Truth on the Market

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Archive for December, 2006

Stay Classy San Diego

Posted by Josh Wright on December 10, 2006

My prediction that the Chargers would win it all last month is not looking so bad after the clinic the Bolts put on the Broncos yesterday to clinch the division. Of course, the big news in the game is that Ladainian Tomlinson broke the all-time single season TD record. For those who didn’t see the game, there was something that LT did that caught my eye right after he scored his record-breaking TD.  Immediately, LT motioned to his entire offensive line (and the rest of his teammates) to join him in the celebration, which they did, hoisting him up in the air in jubilation.  Whatever one thinks about the modern day NFL where players can devote significant time to dreaming up post-TD celebrations but can’t stay awake in team meetings or throw teammates under the bus in the media, for my dime nothing beats LT’s traditional celebration of giving the ball to the official without fanfare (a la Barry Sanders), high-fiving a few teammates, going back to the sideline, and acting like he’s been there before. In any event, most of the highlight shows are not likely to show LT’s team-based celebration of this honor, but his post-game comments capture exactly why Tomlinson may be the best the NFL has to offer in more ways than one:

“Once I got over the pylon, my initial thought process was to bring every guy on the offensive unit over to share that moment. When we’re old and can’t play this game anymore, them are the moments we are going to remember, that we’ll be able to tell our kids, tell our grandchildren. We can talk about something special that we did. We made history today. There’s no better feeling than to share it with the group of guys that’s in that locker room.”

Refreshing.

Posted in musings, sports | Comments Off

Bye Bye, Dr. Miles.

Posted by Thom Lambert on December 9, 2006

So it looks like Dr. Miles is going down. That’s a good thing.

For non-antitrusters, Dr. Miles is a 1911 Supreme Court decision holding that “minimum vertical resale price maintenance” is per se illegal — that is, automatically illegal without inquiry into the practice’s actual effect on competition. Minimum vertical resale price maintenance (or “RPM”) occurs when a manufacturer requires dealers who sell its product to charge no less than a set price for that product. For example, Ford might require its dealers to charge at least $30,000 for an Explorer.

Several theories have been asserted for why RPM is anticompetitive. Some complain that it interferes with dealer freedom. That’s a non-starter. Manufacturers could eliminate dealers altogether and sell their own goods directly, and they’ll be more likely to engage in such “vertical integration” if they can’t exercise meaningful control over how dealers promote and sell their products. It’s therefore in dealers’ interests to permit manufacturers to tailor the dealer relationship — a creature of contract — as they see fit. In any event, dealers would seem to benefit, at least as much as manufacturers, from minimum RPM. Dealers’ compensation is the difference between wholesale price and retail price, so the larger that difference, the greater their compensation. High fixed retail prices might cause total sales to fall, of course, but that would seem to impact manufacturers more adversely than dealers. (Unless they raise wholesale prices as well, manufacturers only suffer lost sales from supracompetitive retail prices; retailers, by contrast, at least make more money on the smaller number of sales that do occur.) In short, theories of dealer harm are unconvincing.

More promising theories of anticompetitive harm have focused on RPM’s potential to facilitate the creation and enforcement of cartels. It might, for example, make it easier to form and enforce dealer-level cartels. Given the strict rules against horizontal price-fixing, it’s tough for competing dealers to agree on a fixed price. If they can get the manufacturer to dictate that price, formation of the cartel is easier. Moreover, the manufacturer could enforce the cartel by punishing dealers who depart from the minimum price. Dealers might therefore pressure manufacturers to mandate minimum resale prices. On the manufacturers’ side, minimum RPM might facilitate a manufacturer-level cartel by decreasing each manufacturer’s incentive to “cheat” by charging its dealers less than the agreed-upon wholesale price. If the dealers are unable (because of RPM) to pass a price cut on to consumers, then manufacturers won’t be able to sell more of their products to end users by lowering their wholesale price from the fixed level. RPM thus reduces their incentive to cheat on a price-fixing agreement in order to expand their output and increase revenues.

For an explanation of why these competitive concerns do not justify a per se rule against minimum RPM, see below the fold. Read the rest of this entry »

Posted in antitrust, law and economics, regulation | 6 Comments »

Bundled Discounts, Exclusive Dealing, and Liability Rules: Thoughts on Crane and Lambert on Bundled Discounts

Posted by Josh Wright on December 5, 2006

Dan Crane and Thom (who has promised more remarks!) have now both posted their prepared remarks for the Section 2 hearings panel on bundled discounts. Both call for bright-line, administrable liability rules for all forms of unilateral exclusionary conduct, and have important things to say about designing antitrust rules for bundled discounts. Both are worth reading in their entirety. Administrable rules that sensibly balance Type I and II errors are certainly an indisputably admirable goal for antitrust analysis and bundled discounts have proven to be a particularly tricky form of conduct for Section 2 analysis. Despite all of the agreement around here between Thom, Dan and I on the design of antitrust rules in a world of costly Type I errors, I think I have found a topic upon which I can at least offer a mild dissent (or at least a different perspective) regarding the usefulness of the analogy of various anticompetitive theories of bundled discounting practices to exclusive dealing.

