Truth on the Market

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Archive for December, 2006

Warren on Rationality, Choice, and Regulation in the Credit Card Market

Posted by Josh Wright on December 28, 2006

Elizabeth Warren (Credit Slips) points to an interesting empirical study by Agarwal, Liu, Souleses, and Chomsisengphet (“ALSC”) which examines consumer credit card selection in a natural experiment setting in which a card company offers two cards to consumers: (1) a high interest rate, no annual fee card and (2) a low rate card with an annual fee. The results?

  • About 60% of consumers get the decision right with the benefit of hindsight
  • 40% do not make initially select the right card
  • Many of these initial errors are subsequently corrected as a result of consumer card switching, while ALSC report that “a small minority of consumers persists in holding substantially sub-optimal contracts without switching.”

Warren (also check out the comments to the post) asks whether “these data support the notion legal policy can be shaped by the presumption of economic rationality, or do the data support a call for more regulation?” Warren’s answer: is more regulation in light of what she describes as the “staggering” 40% error rate. Professor Warren writes:

Would it help to frame the policy question is from the provider angle? What’s the point of offering two different products, except to hope that the number of consumer who get it wrong will exceed in dollar volume the number who get it right. Or, from an informed consumers’ perspective, perhaps the optimal system is one in which they make good decisions and hope for cross-subsidization from less-clever consumers who help keep credit cards highly profitable and easy to use in a variety of settings (e.g., grocery stores, cabs, pizza deliveries, etc.). I realize it is heresy in many circles to ask if consumers should have fewer choices. But at some point the empirical studies about high error rates bring into question the assumptions that underlie the claim that more choice is always good.

Heresy was not the first thought that came to my mind. Though I admit I am not quite sure what Warren has in mind in terms of undermining the claim that more choice is always good. Nonetheless, I don’t think this study undermines those assumptions at all. Quite the contrary, actually. While the burden of proof is on Warren and others advocating more regulation here to demonstrate that less choice would improve consumer welfare, not only does this study not satisfy the burden, I think a reasonable interpretation of the results cuts the other way. The results suggest that consumers making credit card contract decisions behave rationally, the initial error rate is not strong evidence of consumer irrationality in light of relative costs and benefits of card switching, and the error costs are very small.

A little context is necessary to make the case for this interpretation of the data, as well as the reporting of some key results in the ALSC paper that Warren does not discuss in her post but shed light on the question of consumer rationality in the credit card market. In light of these findings, discussed below the fold, I think it is pretty clear that these findings support a standard economic model of credit card borrowing. Read the rest of this entry »

Posted in bankruptcy, economics, law and economics, markets, regulation, scholarship | 5 Comments »

Pathbreaking Work in Modern Law and Economics?

Posted by Josh Wright on December 21, 2006

A project I am working on, and will blog about in the near future, has got me thinking about the following question which I would like to pass along to our readers and my co-bloggers for their thoughts:

What, if any, are the truly pathbreaking contributions to economic analysis of law in the last twenty years?

To be clear, I do not mean good or even important contributions to L&E. Rather, I mean contributions that have or are likely to transform the field or the application of economic thought to a particular subject area (think: Coase and The Problem of Social Cost, Becker on economic analysis of crime, Calabresi on the Cost of Accidents, Manne on Insider Trading, etc.). Is it too early to identify these? Are the L&E trails already blazed such that only marginal contributions (which can be very important but are less likely to be pathbreaking in the sense meant here) are left? Are any post-1986 contributions already “pathbreaking”? Which ones? Be specific! Include the author(s), title(s), and the spirit of the contribution. I’ll return to this topic later on and share my own thoughts then.

Posted in economics, law and economics, legal scholarship, scholarship | 12 Comments »

The Economics of Customer Service

Posted by Elizabeth Nowicki on December 20, 2006

Is the retail customer willing to pay for customer service?  Gaggles of books have been written on the topic of customer service, and those books sell based on the belief that customers *care* about customer service.  But do they?  Do we?  Do I?

The idea that somehow customer service matters to the customer is not complex nor uber-creative.(The smarter, funnier, nicer Professor Nowicki dabbles in the topic.)  But does it *really* matter?  Seemingly, it does matter, according to a recent article (to which I cannot link b/c it is on Cornell’s server):

Virtually all Americans (94%) say customer service is an important factor in selecting where to buy goods and services. And 78% say it is a “very important” factor. In fact, at the “very important” level, customer service outweighs price: 61% of Americans say price is a “very important” factor in
deciding where to spend (compared with 78% who said customer service is “very important”). (Overall, customer service is as important as price — 95% of Americans say price is important, and 94% say customer service is important.) Even in the midst of holiday-shopping pressures, 82% of Americans say they are likely to spend more money this holiday season at stores where they receive better service.

