orphan Works Monopoly? to SSRN.  I have not been following the antitrust issues related to the settlement as closely as I should be and so I’m really looking forward to reading this.  Here is the abstract:

This paper considers the proposed settlement agreement between Google and the Authors Guild relating to Google Book Search. Google boldly launched Google Book Search in pursuing its goal of organizing the world’s information. Even though Google was sensitive to copyright values, the service relied on mass copying and thus Google undertook a substantial legal risk in setting up the service. That risk was realized with the lawsuits by the Authors Guild and the Association of American Publishers. The October, 2008 settlement agreement for those suits will create an important new copyright collective and will legitimate broad-scale online access to United States books registered before early January, 2009.

The settlement agreement is exceeding complex but I have focused on three issues that raise antitrust and competition policy concerns. First, the agreement calls for Google to act as agent for rights holders in setting the price of online access to consumers. Google is tasked with developing a pricing algorithm that will maximize revenues for each of those works. Direct competition among rights holders would push prices towards some measure of costs and would not be designed to maximize revenues. As I think that that level of direct coordination of prices is unlikely to mimic what would result in competition, I have real doubts about whether the consumer access pricing provision would survive a challenge under Section 1 of the Sherman Act.

Second, and much more centrally to the settlement agreement, the opt out class action will make it possible for Google to include orphan works in its book search service. Orphan works are works as to which the rightsholder can’t be identified or found. That means that a firm like Google can’t contract with an orphan holder directly to include his or her work in the service and that would result in large numbers of missing works. The opt out mechanism – which shifts the default from copyright’s usual out to the class action’s in – brings these works into the settlement.

But the settlement agreement also creates market power through this mechanism. Absent the lawsuit and the settlement, active rights holders could contract directly with Google, but it is hard to get large-scale contracting to take place and there is, again, no way to contract with orphan holders. The opt out class action then is the vehicle for large-scale collective action by active rights holders. Active rights holders have little incentive to compete with themselves by granting multiple licenses of their works or of the orphan works. Plus under the terms of the settlement agreement, active rights holders benefit directly from the revenues attributable to orphan works used in GBS.

We can mitigate the market power that will otherwise arise through the settlement by expanding the number of rights licenses available under the settlement agreement. Qualified firms should have the power to embrace the going-forward provisions of the settlement agreement. We typically find it hard to control prices directly and instead look to foster competition to control prices. Non-profits are unlikely to match up well with the overall terms of the settlement agreement, which is a share-the-revenues deal. But we should take the additional step of unbundling the orphan works deal from the overall settlement agreement and create a separate license to use those works. All of that will undoubtedly add more complexity to what is already a large piece of work, and it may make sense to push out the new licenses to the future. That would mean ensuring now that the court retains jurisdiction to do that and/or giving the new Registry created in the settlement the power to do this sort of licensing.

Third, there is a risk that approval by the court of the settlement could cause antitrust immunities to attach to the arrangements created by the settlement agreement. As it is highly unlikely that the fairness hearing will undertake a meaningful antitrust analysis of those arrangements, if the district court approves the settlement, the court should include a clause – call this a no Noerr clause – in the order approving the settlement providing that no antitrust immunities attach from the court’s approval.

Posted in antitrust, copyright, economics, google | Comments Off

Call for Papers: FTC/Northwestern University Second Annual Microeconomics Conference

Posted by Josh Wright on April 16, 2009

The Federal Trade Commission and the Searle Center at Northwestern are hosting the second annual Microeconomics Conference.  The conference will take place on November 19th and 20th at the FTC.  Here’s the conference announcement and call for papers:

The Federal Trade Commission’s Bureau of Economics, Northwestern University’s Searle Center on Law, Regulation and Economic Growth, and Northwestern University’s Center for the Study of Industrial Organization will host a two day conference to bring together scholars working in industrial organization, information economics, game theory, quantitative marketing, consumer behavior, law and economics, behavioral and experimental economics, and other areas related to the FTC’s antitrust, consumer protection and public policy missions. Examples of potentially relevant topics include advertising, information disclosure, mergers, vertical practices, mortgage and consumer credit card markets, bundling, loyalty and other discounts, dynamic demand estimation, nutrition and health, intellectual property, optimal penalties, and cost-benefit analysis in enforcement.

Interested participants should send an abstract or completed paper to BE-IOC@ftc.gov by July 7, 2009. We also welcome suggestions for panel discussions.

The scientific committee for the conference is:

• Kyle Bagwell (Stanford)
• Marianne Bertrand (Chicago-Booth)
• Aviv Nevo (Northwestern)
• Scott Stern (Northwestern-Kellogg)

Organizers: Chris Adams (FTC) and Paul Rothstein (FTC)

The conference will be held at the Federal Trade Commission New Jersey
Avenue Conference Center, 601 New Jersey Avenue NW, Washington, DC
20001.

Posted in announcements, antitrust, economics, federal trade commission, scholarship | Comments Off

 
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