Truth on the Market

Academic commentary on law, business, economics and more

Archive for December, 2007

Legally Mandated RPM in the German Book Market

Posted by Robert Miller on December 16, 2007

A story in the New York Times explains that in Germany booksellers are legally prohibited from discounting books below the price set by the publisher. It’s not clear from the story, but it thus seems that Germany has a legally-mandated system of minimum resale price maintenance. Not surprisingly, this favors small bookstores. “In the United States chain stores have largely run neighborhood bookshops out of business. Here in Germany, there are big and small bookstores seemingly on every block.” The Times story goes on to explain that a similar system in Switzerland has recently been abolished, and now Swiss booksellers are selling books into the German market, undercutting the German booksellers.

The Times story provides very few details, and so it’s difficult to draw conclusions about what’s really going on here. Does the publisher have complete freedom to set the resale price? If so, given that US booksellers haven’t found RPM to be in their interest, why would German booksellers be any different? Why not just set the RPM price so low that even discounters would be selling above the RPM price? Or does the German system somehow facilitate a publishing cartel?

One indication that this might be the case emerges in the Times article. “Last year 94,716 new titles were published in German. In the United States, with a population nearly four times bigger, there were 172,000 titles published in 2005.” Again, it’s hard to tell, but if the publishers are making monopoly profits on books, perhaps they’re competing some of those profits away by publishing more titles in an effort to capture a larger share of the market. Compare how the airlines, when still regulated, competed on quality.

By the way, one thing is clear: at least for popular books, prices are a lot higher in Germany than in the US. You can buy the English version of Harry Potter and the Deathly Hallows from Amazon in the U.S. for $19.24, but the German version from Amazon.de in Germany costs EUR 24.90, or about $35.81. Part of the disparity is due to the current weakness of the dollar, of course, but even if the dollar and euro were of equal value, the German version of the book would still cost about 20% more.

Posted in antitrust | 1 Comment »

Vertical Integration and Retail Gasoline Prices Revisited

Posted by Josh Wright on December 15, 2007

A trio of Federal Trade Commission economists (Christopher Taylor, Paul Zimmerman, & Nicholas Kreisle) have revisited Justine Hastings’ 2004 AER analysis of the ARCO/ Thrifty vertical merger in their paper, “Vertical Relationships and Competition in the Retail Gasoline Market: Comment.”  (HT: Danny Sokol).  Hastings’ analysis is viewed as particularly important because it is one of the few empirical results that suggests that vertical integration is associated with lower retail prices and that regulations restricting vertical integration might improve welfare.

The FTC economists  challenge both the underlying empirical results using a similar differences in differences methodology and also take a closer look at the welfare implications of Hastings’ theoretical model.  Their conclusion:

According to Hastings’ analysis of the W-L data, the ARCO/Thrifty acquisition increased prices at nearby competing stations by $0.05 per gallon, on average. Our analysis of the OPIS data provides a very different estimated price effect of this transaction, suggesting that if there was any price effect, it was an order of magnitude smaller. In a number of instances we cannot reject the hypothesis of no effect at standard levels of significance. While we used a different data set, we have found no reason that would explain this discrepancy. Regardless of which data set more accurately depicts the transaction’s actual impact on prices, our theoretical analysis reveals some difficulties in inferring welfare effects from price changes when consumers attach value to particular brands of gasoline.

This sort of merger retrospective work is very important for formulating competition policy and regulation that is well grounded in both theory and evidence.  As the FTC authors notes, however, their is still a significant shortage of this type of work.  For those interested in the state of evidence on vertical integration, Francine Lafontaine and Margaret Slade also recently published a survey on the topic in the Journal of Economic Literature (available here).

Posted in antitrust, economics, federal trade commission, law and economics, markets, mergers & acquisitions, regulation, scholarship | Comments Off

What Happens When Attempted Collusion Fails

Posted by Thom Lambert on December 11, 2007

Harvard College decided this year not to offer a service option many of its customers want — early admission. When Harvard’s new policy was announced, the dean of admissions took care to emphasize, “We’re looking for all the company we can get.” Soon thereafter, Harvard got some company; Princeton adopted a similar policy, and a number of other elite Northeastern schools began planning to cut early admission.