I find it hard to believe, however, that customer service really, really matters.  Exhibit A:  Many friends of mine think Wal-Mart’s customer service is not particularly good.  But those friends still shop at Wal-Mart because it is cheap.  Exhibit B:  The closest coffee store to the Law School has employees who have not yet once smiled at me or said “thank you.”  I usually get to overhear internal quibbling while I wait at the counter, hoping someone notices me and is willing to take a pause to wait on me.  Yet I *still* go to that coffee shop because it is the closest one to the Law School.

Perhaps Wal-Mart’s perceived mediocre service is part of their calculus.  Perhaps Wal-Mart has calculated how particularly mediocre they can become before the savings to customers in dollar value is outweighed by customer frustration with mediocre service and customers therefore stop shopping at Wal-Mart.

I guess I need to make my peace with questionable customer service.  I mean, I *did* just pay $5.40 for a fancy coffee served by a not-so-very-service-oriented person.  (Allow me to note that I worked retail since I was old enough to work.  And I waitressed for years.  So I know a bit about customer service, and what the “front line” employees have to tolerate.  Dealing with customers is a difficult job, to be sure, but it seems to me that the employees who do not like to deal with the public should at least make a small effort to conceal their contempt.  I did not want a happy dance from my coffee barrista this morning - I just wanted . . . a “thank you” or eye contact or a smile or a “enjoy” or something other than being ignored for a bit and then viewed with impatience.  Then again, does my $5.40 entitle me to pleasant service or does it only entitle me to a coffee?)

Posted in Uncategorized | 9 Comments »

Morrison at ELS Blog

Posted by Josh Wright on December 18, 2006

Ed Morrison (Columbia) has a great series of guest blogs at the always worth reading ELS Blog on a few research questions in bankruptcy and torts as well as a methodological entry. I am a little bit late with the link (his guest stint ended December 8th ), but I really enjoyed the posts. Here are the links:

Why are Small Business Bankruptcies so Rare?;

Propensity Score Matching; and More on Propensity Score Matching;

Do Consumers Want Insurance Coverage for Pain and Suffering? (proposing a diff-in-diff estimation strategy for answering this question based on California’s Prop 213);

and How Inefficient is Tort Law?

Posted in bankruptcy, economics, law and economics, legal scholarship, torts | Comments Off

Investing for Joe Common Man/Gal

Posted by Elizabeth Nowicki on December 17, 2006

The Nowicki family Christmas dinner was tonight.  Michelle, the Nowicki family psychiatrist, said (to my FATHER, not me, the securities wonk)

“How do I know what stock to invest in?  I don’t follow the market.  I don’t watch the stock shows on MSNBC.  Jim Cramer – the mad money guy – all of that.”

After I convinced Michelle that I was credible, given my Wall Street background and my SEC background, I suggested she do two things:

1.  Think about products that SHE and likely the rest of the population need.  Lawn mowers, for example, are a good example of generally needed products.  How ’bout the company that makes ROOF sheeting?  How ’bout the company that makes . . . blinds!?  I suggested that my sister look around and look for companies that make products that are really, honestly, undoubtedly NECESSARY.

2.  Pull from the website of the relevant company the past couple of years’ worth of annual reports.  Take a look at “measures of success” – profit, earnings per share, stock price.  Ask “did the company do well over the past few years?  How has the stock done over the past decade?”

Chew over points one and two above.  Take your $3000 Roth IRA and invest accordingly.  Pay your sister qua financial advisor a small fee when you are wealthy.

SERIOUS POINT:  Joe Common Investor, or my sister, needs to avoid reading the WSJ or watching Squawk Box (etc.) for purposes of seeking “hot” investment tips.  Instead, look for a good, solid company, a fair assessment of the company’s use to the public, and a simple review of recent annual points.

The day-to-day drama of the market, about which I have before blogged, is not anything about which ye olde average investor should much care.  Instead, it seems that the more sensible thing to do is take a LONG view of products that have a LONGER-term, solid future.  Invest in companies in which it makes common SENSE to invest.  Unless you need to worry about cash in the short-term, I am not convinced that paying attention to what is currently “hot” and what is “not” is of the most value.    (Mind you, I am not an investment professional, nor am I giving advice for those who have less than … 20-30 years left to live.)

Posted in Uncategorized | 7 Comments »

Two in the WSJ

Posted by Josh Wright on December 16, 2006

Airlines and Antitrust.