The overlap between exclusive dealing and bundled/ loyalty discounts is frequently addressed by commentators, and is a topic of newfound interest in what has become the quest for a “holy grail’, one size fits all standard for Section 2 analysis of exclusionary conduct. At times, I detect a tension between the analysis of bundled discounts and exclusive dealing contracts which both purport to exclude exclude by depriving rivals from the opportunity to compete for distribution sufficient to support minimum efficient scale. For example, I discuss what I perceive to be a tension in Professor Hovenkamp’s very sensible analysis of bundled discounts and exclusive dealing in this post:

Hovenkamp concludes that adminstrative costs justify a predatory pricing-type rule in the context of for bundled discounts where the anticompetitive mechanism is de facto “foreclosure” or deprivation from distribution resources (i.e. shelf space) that would prevent rivals from achieving minimum efficient scale and extend the duration of monopoly by increasing barriers to entry. One would think that it would follow from Hovenkamp’s position that a predatory pricing-type rule would also be sensible for exclusive dealing and tying arrangements where the anticompetitive mechanism is the economic equivalent. To the contrary, Hovenkamp advocates rule of reason analysis (p. 201) for exclusive dealing and tying, noting that “foreclosure concerns can be assessed meaningfully only via the rule of reason” and that “the antitrust law of exclusive dealing,” which generally requires proof of substantial foreclosure as a necessary condition of competitive harm, “seems to be on the right track.”

The basic tension here is that the anticompetitive theories underlying both forms of conduct require foreclosure of a rival sufficient to deprive the opportunity to compete for minimum efficient scale. Of course, the pro-competitive side of the ledger differs. One might sensibly believe that the standard for the two forms of exclusion should be different because lower prices are inherently pro-competitive whereas exclusive dealing may not invoke the same immediate consumer benefits. This is certainly a sensible position. But it only suggests that the standard for bundled discounts ought to be more difficult to satisfy than the exclusive dealing standard given equal administrative costs and the same anticompetitive mechanism. This point is not sufficient to render the exclusive dealing analogy fruitless. I offer below some tentative thoughts on the usefulness of the exclusive dealing analogy to bundled discounts.

Read the rest of this entry »

Posted in antitrust, economics, federal trade commission, legal scholarship, regulation, scholarship | 5 Comments »

UCLA 13 – USC 9!

Posted by Josh Wright on December 2, 2006

UCLA Beats USC

Photo: Robert Laberge/ Getty Images.

Posted in sports | Comments Off

Friday Blog Reading

Posted by Josh Wright on December 1, 2006

Posted in announcements, musings | Comments Off

Bundled Discounts Remarks (More to Come…)

Posted by Thom Lambert on December 1, 2006

In response to Josh’s gentle nudge, here are my remarks from Wednesday’s DOJ/FTC hearing on loyalty discounts. I focus entirely on bundled discounts (as opposed to single-product loyalty discounts, like volume or market-share discounts). Bundled discounts are discounts (or rebates) that are conditioned upon purchasing separate products from disparate product markets — e.g., “we’ll give you a 25% discount on all your A and B purchases if you buy 70% of your A requirements and 80% of your B requirements from us.”

In my remarks, I attempt to do three things:

(1) explain the primary competitive threat bundled discounts pose;

NUTSHELL: They can exclude equally efficient, but less diversified, rivals.

(2) summarize and critique the six leading proposals for evaluating the legality of bundled discounts;

NUTSHELL: They are (1) a rule of per se legality for above-cost bundled discounts (Josh’s colleague, Tim Muris, advocates that position); (2) a rule condemning bundled discounts that unjustifiably raise rivals’ costs (Harvard’s Einer Elhauge advocates that position); (3) the “rule” adopted in the Third Circuit’s (in)famous LePage’s decision; (4) a rule focusing on whether a complaining rival is equally efficient but excluded because of its narrower product line (the Ortho rule); (5) a rule asking whether a hypothetical equally efficient single-product rival would be excluded (the original Areeda-Hovenkamp rule); and (6) a rule asking whether the bundled discount amounts to a de facto tie-in and then applying a rule of reason analysis (the revised Areeda-Hovenkamp position).

(3) offer an alternative evaluative approach.

NUTSHELL: I propose a prima facie case and a rebuttal opportunity that, taken together, would identify bundled discounts that could exclude “competitive rivals” (those that had exhausted all competitive options and could match the discounter’s efficiency) and lead to consumer harm (because the market at issue is capable of monopolization).

The panel was tons of fun. I’ll post more once I’ve cleared a few things off my plate.

Posted in Uncategorized | 1 Comment »

 
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