Truth on the Market

Academic commentary on law, business, economics and more

Archive for September, 2006

Thoughts on Walker on Backdating

Posted by Josh Wright on September 22, 2006

Professor Ribstein responds to David Walker’s backdating article, which Bill highlighted here at TOTM a few weeks ago. Larry’s take?

This is a useful paper as far as it goes. The problem is that it has missed a significant chunk of the “literature” on this rapidly developing topic that has developed in our rapidly developing medium — i.e., the blogs. For example, consider my posts here and here and throughout my executive compensation archive, Josh Wright and Geoff Manne’s comprehensive post, and many many others by Bainbridge, Bodie, Fleischer, etc. This is not merely some kind of procedural problem. By missing this commentary, the article fails to pay any attention to some very important issues, particularly including whether the market looked through any accounting shenanigans. The latter issue alone would seem to be rather critical if you’re trying to explain backdating and its consequences, as Walker is.

Larry’s reaction to the paper has evoked reactions from Vic and Walker in the comments section. Holding aside the issue of whether Manne & Wright should be cited (as readers of this blog know, Geoff and I have elsewhere set forth our own thoughts on backdating, individually and cooperatively), I took Larry’s central criticism to be that the argument raised by some of these bloggers that “stealth compensation” is simply not a good description of backdating if it did not fool the market should be addressed in a paper purporting to explain backdating. It is a fair point and I tend to agree. To be sure, it is an excellent marketing strategy to describe the options this way. Indeed, I could describe backdated options as “alternative in-the-money compensation.” But I digress. Further, Larry offers a second post responding to Walker’s comment, and argues that any substantive explanation of backdating must address whether the market was fooled:

I continue to be puzzled how one can argue that options were “stealth compensation” without discussing whether enough information was available that the compensation was reflected in stock price. If the market knows what the executive is being paid, then I’m not sure how one can argue that it could not make the judgments that Walker is concerned about.

I agree with both Ribstein and Walker that this sort of exchange is precisely what the blogosphere needs more of. In that spirit, let me chime in with a few of my own thoughts here in response to Walker’s article.

First, the empirical contribution of this article should celebrated. In particular, in addition to documenting the fact that a good deal of backdating occurs with rank-and-file employees rather than executives, Walker conducts a descriptive analysis of backdating within the semiconductor industry and highlights differences in executive compensation for firms involved in the backdating scandal (p. 34-35). I think this sort of descriptive analysis is definitely value added and tells us more about the phenomenon which we are attempting to ultimately explain.

Second, I am left somewhat unsatisfied with Part III of the paper (which starts at p.21), which is titled “Explaining Backdating.” To be sure, Walker notes that “the aim of this part is to lay out a range of possible rationales,” and test them against the early empirical evidence. For my tastes, this paper does too much of the former and too little of the latter. Walker discusses a range of rationales including compensation concealment, share dilution limitations, cognitive biases, boosting ISO grants, and the influence of common advisors (which Walker lumps together, somewhat inexplicably, with “herd mentality”). With respect to herd mentality, the “evidence” is that a number of firms adopted the same practice in the Silicon Valley and Larry Sonsini was linked to many firms. I’m not sure what this has to do with “herd mentality,” but I can think of a number of reasons why many firms adopt the same practice which have nothing to do with psychology.

As for the other explanations, again, I find the paper a bit light on the discussion of evidence, which is odd, because I do believe that the central (and most important) contribution of Walker’s paper is his empirical work. Walker seems to be impressed with the naivete / cognitive bias explanation throughout this section, but as I have noted elsewhere, I do not find this explanation persuasive in light of the time series evidence (have compensation committee’s become more naive? Or for that matter, employees or executives?). In any event, to the extent that many of these explanations touch upon the economic explanation for the increase in executive compensation more generally, simple explanations like this one (that apparently explain much of the data) should be addressed, as should evidence of the stock price effects.