Kenneth Starr on Sarbox. The punchline:

Even the statute’s co-author, Rep. Mike Oxley, has conceded that Sarbanes-Oxley was hastily written and enacted. In its rush to “do something” about corporate scandals, Congress overstepped the bounds of its authority. It is time to call Congress back, both to help our economy and reaffirm that our constitutional system imposes clear limits on the government’s urgent desire to “do something.” Congress must be reminded that the “solution” is at times worse than the problem.

UDPATE: Ribstein comments on Starr’s constitutional case against the PCAOB.

Posted in antitrust, regulation, sarbanes-oxley | Comments Off

Markel on D'Amato

Posted by Josh Wright on December 13, 2006

Dan Markel at Prawfs has posted some reactions to D’Amato’s piece on The Interdisciplinary Turn in Legal Education.  It is an excellent post and well worth reading, as is D’Amato’s article.

Posted in economics, law and economics, law school, legal scholarship, scholarship | Comments Off

"There is Little Evidence that Economic Analysis of Law Has Changed [Antitrust] in Any Noticeable Way"

Posted by Josh Wright on December 12, 2006

Huh? This statement appears in this article by Professor Anthony D’Amato (Northwestern) on the failure of interdisciplinary scholarship in the legal academy. HT: Brian Leiter. Quite frankly, I was very surprised to see a claim like this in a paper written after 1970 or so. Even in corners of the academy hostile to economic analysis, antitrust is conventionally distinguished as a special case where economics is useful, typically along with some statement about the uniqueness of antitrust. D’Amato reserves no such special treatment for antitrust, criticizing that field in the context of a more general critique of what he describes as the “interdisciplinary turn” in the legal academy on three grounds:

First is the unlikelihood that the joint-degreed persons who join the law faculty will happen to be the ones that their colleagues will end up collaborating with. Second is the even greater unlikelihood that any given discipline can communicate usefully with another discipline. Third is the opportunity-cost factor: that the new interdisciplinary courses will crowd out an essential part of the legal discipline, namely, an understanding of the foundations and dialectical evolution of its forms of language.

Those who study antitrust might be surprised to read the claim that economics has not changed antitrust in any significant way. To give some context, this claim comes as part of D’Amato’s rebuttal case against law and economics as an example of successful interdisciplinary scholarship. D’Amato’s conclusion? Economic analysis earns a “gentlemanly C+” on its report card and claims of success are “misleading if not false.” The rebuttal case consists largely of claims that economic analysis has not been fruitful in many areas of law: contracts (see Eric Posner), torts, criminal law, and includes the statement that the Coase theorem “is hardly helpful to lawyers.” I admit that I found the argument about criminal law difficult to follow (it consists largely of a response to hypothetical examples of crimes that Richard Posner could have but apparently did not write and the obligatory mention of Posner’s comments on the potential benefits of a market in parental rights.

My disagreement is somewhat predictable, as someone engaged in law and economics. But I want to focus on D’Amato’s claim that economic analysis has not even been successful in areas that are “ideal for the division of labor between lawyer and economist,” like antitrust. D’Amato offers as support for the words in the title to this post the following analysis (p.65):

The focus on the quantitative aspects of antitrust — such as Robert Bork’s reductionism of antitrust to the goal of delivering the lowest prices to the consumer — has had a distorting effect on the field. The original impetus for antitrust legislation — combating an incipient fascist tendency of huge corporate combinations to overwhelm and run the government — seems to be an inconvenient memory for those who would like economic analysis to place a price tag on every legal value.

I respectfully dissent. I discuss an objection to D’Amato’s characterization of the antitrust endeavor and ten reasons to think that D’Amato’s claim in the title of this post are wrong below the fold.
Read the rest of this entry »

Posted in antitrust, economics, law and economics, law school, legal scholarship, scholarship | 20 Comments »

US World and News Reports

Posted by Elizabeth Nowicki on December 12, 2006

Do we know when the Law School rankings for 2008 are due out?  Just today, I was having a conversation with a colleague about z-scores and standard deviations and all that, and I found myself yearning to apply my mathmatical skills to the most recent information.Â

Do we know what the due date is?

Posted in Uncategorized | 1 Comment »

Loyalty Discount Propositions

Posted by Thom Lambert on December 12, 2006

One of the more interesting parts of the November 29 DOJ/FTC hearing on loyalty discounts (where I presented these remarks) was the panelists’ discussion of a number of “propositions” advanced, for purposes of discussion only, by the agencies. Unfortunately, we didn’t have time to discuss all the propositions. I’ve reproduced them below the fold, along with my own thoughts on whether they’re sound. (Please note the agencies’ insistence that “[t]hese propositions are solely for the purpose of discussion and do not necessarily represent the agencies’ views.”) Read the rest of this entry »

Posted in antitrust, federal trade commission, law and economics | 1 Comment »

 
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