I thought this looked fishy. (See here and here.) There was a consciously parallel service cut-back that would not seem to make sense if accomplished unilaterally. (Indeed, officials from a number of the schools admitted that unilateral action wouldn’t make sense.) That looks like an “agreement” under cases like Interstate Circuit. And if it’s an agreement, then it’s an agreement not to compete in providing a service demanded by customers. Smells like anticompetitive collusion.

Collusion, though, is tough to implement. If there are other suppliers of the good or service besides those who are parties to the agreement, they can respond to consumer demand, thereby usurping business from the colluders. Perhaps that’s what’s happening with college admissions. Since Harvard and Princeton announced their policies, applications are up 45% at the University of Chicago. Wow.

It’ll be interesting to see how Harvard and Princeton respond. If they stick to their policies of no early admissions, then we can infer that they’re truly trying to better their institutions by setting up optimal admissions procedures. If they go back to their early admissions ways, we might chalk this up to a failed attempt at collusion. Anyone wanna place bets?

Posted in antitrust, universities | Comments Off

Most Cited Antitrust Law Professors

Posted by Josh Wright on December 10, 2007

Dave Hoffman aptly describes the contours of a lot of the blog debate over Brian Leiter’s citation rankings of law professors by specialty:

Objection: “But you didn’t measure X…”
Leiter: “True. Let a hundred flowers bloom, and do your own data collection!”

I’ve got to say, I’m not sure that I really understand any of the objections to Leiter’s provision of this service. I suspect my initial reaction to the rankings was not unlike many law profs — I perused the rankings to look for scholars in my primary field: antitrust.

Apparently, antitrust scholarship is not as heavily cited as other areas in the business law classification with which antitrust is grouped (corporations, securities, commercial law, and bankruptcy). Interestingly, but perhaps not surprisingly given the breadth of the category, there are not many antitrust types that make the list. But there are a few. A quick look at the rankings in business law and law and economics yields the following folks that I recognize as antitrust scholars (even if it is not their primary field):

  1. Richard Epstein (University of Chicago), 3390 citations
  2. Mark Lemley (Stanford University): 2110 citations, age 41.
  3. William Landes (University of Chicago): 1550 citations, age 68
  4. Herbert Hovenkamp (University of Iowa), 1450 citations
  5. Louis Kaplow (Harvard University): 1370 citations, age 51.
  6. George Priest (Yale University): 870 citations, age 60.

I’m probably missing a few.

Categorizing these folks is obviously a very difficult task. Each of these six has published extensively in a number of other areas (IP, tax, law and economics, etc.) as well as made significant contributions to the antitrust literature. Still, my own sense (based mostly on casual empiricism) is that Professor Hovenkamp should be categorized as an antitrust person as I suspect an overwhelming majority of his citations are in antitrust. This change would make Hovenkamp #3 in Business Law. George Priest (#10 on the L&E list) is another candidate for an “antitrust” representative in the Business Law category. But this is a much closer call than Hovenkamp given Priest’s wide ranging publications across L&E generally and its pretty difficult to quarrel with the L&E category classification.

Besides — if I did have a serious quarrel — I guess I could just make my own antitrust ranking! I don’t. But I’ve decided that I’ll work on an antitrust-specific ranking since I’m curious as to what the top 10-20 in antitrust would look like. I’ve assigned an RA to work on tracking down some citation data and will post them along when we’ve got results. Feel free to email me (or comment) if you have thoughts on what a useful set of antitrust scholarship rankings would look like.

Posted in antitrust, economics, law and economics, law school, legal scholarship, musings, scholarship | Comments Off

Keith Hylton's Antitrust World Reports

Posted by Josh Wright on December 3, 2007

Over at Antitrustworldwiki.com, Keith Hylton has a very cool wiki project compiling antitrust laws around the world.  Here’s the description:

AntitrustWorldWiki.com is a collaborative database covering antitrust laws around the world. Its purpose is to provide information on the key provisions of antitrust laws in a manner that enables users of this wiki to compare antitrust enforcement regimes around the world. We will expand the site to include new information and to enable users to post comments and observations.

The project looks very promising for future empirical research and already includes a number of special reports with details on predatory pricing laws, competition enforcement budgets, and penalties.

Posted in antitrust, legal scholarship, markets, regulation | Comments Off

 
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