The strength of this paper, by my lights, is Walker’s empirical analysis. His contribution to our understanding of what is going on within a particular industry with a lot of backdating is an important one. In fact, I would be inclined to organize the entire paper around this analysis — which is really his unique contribution. I know, nobody asked me. Just a thought.

Posted in economics, executive compensation, law and economics, option timing scandal | 1 Comment »

Antitrust Canons

Posted by Josh Wright on September 21, 2006

Matt Bodie’s “Canons” project continues over at Prawfs, and antitrust is up to bat.  I took a stab at a reading list which I believe meet’s Matt’s criteria: articles that are essential to doing antitrust scholarship.  My long, but embarrassingly underinclusive list, is below the fold.  In particular, I have left out a good deal of more technical economics scholarship (though some appears on the list): the literature on merger simulation, post-Chicago models on specific vertical practices, nothing on immunities or exemptions, federalism, etc.  But it’s a start.  By the way, Andrew Gavil’s Antitrust Anthology is an excellent collection of classic antitrust scholarship.  Please feel free to add your own entries over at Prawfs!  But here’s what I’ve got so far…
Read the rest of this entry »

Posted in antitrust, economics, legal scholarship, scholarship | 6 Comments »

SEC Office of Chief Accountant position on spring-loading and bullet-dodging

Posted by Bill Sjostrom on September 19, 2006

The SEC Office of the Chief Accountant issued a letter today “summarizing the staff’s views regarding the accounting for stock options in the historical financial statements of public companies.” See here. The letter addresses a number of accounting issues concerning option backdating. It also has this to say about spring-loading and bullet-dodging:

H. Timing of Option Grants

Some companies appear to have engaged in techniques to select their award dates in coordination with the disclosure of information to the public. For example, a company may have granted stock options while it knew of material non-public information that was likely to result in an increase to the stock price [i.e., spring-loading]. Alternatively, a company may have delayed the grant of options until after material information that was expected to result in a decrease to the stock price was issued [i.e., bullet-dodging]. To the extent such practices were used, questions have been raised as to whether an adjustment would be necessary to the market price of the stock at the measurement date for the purpose of measuring compensation cost. Pursuant to paragraph 10(a) of Opinion 25, the staff believes that compensation cost must be computed on the measurement date by reference to the unadjusted market price of a share of stock of the same class that trades freely in an established market.

In other words, neither spring-loading nor bullet-dodging creates an accounting issue. Of course, the question of whether these practices constitute insider trading (my view is that they do not) or give rise to tax issues remains open.

Posted in executive compensation, option timing scandal | Comments Off

Richard Sander at ELS Blog

Posted by Josh Wright on September 19, 2006

His first two installments are already up here and here.  This promises to be an interesting series.

Posted in blogging, law school, universities | Comments Off

More Evidence of an Antitrust Violation Brewing at Elite Schools

Posted by Thom Lambert on September 19, 2006

I called it last week. Today’s NYT reports that Princeton has accepted Harvard’s invitation to join it in eliminating early admissions. In addition, the presidents of eleven elite liberal arts colleges (including Swarthmore, Williams, Barnard, and Amherst) have met to discuss, among other things, collectively eliminating their early admission programs and reducing merit-based aid.

Just a friendly reminder, guys:

You are competitors. This is not a joint venture. You are agreeing to reduce competition by eliminating a service option that your customers desire and that would be available but for your agreement not to compete. That’s not good.

Now, each of you may decide that the early admissions program is bad for your school because, for example, it tends to produce a class of homogeneous, privileged students who blow off their last semester of high school. If you reach this conclusion and you want to change your admissions protocol unilaterally, then by all means do so. But there’s no legitimate reason for you to agree among yourselves to eliminate competition.

Make no mistake — that is what the elite schools are doing. As Reed College president Colin Diver said with respect to merit aid: “Do we really need to be part of this arms race in merit aid? … I talk to lots of presidents who would love to disarm, but they’re afraid to do it unilaterally.”

Of course they are. When any business decides to stop responding to customers’ demands, it runs the risk of losing business to its rivals unless it can get them, too, to stop responding to customers’ demands. Unfortunately, limiting competition in this fashion usually isn’t good for customers.

The presidents of these elite schools are less confident about competition’s benefits. As Amherst president Anthony Marx remarked, “Competition is important and strengthens us and can spread our net. But if it’s designed to drive us in a way that’s self-serving and not in society’s interest, then that’s a problem.” That’s an awfully big exception there, Mr. Marx. Pretty much all competition is designed to be self-serving rather than public interest-promoting. To quote Adam Smith: “It is not from the benevolence of the butcher, the brewer, or the baker that we expect our dinner, but from their regard to their self-love, and never talk to them of our own necessities but of their advantages.”

The elite colleges’ idea that they may limit competition among themselves in order to preserve the “public interest” seems to derive from a conclusion that the competition at issue is somehow “ruinous.” While the notion of ruinous competition has a long history in antitrust jurisprudence, it’s certainly in decline. As the Supreme Court remarked in the Professional Engineers case:

The Sherman Act reflects a legislative judgment that ultimately competition will produce not only lower prices, but also better goods and services. “The heart of our national economic policy long has been faith in the value of competition.” … The assumption that competition is the best method of allocating resources in a free market recognizes that all elements of a bargain – quality, service, safety, and durability – and not just the immediate cost, are favorably affected by the free opportunity to select among alternative offers. Even assuming occasional exceptions to the presumed consequences of competition, the statutory policy precludes inquiry into the question whether competition is good or bad.

Posted in antitrust, economics, law and economics, universities | 9 Comments »

GM/Ford: An Idea Whose Time Has Come?

Posted by Keith Sharfman on September 18, 2006

When teaching antitrust as I am this fall, a time always comes during the semester when I need to give my students an example of a merger whose implications for competition are so obviously adverse that the antitrust authorities would surely seek an injunction against the merger under Section 7 of the Clayton Act. My favorite example of this type of transaction has always been a completely unrealistic and therefore highly instructive hypothetical merger between the two leading U.S. automakers, Ford and GM.

With today’s reports that each of the two firms is discussing a potential collaboration with Nissan and Renault and that a three-way alliance is also being considered, I’ll now have to rethink my hypo.

Analysts have been quick to emphasize that a full-blown merger between GM and Ford is not in the cards and that the only thing being considered is some type of joint venture whose antitrust implications are being analyzed carefully. But why not think about a straightforward merger?

Sure, each firm has a substantial (if declining) share of the U.S. market (GM has about 25% and Ford has about 18%) such that a merger between the two firms would result in a more than sufficiently large increase in the industry HHI to create a presumption of illegality under the U.S. Merger Guidelines. But perhaps the firms could realistically offer a number of arguments to rebut that presumption.

First, GM’s many difficulties in the past year could plausibly justify treating GM as a “failing firm” for purposes of applying the Merger Guidelines, which subject the acquisition of such firms to less scrutiny than the same transaction would receive in better times. If there’s anything to the claim that analysts have been making over past year that GM is facing serious insolvency risks, then the failing firm strategy might really be worth a try.

An additional way to cast the merger in a more favorable light would be to argue that the relevant geographic market for cars in this day and age is not the U.S. or even North America but rather the world. Other products such as computer software are thought of in this way. And while cars (and car parts for local assembly) are more costly than software to transport intercontinentally, the principle is the same: firms in both industries compete with each other all over the world. GM and Ford have much lower shares of the world market than of the U.S. and North American markets. So if the world market were considered the relevant one, the merger would seem less threatening to competition.

A final point perhaps worth emphasizing is industry trends. It matters more for competition where market shares are likely to be in the future than where they are today. And both firms’ market shares have been in steady, long-term decline over the last few decades (albeit with an occasional uptick every now and then). The popular cars of even the near-term future are likely to be those that are hybrid or that do not rely on gasoline at all. And in these markets, Ford and GM are not major players–both take a back seat to Toyota and Honda. That being the case, Ford and GM might argue from a dynamic perspective that a merger between them, while no doubt resulting in some consolidation in old technology markets, would nevertheless enhance rather than harm competition in hybrid and electric cars — the innovation markets of the future. Current market share data thus may not express accurately the true underlying competitive reality.

It should be noted that all of these arguments could also potentially be made in support of a more limited proposed joint venture between the two firms. And of course, depending on how the venture proposal is structured, additional arguments might also be available.

All of this analysis is really beginning to make me worry about the future utility of that old GM/Ford hypo. Who knows? Perhaps I had better switch to Coke and Pepsi!

Posted in antitrust, bankruptcy, business, contracts, corporate governance, corporate law, economics, federal trade commission, law school, markets, mergers & acquisitions, regulation | 2 Comments »

The Ivey Files: A New Admissions Blog

Posted by Keith Sharfman on September 18, 2006

My friend Anna Ivey (former Dean of Admissions at the University of Chicago Law School and author of The Ivey Guide to Law School Admissions: Straight Advice on Essays, Resumes, Interviews, and More (Harcourt, 2005)) has recently started a new blog devoted to the topic of university admissions with a particular focus on the fields of law and business.

Anna is one of the brightest minds in the admissions game, and this blog will likely be of great value both to students and administrators who are trying to stay ahead of the curve. Anna’s motto? “It’s your life. Choose wisely.”

Stay tuned for what is likely to be some great content from Anna in the weeks ahead.

Posted in blogging, law school, markets, universities | Comments Off

Gordon Tullock in the National Review

Posted by Josh Wright on September 18, 2006

John Miller has a fantastic essay on my colleague Gordon Tullock and his work in law and economics in the September 25 National Review. The following excerpt appears on the GMU Law website (and I believe subscribers can access the full article at the National Review):

“Tullock is the author of one of the most groundbreaking economics papers ever published: ‘The Welfare Costs of Tariffs, Monopolies, and Theft.’ It explained that when individuals or groups try to gain economic advantages through the manipulation of government policy — lobbying to build trade barriers or legal monopolies, for instance — the costs of their activities are both high and hidden. They not only discourage competition, but also drive talented people into non-productive activities, as skilled managers devote themselves to winning new favors from government or defending the ones they already have. Today, this behavior is called ‘rent-seeking,’ and it is of course deeply embedded in Washington’s political culture of earmarks and subsidies. In his paper, Tullock mischievously likened the whole enterprise to theft. ‘I try to raise eyebrows in everything I write,’ he says.”

“Tullock never married and he has no kids, so what he will leave behind is his work. There’s an awful lot of it, and it covers a vast range of subjects: income redistribution, political revolutions, and even biology (he once wrote a paper on a bird called the coal tit). The Liberty Fund recently put out The Selected Works of Gordon Tullock, a ten-volume set that spans more than 4,000 pages. ‘I can’t complain about my career being blighted,’ he says. ‘I’ve done very well.’ He’s also done a great deal of good, for which the world should be grateful, regardless of what they say in Stockholm.”

Posted in economics, law and economics, scholarship | Comments Off

Who Has the Moral High Ground Here?

Posted by Thom Lambert on September 16, 2006

Life in the inner city can be hard. Jobs are scarce, prices are high, and transportation is difficult, making it hard to travel significant distances to work or shop. So when major retailers announce plans to enter the inner city, hire lots of employees, turn their neighborhoods into shopping destinations (thereby encouraging the creation of more jobs and conveniences), and offer signficantly lower prices than are currently available, you’d think “moral” folks would be pretty happy.

I suppose morality is in the eye of the beholder.

The New York Times believes the moral thing to do is to impose such stringent wage regulations on these retailers — who already face higher costs (land prices, taxes, etc.) associated with doing business in the city — that they scrap their plans and head for the suburbs. Lamenting Mayor Daley’s recent veto of Chicago’s big box minimum wage ordinance, the Times contends that proponents of such ordinances “have the moral high ground.” Apparently, the Times would rather that nobody in the inner city get a Wal-Mart or Target job than that the folks who voluntarily take such jobs (presumably because they believe the jobs will make them better off) receive wages the Times, in its superior wisdom, has decided are too low.

Now, of course, the Times doesn’t want to admit that its insistence on above-market wages will drive big box (a.k.a. inexpensive) retailers from poor city neighborhoods to rich suburban ones, but the available evidence seems to the contrary.

Ignoring such evidence, the Times resorts to theories as to why local ordinances requiring above-market wages won’t drive retailers elsewhere or lead to higher prices. First, retailers won’t avoid high-cost markets because they “need market share.” Second, they won’t raise prices in high-cost markets because higher labor costs “could be absorbed by higher productivity or by a narrowing of profit margins.”

It would be a pretty dumb business move to pursue market share at the expense of profits. What these retailers want is to be as profitable as possible, not as big as possible. Thus, when they consider opening a store they ask: “Is our expected marginal (incremental) revenue from this expansion greater than our expected marginal cost?” If so, they’ll open the store; if not, they won’t. When laws requiring above-market wages cause marginal costs to rise, the likelihood that marginal revenue will exceed marginal cost diminishes — unless, of course, marginal revenue can be increased as well.

So how could these retailers increase marginal revenue? The Times hypothesizes that they might see marginal revenues rise because the expansion enhances productive efficiencies (e.g., permits the attainment of economies of scale, thereby lowering per-unit costs). Big box retailers, though, are already pretty huge. It’s unlikely that the productivity gains associated with opening a relatively small number of new stores in cities would offset the rather significant increase in labor costs at those stores. Thus, the most plausible means of increasing marginal revenue is by raising prices. That would hardly seem to benefit the poor for whom the Times expresses such concern.

Now, the Times also suggests that big box retailers could just “narrow[] … profit margins” in order to account for higher labor costs. That’s not a plausible option. Given the ease of entering retail markets and the intense competition among retailers, American retailers operate on extraordinarily narrow per store margins. A big box retailer could not cover the higher costs associated with a local wage law like the failed Chicago ordinance by shrinking margins at the affected stores — those profit margins simply aren’t big enough. Thus, retailers would have to subsidize stores in the affected markets, which would result in overall profit losses. They’re understandably unwilling to take such a tack.

The bottom line is, if laws like the failed Chicago ordinance are enacted, big, inexpensive retailers will take their businesses — and the employment opportunities and “everyday low prices” they offer — elsewhere. Of course, those of us who can afford to travel to the suburbs could still avail ourselves of these retailers’ price-savings. Just ask Alderman Joe Moore, the primary sponsor of the failed Chicago ordinance, whose own campaign purchased $30,589 worth of supplies at suburban Wal-Marts (presumably because the prices were lower than prices in Moore’s own city, which has no Wal-Mart stores). (See here.)

Wouldn’t the “moral” position be one that (1) respects people enough to let them decide for themselves which job opportunities are “good enough” for them, and (2) permits the sort of trade that would give everyone access to the low prices available to Alderman Moore?

Posted in business, economics, law and economics, markets, regulation | 8 Comments »

Happy Constitution Day!

Posted by Josh Wright on September 15, 2006

GMU will celebrate Constitution Day today with a debate between Professors Neomi Rao and Todd Zywicki (of VC fame). Here are the details:

Worth Wining About!  Should You Have a Constitutional Right to be Your Own Wine Importer?

A lively discussion of Granholm v. Heald.

Featuring Professors Neomi Rao and Todd Zywicki.
Moderated by Professor Ron Rotunda.
Friday, September 15
4:00 -5:00 p.m.
Room 121

For those who missed last year’s Constitution Day at GMU, a discussion between Professors Rotunda and Nelson Lund as to “whether it is constitutional for Congress to use its spending power to reach down into the curriculum and culture of every school in the country and dictate what shall be taught, celebrated, or memorialized — and when,” I leave you with my colleague Nelson Lund’s Green Bag essay on the topic, “Is Constitution Day Constitutional?”

Posted in announcements, constitutional law, musings | Comments Off

 
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